Emergence of the Americas in global affairs 1880–1929

Peter Clements
Emergence of the Americas in global affairs 1880–1929

Peter Clements
# Contents

Dedication 1

Introduction 2

1 What you will study 2
2 How you will be assessed 3
3 About this book 6

**CHAPTER 1** United States' expansionist foreign policies 9

1 US involvement in foreign affairs 9
2 Reasons for emerging imperialism 19
3 Growth of US imperial interests 24
Examination advice 30
Examination practice 32

**CHAPTER 2** The Spanish–American–Cuban War, 1898 33

1 Causes of the Spanish–American–Cuban War 33
2 Key debate: What reasons have been suggested by historians for the outbreak of the Spanish–American–Cuban War? 42
3 The course of the war 45
4 The annexation of the Philippines 49
5 Key debate: What reasons have historians offered for the annexation of the Philippines? 55
Examination advice 57
Examination practice 59

**CHAPTER 3** United States' foreign policies, 1901–17 60

1 The progressive era and progressive presidents 60
2 US relations with the Caribbean and Latin America under Roosevelt 61
3 US relations with the Great Powers and Asia 71
4 President Taft and dollar diplomacy 78
5 President Wilson and moral diplomacy 80
6 Key debate: What were the motives for US imperialism? 85
Examination advice 88
Examination practice 90

**CHAPTER 4** The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement 91

1 US neutrality, 1914–17 91
2 US entry into the war 99
3 Key debate: What reasons have been offered by historians for the entry of the USA into the First World War? 104
## Chapter 4: The USA during the First World War

1. Woodrow Wilson and the post-war peace settlement
2. Overview: the isolationist impulse
3. US influence in Latin America
4. International agreements
5. Key debate: How far do historians agree about the level of the USA’s involvement in foreign affairs in the 1920s?

### Examination advice
- 107
- 116
- 122
- 123
- 129
- 133
- 136
- 138

## Chapter 5: Canada and the First World War: participation and impact

1. Canada, Britain and the USA
2. The nature of Canada’s participation in the First World War
3. The post-war impact of the conflict
4. Key debate: How far do historians agree that involvement in the First World War saw the creation of a Canadian nationhood and identity?

### Examination advice
- 139
- 146
- 159
- 165
- 167
- 169

## Chapter 6: Latin America in the First World War: participation and impact

1. Latin America and the First World War
2. Argentina and the First World War
3. Brazil and the First World War
4. Mexico and the First World War
5. Key debate: How far are historians in agreement about the impact of the war on Latin American countries?

### Examination advice
- 170
- 174
- 179
- 185
- 189
- 192
- 195

### Timeline
- 196

### Glossary
- 198

### Further reading
- 205

### Internal assessment
- 208

### Index
- 209
Dedication

**Keith Randell (1943–2002)**

The original Access to History series was conceived and developed by Keith, who created a series to ‘cater for students as they are, not as we might wish them to be’. He leaves a living legacy of a series that for over twenty years has provided a trusted, stimulating and well-loved accompaniment to post-sixteen study. Our aim with these new editions for the IB is to continue to offer students the best possible support for their studies.
Introduction

This book has been written to support your study of HL option 3: Aspects of the history of the Americas: Emergence of the Americas in global affairs 1880–1929 of the IB History Diploma Route 2.

This introduction gives you an overview of:
- the content you will study for Emergence of the Americas in global affairs 1880–1929
- how you will be assessed for Paper 3
- the different features of this book and how these will aid your learning.

What you will study

This book focuses on how and why the region of the Americas became more globally engaged during the period 1880 to 1929. As American countries, in particular the USA, Canada and Mexico, began to modernize and industrialize, the production of more goods than could be consumed at home led to a growth in the number of exports. The USA went to war in 1898 against the Spanish empire and by the conclusion of the short, sharp conflict had to decide how far it was prepared to emulate the older European colonial powers. US foreign policy became more active, especially in the Caribbean and in Central America. The region as a whole had to come to terms with the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 and, unsurprisingly, there was a range of economic and political actions taken in response.

This book:
- begins by discussing why and how the USA moved to a more active role in foreign affairs; economic, social and political factors behind this shift are explored (Chapter 1)
- examines in detail the 1898 Spanish–American–Cuban War; whether or not growing US imperialism was an anomaly or not is also considered, especially in light of the US occupation of the Philippines (Chapter 2)
- traces US foreign policies from 1901 to 1917 – the policies of the progressive presidents, including the Roosevelt Corollary, dollar diplomacy and moral diplomacy are examined, as are the motives for US imperialism (Chapter 3)
- explains how the USA shifted from a policy of neutrality when the First World War erupted in 1914 to becoming an active belligerent in 1917; the economic repercussions of the war on the home front are investigated; also discussed are the post-war peace negotiations and the USA’s growing economic clout in the region (Chapter 4)
explores Canada’s participation in the First World War; additionally, the impact of the war on the development of a growing sense of Canadian nationhood and identity is evaluated (Chapter 5)

analyses the extent to which Latin America was involved in the First World War, particularly in terms of political developments and her economies (Chapter 6).

How you will be assessed

The IB History Diploma Higher Level has three papers in total: Papers 1 and 2 for Standard Level and a further Paper 3 for Higher Level. It also has an Internal Assessment that all students must do.

For Paper 1 you need to answer four source-based questions on a prescribed subject. This counts for 20 per cent of your overall marks.

For Paper 2 you need to answer two essay questions on two different topics. This counts for 25 per cent of your overall marks.

For Paper 3 you need to answer three essay questions on two or three sections. This counts for 35 per cent of your overall marks.

For the Internal Assessment you need to carry out a historical investigation. This counts for 20 per cent of your overall marks.

HL option 3: Aspects of the history of the Americas is assessed through Paper 3. You must study three sections out of a choice of twelve, one of which could be Emergence of the Americas in global affairs 1880–1929. These sections are assessed through Paper 3 of the IB History diploma, which has 24 essay questions – two for each of the twelve sections. In other words, there will be two specific questions that you can answer based on Emergence of the Americas in global affairs 1880–1929.

Examination questions

For Paper 3 you need to answer three of the 24 questions. You could either answer two on one of the sections you have studied and one on another section, or one from each of the three sections you have studied. So, assuming Emergence of the Americas in global affairs 1880–1929 is one of the sections you have studied, you may choose to answer one or two questions on it.

The questions are divided up into twelve sections and are usually arranged chronologically. In the case of the questions on Emergence of the Americas in global affairs 1880–1929, you should expect numbers 9 and 10 to be on this particular section. When the exam begins, you will have five minutes in which to read the questions. You are not allowed to use a pen or highlighter during the reading period. Scan the list of questions but focus on the ones relating to the sections you have studied.

Remember you are to write on the history of the Americas. If a question such as, ‘Discuss the impact of the First World War on one country in the region’ is
asked, do NOT write about the impact the war had on Germany or England. You will receive no credit for this answer. It is also important to keep in mind that you should be writing about countries in the Americas from 1880 to 1929. Be sure to stick to this time frame. If you write about the impact of the Great Depression, for example, your score will be seriously affected.

**Command terms**

When choosing the three questions, keep in mind that you must answer the question asked, not one you might have hoped for. A key to success is understanding the demands of the question. IB History diploma questions use key terms and phrases known as command terms. The more common command terms are listed in the table below, with a brief definition of each. More are listed in the appendix of the IB History Guide.

Examples of questions using some of the more common command terms and specific strategies to answer them are included at the end of Chapters 1 to 6.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command term</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Where exemplified in this book</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analyse</td>
<td>Investigate the various components of a given issue.</td>
<td>Pages 167–169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess</td>
<td>Very similar to evaluate. Raise the various sides to an argument but clearly state which are more important and why.</td>
<td>Pages 192–195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compare and contrast</td>
<td>Discuss both similarities and differences of two events, people, etc.</td>
<td>Pages 88–90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluate</td>
<td>Make a judgement while looking at two or more sides of an issue.</td>
<td>Pages 30–32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent</td>
<td>Discuss the various merits of a given argument or opinion.</td>
<td>Pages 136–138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why</td>
<td>Explain the reasons for something that took place. Provide several reasons.</td>
<td>Pages 57–59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Answering the questions**

You have 2 hours and 30 minutes to answer the three questions or 50 minutes on each. Try to budget your time wisely. In other words, do not spend 75 minutes on one answer. Before you begin each essay, take five to seven minutes to compose an outline of the major points you will raise in your essay. These you can check off as you write the essay itself. This is not a waste of time and will bring organization and coherency to what you write. Well-organized essays that include an introduction, several well-supported arguments and a concluding statement are much more likely to score highly than essays that jump from point to point without structure.

The three essays you write for Paper 3 will be read by a trained examiner who will check what you write against the IB mark scheme. This mark scheme offers guidance to the examiner but is not comprehensive. You may
well write an essay that includes analysis and evidence not included in the mark scheme and that is fine. It is also worth remembering that the examiner who marks your essay is looking to reward well-defended and argued positions, not to deduct marks for misinformation.

Each of your essays will be marked on a 0–20 scale, for a total of 60 points. The total score will be weighted as 35 per cent of your final IB History. Do bear in mind that you are not expected to score 60/60 to earn a 7; 37–39/60 will equal a 7. Another way of putting this is that if you write three essays that each score 13, you will receive a 7.

Writing essays
In order to attain the highest mark band (18–20), your essays should:

- be clearly focused
- address all implications of the question
- demonstrate extensive historical knowledge
- demonstrate knowledge of historical processes such as continuity and change
- integrate your analysis
- be well structured
- have well-developed synthesis.

Your essay should include an introduction in which you set out your main points. Do not waste time copying the question but define the key terms stated in the question. The best essays probe the demands of the question. In other words, there are often different ways of interpreting the question.

Next, you should write an in-depth analysis of your main points in several paragraphs. Here you will provide evidence that supports your argument. Each paragraph should focus on one of your main points and relate directly to the question. More sophisticated responses include counter-arguments.

Finally, you should end with a concluding statement.

In the 45 minutes (approximately) that you spend on one essay, you should be able to write three to six pages. While there is no set minimum, you do need explore the issues and provide sufficient evidence to support what you write.

At the end of Chapters 1 to 6, you will find IB-style questions with guidance on how best to answer them. Each question focuses on a different command term. It goes without saying that the more practice you have writing essays, the better your results.

The appearance of the examination paper

Cover
The cover of the examination paper states the date of the examination and the length of time you have to complete it: 2 hours 30 minutes. Please note that there are two routes in history. Make sure your paper says Route 2 on it.
Instructions are limited and simply state that you should not open it until told to do so and that three questions must be answered.

Questions
You will have five minutes in which to read through the questions. It is very important to choose the three questions you can answer most fully. It is quite possible that you answer two of the three questions on the Emergence of the Americas in global affairs 1880–1929, especially after mastering the material in this book. That is certainly permissible. After the five minutes’ reading time is over, you can take out your pen and mark up the exam booklet:

- Circle the three you have decided to answer.
- Identify the command terms and important points. For example, if a question asked, ‘With reference to two countries in the region, analyse the economic impact of the First World War’ underline ‘analyse’ and ‘economic impact’. This will help you to focus on the demands of the question.

For each essay take 5 to 7 minutes to write an outline and approximately 43 to 45 minutes to write the essay.

About this book

Coverage of the course content
This book addresses the key areas listed in the IB History Guide for Route 2: HL option 3: Aspects of the history of the Americas: Emergence of the Americas in global affairs 1880–1929. Each chapter starts with an introduction outlining the key questions it addresses. It is then divided into a series of sections and topics covering the course content.

Throughout the chapters you will find the following features to aid your study of the course content:

Key and leading questions
Each section heading in the chapter has a related key question, which gives a focus to your reading and understanding of the section. These are also listed in the chapter introduction. You should be able to answer the questions after completing the relevant section.

Topics within the sections have leading questions, which are designed to help you focus on the key points within a topic and give you more practice in answering questions.

Key terms
Key terms are the important terms you need to know to gain an understanding of the period. These are emboldened in the text the first time they appear in the book and are defined in the margin. They also appear in the glossary at the end of the book.
Sources
Throughout the book are several written and visual sources. Historical sources are important components in understanding more fully why specific decisions were taken or on what contemporary writers and politicians based their actions. The sources are accompanied by questions to help you dig deeper into the history of the global emergence of the Americas from 1880–1929.

Key debates
Historians often disagree on historical events and this historical debate is referred to as historiography. Knowledge of historiography is helpful in reaching the upper mark bands when you take your IB History examinations. You should not merely drop the names of historians in your essay. You need to understand the different points of view for a given historiographical debate. These you can bring up in your essay. There are a number of debates throughout the book to develop your understanding of historiography.

Theory of Knowledge (TOK) questions
Understanding that different historians see history differently is an important element in understanding the connection between the IB History Diploma and Theory of Knowledge. Alongside some of the debates is a Theory of Knowledge-style question that makes that link.

Summary diagrams
At the end of each section is a summary diagram that gives a visual summary of the content of the section. It is intended as an aid for revision.

Chapter summary
At the end of each chapter is a short summary of the content of that chapter. This is intended to help you revise and consolidate your knowledge and understanding of the content.

Examination guidance
At the end of Chapters 1 to 6 is:

● examination guidance on how to answer questions, accompanied by advice on what supporting evidence you might use, and sometimes sample answers designed to help you focus on specific details
● examination practice in the form of Paper 3-style questions.

End of the book
The book concludes with the following sections:

Timeline
This gives a timeline of the major events covered in the book, which is helpful for quick reference or as a revision tool.

Glossary
All key terms in the book are defined in the glossary.
Further reading
This contains a list of books and websites, which may help you with further independent research and presentations. It may also be helpful when further information is required for internal assessments and extended essays in history. You may wish to share the contents of this section with your school or local librarian.

Internal assessment
All IB History diploma students are required to write a historical investigation, which is internally assessed. The investigation is an opportunity for you to dig more deeply into a subject that interests you. This gives you a list of possible areas for research.
This chapter examines the reasons why the USA became more involved in foreign affairs and imperial expansion towards the end of the nineteenth century. It considers how far the USA had historically distanced itself from foreign involvements; what factors in 1880 were significant in the USA being ready for greater involvement in world affairs; and the reasons for this greater involvement. Finally, it considers specific examples of foreign involvement, notably in the Pacific and Latin America.

You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter:

- How far had the USA involved itself in foreign affairs during the early to mid-nineteenth century?
- What were the most significant reasons why the USA became an imperial power?
- How far did the USA develop imperial interests before 1898?

**US involvement in foreign affairs**

**Key question:** How far had the USA involved itself in foreign affairs during the early to mid-nineteenth century?

On 4 March 1885, the new president, Grover Cleveland, gave his inaugural address. What he had to say about foreign policy was so familiar to both himself and his audience that he spoke without notes. No-one was in any way surprised by his words, as he repeated the familiar themes of avoiding overseas conflict and ensuring European powers didn’t interfere in the Americas.

**SOURCE A**

An excerpt from the inaugural address of President Grover Cleveland, 4 March 1885 (found at www.infoplease.com/t(hist/state-of-the-union/97.html).

It is gratifying to announce that the relations of the United States with all foreign powers continue to be friendly. Our position after nearly a century of successful constitutional government, maintenance of good faith in all our engagements, the avoidance of complications with other nations, and our consistent and amicable attitude toward the strong and weak alike furnish proof of a political disposition which renders professions of good will unnecessary. There are no questions of difficulty pending with any foreign government...

Maintaining as I do the tenets of a line of precedents from Washington’s day which proscribe entangling alliances with foreign states, I do not favour a policy of acquisition of new and distant territories or the incorporation of remote interests with our own.
The late nineteenth-century president, Benjamin Harrison, called the USA ‘an apart nation’ while historian James Bryce in his 1888 book, The American Commonwealth, wrote, ‘happy America, stand[s] apart in a world of her own, unassailable by European powers, easily superior to the other republics on the continent, but with no present motive for aggression upon them’. It appears therefore from this evidence that the USA did not and had no need to concern itself with foreign commitments.

**Reasons why the USA was isolationist**

In the nineteenth century, the USA seemed detached from foreign entanglements. This policy is generally referred to as isolationism. Europe, the continent containing the other major powers such as Britain, France and Germany, was thousands of miles away. Some historians have argued that the USA felt superior to those countries that engaged in aggrandizement and empire building; indeed the very fact that the United States had been born out of rebellion against an imperial power, Britain, and had set up a republic unique among countries at that time precluded foreign entanglements.

The USA became populated by people often seeking to escape persecution and discrimination in their own lands, wanting to make a new start. In this scenario, as a new and growing republic, the USA did not want to get involved with old regimes, which may have practised the very policies it rejected. The USA was different to other countries and would be guided by different, more morally-based principles than the older European states.

Historian Ralph Emerson wrote in 1942, ‘With the exception of the brief period of imperialism at the time of the Spanish–American War, the American people have shown a deep repugnance to both the conquest of distant lands and the assumption of rule over alien peoples.’

It is the intention in the remainder of this chapter to investigate how far the USA was isolated during the nineteenth century, and the extent to which it was involved in foreign affairs and imperial expansion almost from its inception and at least since the end of the US Civil War in 1865.

**The USA in 1880**

By 1880, some developments suggested that the USA might be ready for imperial expansion:

- the conquest of internal frontiers
- the development of the economy
- foreign involvement.

**The American Civil War, 1861–65**

The American Civil War broke out when eleven Southern states broke away from the Union to form the Confederacy. The war stimulated industrialization in the Northern USA with mass production of uniforms and military supplies. The North also had twice the population of the South and commanded control of the seas. However, the war was a long, drawn-out affair, which saw 600,000 dead. Widespread support for the South in Britain strained relations with the Federal Government.
Chapter 1: United States’ expansionist foreign policies

The conquest of internal frontiers

The Founding Fathers had no doubt that the USA should expand to fill its continental frontiers. This was achieved within a century. Following their independence from Great Britain in 1783, Americans began to settle their new continent with amazing speed. In 1783 the USA consisted of 13 states on the eastern seaboard, comprising a land area of 360,000 square miles; by the mid-nineteenth century it had gained all the lands south of Canada and north of Mexico between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, with a land mass of almost 3 million square miles, in contrast, say, with 94,525 square miles of the United Kingdom. This was achieved largely through two means:

- Purchase from France, Mexico and Russia. In 1812, the Louisiana Purchase from France bought nearly a million square miles for $15 million and opened up the continent to westward expansion. The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo ended the war between the USA and Mexico in 1849, with the latter selling much of the south-western region to the USA, again for $15 million. In 1854, the Gadsden Purchase added 29,000 square miles for railroad development at a cost of $10 million. Alaska was bought from Russia in 1869 (see page 17).
- Warfare, notably against Mexico in the 1840s and different groups of Native North Americans throughout the century.

The vast US land mass was settled so quickly that in 1890 the Census declared there was no longer any undeveloped territory available for settlement.

In 1893, historian Frederick Jackson Turner, in his hugely influential thesis The Significance of the Frontier in American History (sometimes called Turner’s thesis), argued that the westward frontier was now closed; everywhere within the continental USA was now settled.
The development of the economy

The USA was a land rich in raw materials, and fertile for crops. In the years following the Civil War of 1861–65, it grew to become one of the wealthiest countries on Earth. By 1900, the USA had equalled Britain in coal production at 244 million tons of coal each year; in 1840 the figure had been 2.5 million tons and 8.4 million by 1850. The USA also produced vast amounts of food for export. Between 1865 and 1898, its corn production tripled and production of refined sugar grew five-fold. Exports generally quadrupled between 1865 and 1900, when they were worth $1.4 billion. In 1898, the USA manufactured 33 per cent more goods than Britain, compared to less than half that of Britain in 1865.

Extent of government involvement

The USA had an economic structure in which people were free to make money with very little government interference. Governments of the period followed strictly *laissez-faire* policies; presidents tended to be, if not exactly weak, then reluctant to become too assertive. President Benjamin Harrison (1889–93), for example, believed *Congress*, not the president, should assume responsibility for national issues.

Presidents and Congress both tended to believe the wealth of the USA was based largely on the ability of business interests to run their concerns free...
from government interference or constraint. The USA was a land of low taxes and minimal government activity. This undoubtedly stimulated business interests to take risks and invest in multifarious ventures in the absence of regulations to limit business practices.

**Development of industry**

In the years following the Civil War, the USA saw an **industrial revolution**. Huge industrial concerns grew up in the great cities; small-scale industry also thrived. This happened for a number of reasons:

- The USA was rich in natural resources such as coal, oil and precious metals that could be exploited to provide the materials to drive the development of industry after the Civil War.
- The Civil War had seen heavy government spending on weapons, transportation and machinery, which had triggered a massive growth in factories, railroads and other aspects of industrial infrastructure.
- The exploitation of natural resources became possible partly because of improved communications and the development of the railways.
  - By 1900, the USA had 193,000 miles of railroads; an eight-fold increase since the Civil War period. Railroads were built from natural resources such as coal, and were used to transport them.
  - Communications improved after the development of the telegraph by an American inventor, Samuel Morse, in the 1840s. By the 1860s, not only did telegraph lines span the USA, but they were also connected to Europe by an underwater cable. This vastly facilitated the possibilities of business between US and European entrepreneurs.
- The country was growing through westward expansion and massive immigration. Its population almost doubled to 76 million between 1870 and 1900; in Europe only Russia had more people. Between 1820 and 1869, 6 million immigrants arrived in the USA, mainly from Northern Europe and Ireland, and a further 20 million between 1870 and 1900, often from Eastern and Southern Europe. Many of them lived in towns and cities, working in the manufacturing industries. By 1896, more Americans lived in urban areas than the countryside. Urban populations were both consumers and producers; they stimulated the massive demand for manufactured goods which they helped produce.
- High **tariffs** kept out foreign goods. The USA hardly needed to export during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Population growth within the USA more than maintained sufficient demand for what was produced. However, from 1880 entrepreneurs felt there was a capacity to produce more, and were increasingly looking for foreign markets to stimulate even greater profits. Indeed, governments during this period did little to promote exports and there was no significant demand for the reduction of tariffs. Furthermore, US business interests stifled **reciprocity agreements** with Canada in 1865 and Mexico in 1883; these same interests blocked
the proposed annexation of Hawaii in 1893 (see pages 25–26) because of the fear of competition from Hawaiian sugar-refining businesses.

- There was a dynamism within the age that encouraged risk and adventure. Inventors such as Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell worked respectively on electric light and telephones, which revolutionized daily life; entrepreneurs such as the Rockefellers and Henry Ford developed the oil and motor-car industries.

The two industries that saw the greatest development were those of iron and steel, and oil.

**Iron and steel**

Iron production rose from 920,000 tons in 1860 to 10.3 million tons by 1900, twice that of the USA’s nearest rival, Germany. The city of Pittsburgh in Pennsylvania became the centre of the iron industry. It was highly centralized, with 38 iron and steel plants along 42 kilometres of navigable waterways. Annual US steel production grew from 380,000 tons in 1875 to 60 million by 1920; annual growth rates from 1870 to 1913 were 7 per cent in the USA compared with 6 per cent in Germany, and 1 per cent in Britain.

**Oil**

Modern oil production began in January 1901 with the success of the Lucas Well in Spindletop, Texas. This well produced 70,000 to 110,000 barrels per day for nine days before being capped. Further ‘gushers’ were discovered throughout the southwest; by 1907, the comparatively small state of Oklahoma was the leading oil producer, and by 1913 was producing 25 per cent of the nation’s oil. By 1919 the USA produced two-thirds of the entire world’s oil at 577 million barrels per year.

**Foreign involvement**

It is simply not true to suggest that the USA pursued a policy of isolationism in the nineteenth century. In the early and middle part of the century, it had a series of clashes with Britain, formulated the Monroe Doctrine (see page 15), developed interests in the Far East and purchased Alaska. However, it had little appetite for colonization in these years, whereas in the later part of the century there were significant changes in world affairs which meant that the USA became more imperialistic in outlook (see Section 2, page 19).

**Britain**

Britain and the USA had an often fractured relationship during the nineteenth century.

As early as 1812, the USA went to war with Britain in protest at the trade restrictions the latter imposed as a result of the Napoleonic Wars. In the 1840s there were disputes about the location of the borders between Oregon and Canada, which was a British colony.

During and after the Civil War period (1861–65), the Federal Government was incensed by the perceived British support for the Confederacy. In particular Britain was blamed for supplying the South with cruisers which...
sank 100,000 tons of Northern shipping. Only in 1871 was this dispute resolved, by the Treaty of Washington, in which Britain agreed to pay compensation – a figure of $15.5 million was agreed on in 1872.

The Monroe Doctrine
In 1823, largely in the face of Latin American countries fighting for their independence from Spain, the USA declared the Monroe Doctrine to warn European countries against involvement in the Americas.

SOURCE C

An extract from the Monroe Doctrine, elucidated by President James Monroe in his seventh annual State of the Union message to Congress, 1823 (found at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/monroe.asp).

It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those new Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in hope that other powers will pursue the same course.

While this declaration went unnoticed at the time, it was applied against French involvement in Mexico in the 1860s. Here, France had taken advantage of the USA’s preoccupation with the Civil War to establish a puppet emperor, Maximilian, supported by French troops. In 1866, Secretary of State William H. Seward demanded that the French withdraw, and the USA moved 50,000 troops to the borders. The French acceded to Seward’s demands and left Maximilian to his fate – eventual defeat and execution.

However, according to some historians, the Doctrine was mainly a bluff and Latin Americans did not expect the US to come to their aid. The USA did not prevent Britain from acquiring the colonies of British Guiana and Honduras in 1831 and 1862 respectively, and the Spanish maintained their colony of Cuba until the end of the century (see Chapter 3). Nevertheless, as we have seen in the case of Mexico above, the USA did involve itself in issues when it felt its own interests were threatened.

The Far East
The USA recognized the potential of trade with the Far East.

China and Japan
To promote trade with China and Japan the following treaties were made:

● In 1844, the USA made the Treaty of Wanghia with China, giving favourable trade agreements and the opportunity to send missionaries to the Chinese to persuade them to adopt Christianity.
Similarly, in 1858, a commercial treaty was agreed with Japan in which US advisers taught the Japanese how to modernize their industries. Japan was generally treated with more respect than China because of its enthusiasm to embrace industrialization and, by the 1890s, the USA saw it as a rival.

In 1868, the Burlingame Treaty endorsed the free movement of people and free trade between the USA and China, in part to stimulate Chinese immigration for work on railroad building in the US. This was negated by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 when legislators feared Chinese immigration was too great.

The new imperialism

The new imperialism of the later nineteenth century meant that European powers were expanding their empires. There had been a ‘scramble for Africa’ which saw most of that continent colonized either by Britain, France or Germany by the end of the century, and Britain, Germany and Japan were increasingly involved in the Pacific and the Far East. With Africa largely colonized by the latter decades of the nineteenth century, many Americans increasingly felt that the USA could not afford to miss out on imperial expansion in the Far East.

Every European country except Britain had introduced tariffs to restrict their imports; this meant the USA would have to expand its trade elsewhere.

Following Japan’s success in the First Sino-Japanese War, its aggression stimulated the scramble for ports and economic concessions in China. The poor performance of China indicated its weakness to other powers, which they were keen to exploit, demanding trading rights and the right to settle areas on the Chinese mainland.

Inevitably, this interest in the Far East would lead to the desire for coaling stations and strategic islands in the Pacific, such as Hawaii, Midway Island, Guam, Wake Island and Samoa, in order to have stopping off points for naval and merchant vessels, and ports, which could be fortified in case of attack.

Hawaii

The USA discouraged the British from trying to make the Hawaiian islands protectorates in the 1840s by asserting that the USA had major interests there. The first calls for the annexation of Hawaii came in the 1850s. As we shall see, descendants of American settlers and missionaries began to dominate the sugar industry and Hawaii was annexed by the USA in 1898.

Midway Island, Guam, Wake Island and Samoa

In 1867, the USA acquired the uninhabited Midway Island in the West Pacific, originally to obtain supplies of guano to use in the manufacture of fertilizer and gunpowder. Guam was ceded to the USA by Spain after the Spanish–American–Cuban war of 1898 (see Chapter 2). In the following year, Wake Island, nearly 6000 miles from San Francisco (the nearest US city) was acquired as a telegraph cable station. In the same year, after civil war there, the eastern islands of Samoa were also annexed (see pages 24–25).
None of these possessions were primarily seen as colonies, but instead merely coaling stations, naval bases and communication centres. In refuting the normal economic reasons for colonial development, such as supplying raw materials and acquiring new markets for manufactured goods, historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote in 1999, ‘The notion that poverty-stricken Samoans had the money to buy American wheat and flour, even if it were part of their diet, is absurd.’

**Source D**

*Map of US possessions by 1900.*

**Alaska**

In 1867 the USA purchased Alaska from Russia for $7.2 million – mainly to remove Russia’s presence from the American continent. Many people couldn’t understand the motives for or the benefit of the purchase at the time – it was referred to dismissively as ‘Seward’s icebox’ and ‘Seward’s folly’. However, Secretary of State William H. Seward had a prior motive; he felt the development of Alaskan harbours might provide a gateway to northern Asia where US merchant ships could fuel and make provision for the long voyage across the Pacific Ocean.

**Opposition to colonialism**

There was comparatively little support for colonization as such. Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney asserted in 1857 that the Constitution gave no authority for the US to colonize. When the Caribbean state of the Dominican Republic actually offered itself up for colonization by the USA in 1869, Congress refused. Similarly, an attempt by the Federal Government to annex the

**KEY TERM**

**Colonies**

People or territories ruled by a separate country or power.
Dominican Republic in 1870 stimulated a ‘Great Debate’ on imperial expansion, with proponents arguing that the USA could exploit the wealth and resources of the Dominican Republic and sell its goods to a ready market there. However, the Senate rejected the treaty, arguing a racist line that the USA would not deal with ‘savages’. There was a fear that people regarded as inferior might one day have to be admitted into the Union or that former colonies might become states, thus diluting the Anglo-Saxon basis of the United States. As we will see, racist arguments loomed large in the debate about the pros and cons of colonialism.

**KEY TERM**

**Senate** Upper house of the US Congress with two senators from each state.

**Colonialism** The expansion of an empire by acquiring, ruling and exploiting countries or people.

**SUMMARY DIAGRAM**

US involvement in foreign affairs
Chapter 1: United States’ expansionist foreign policies

By the 1880s, attitudes towards imperialism were changing in the USA. While it may be contentious to suggest that the USA shifted to actively becoming an imperial power, it did acquire overseas territories and both co-operated and contended with the European Imperial powers. In the final decades of the nineteenth century there were significant changes in world affairs which meant that the USA simply could not afford not to get involved.

In Section 3 (pp. 24–29) we will look at how far the US had started to become an imperial power in the latter two decades of the nineteenth century, whereas in this section we will examine the reasons for this change, including:

- the end of westward expansion
- industrial development
- naval expansion and sea power
- Manifest Destiny
- missionary work
- preclusive imperialism.

The end of westward expansion

Some historians have argued that western expansion was a form of colonialism in that immigrants moved into underpopulated land, exploited its wealth and settled it, in much the same way that they may have done outside the American continent. President George Washington (1789–97) had spoken of the USA as a potential empire by expanding westwards. In this sense one could argue that the first empire the USA built was that of its own continent; when this had been achieved it could turn its attention to foreign adventures.

In his 1893 treatise on the significance of the frontier (see page 11), historian Frederick Jackson Turner argued that it (i.e. the frontier) was, quite simply, the main reason why Americans had developed to be so self-sufficient, energetic and egalitarian in outlook. It followed then that if there was no longer a frontier to exploit, they might lose these characteristics. If the internal frontier no longer existed, external ones did – in the form of partially and undeveloped countries – that could be exploited by the USA, and it was incumbent on Americans to settle them anew. Turner wrote, ‘The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlements westward explain American development.’ Turner’s thesis has been hugely influential in analyses of reasons for US expansion.
Industrial development

Before the 1880s, American business found enough demand within western expansion; after this was complete it turned its attention to foreign markets.

**SOURCE E**

An excerpt from a speech made in 1898 by Albert J. Beveridge, a statesman and soon-to-be Senator from Indiana who promoted imperialism (found at http://historyunfolding.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/evolution-of-american-foreign-policy.html).

American factories are making more than the American people can use; American soil is producing more than they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall be ours. And we will get it as our mother [England] has told us how. We will establish trading-posts throughout the world as distributing-points for American products. We will cover the ocean with our merchant marine. We will build a navy to the measure of our greatness. Great colonies governing themselves, flying our flag and trading with us, will grow about our posts of trade. Our institutions will follow our flag on the wings of our commerce. And American law, American order, American civilization, and the American flag will plant themselves on shores hitherto bloody and benighted, but by those agencies of God henceforth to be made beautiful and bright.

Already by the 1880s, the value of US exports was increasing, from $450 million in 1870 to over $1 billion by the 1890s. Much of this increase was in industrial products. By the end of the century, US steel could easily compete with that of Britain, and was indeed gaining contracts from both within Britain and the British empire. For example, one US firm gained contracts to produce structural steel for the construction of bridges in the British colony of Uganda.

**Tariffs**

Some historians have also pointed to fear and uncertainty as an economic reason for colonization. The USA faced surpluses in farm produce from the post-Civil War period as westward development led to increases in production; it needed foreign markets to absorb this increase. In 1893, a depression hit the US economy, making the search for foreign markets more urgent. This prompted the Federal Government to reduce tariffs and encourage US firms to exploit foreign markets. In the early 1890s reciprocity agreements were negotiated with various Latin American countries (see page 27). In particular, following westward expansion, Americans came to appreciate the potential of their Pacific coastline as a springboard for the development of trade with the Far East.

This does not mean, however, that the USA changed its policy from one of protection to ‘freer’ trade; the agreements made annoyed both protectionists who felt they went too far in reducing tariffs, and those who felt they didn’t go far enough in promoting free trade between nations.

**KEY TERM**

**Depression** Downturn in the economy leading to firms closing down and unemployment.

**Protectionists** Those who supported import and export duties to protect domestic industries from foreign competition.
Naval expansion and sea power

This growth of trade required military protection from army and naval forces. With geographical protection from invasion and only Native North Americans to fight however, the US army was limited to 25,000 by the 1880s.

The USA had waged a series of minor naval wars such as a campaign against Barbary pirates, from 1801–06, and, during the Revolutionary Wars, had even attacked the British port of Whitehaven in 1778. However, 90 years later, the navy was only twelfth in size in the world and was smaller than that of Sweden’s maritime force.

As early as 1882 the Secretary of the Navy, William H. Hunt, was advocating naval expansion after a review he commissioned found that, of 140 ships on the naval list, only 42 were operational, and the navy was still mainly comprised of wooden sailing vessels as opposed to more modern steamships. Of only seventeen steamships, fourteen dated from the Civil War period. In 1890 one of Hunt’s successors, Benjamin Tracy, challenged Congress to finance the building of two ocean fleets of 20 battleships and 60 cruisers by 1900. Although at the time it did not happen, this cannot negate the fact that the notion was in the public domain and the seeds for expansion had been planted. However, in the 1890s, it was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan who gave the impetus to naval expansion.

Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan

Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote two hugely influential books, The Impact of Sea Power Upon History in 1890 and The Influence of Sea Power Upon The French Revolution and Empire two years later. Mahan argued that history proved that nations with powerful navies and overseas bases to maintain them would grow in strength. Ironically, Mahan, a member of the naval staff, hated to go to sea himself because he suffered from chronic seasickness.

In the 1890s, Mahan had the support of influential figures such as the rising politicians Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, who made sure his ideas gained a wide audience in government circles. His ideas involved:

- building a modern steam fleet
- building coaling stations and bases in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean
- cutting a canal across Latin America in order to facilitate communication and trade.

As we will see in Chapter 3, all these ideas would be actualized within a decade, beginning with an 1893 Act to build three steel warships. In terms of numbers of ships, the US navy rose from twelfth to fifth largest in the world. The growth of the navy was increasingly seen as vital to the USA becoming a major world power with the ability to defend its overseas possessions and protect its trading interests.
In 1893, Mahan was given his final command, the USS Chicago, which sailed to Europe where he was treated as a hero in both Britain and Germany. Mahan believed military success depended on attack; one fleet had to ensure it was superior to its enemy before it engaged it in battle and destroyed it. He saw Germany as the main potential enemy; it was ironic therefore that Germany was the country most influenced at the time by his work, and used his ideas uncritically as a blueprint for the development of its navy and naval strategies.

**Manifest Destiny and imperial expansion**

**Manifest Destiny** was a vital concept in the development of the USA. First cited by journalist John L. Sullivan in 1846, it referred to the superiority of the Americans – initially to their right to settle and dominate their continent, to exploit its resources, to civilize and develop its potential, and show the world that Americans were indeed God’s chosen people – and then to move out to conquer new lands. When the continental land mass was settled it was a short step to apply the principles of Manifest Destiny to development of lands elsewhere.

There was an increasingly held view that the USA was destined to expand into foreign fields after it had developed within the North American continent. In particular, proponents of this view in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries supported current theories of evolution and Social Darwinism.

**Social Darwinism**

**Social Darwinism** was an idea named after Charles Darwin (1809–82), the British scientist who had proposed the *theory of evolution*. Darwin had showed that successful life forms adapt and develop according to needs and circumstances, but only the fittest survive; those who cannot adapt themselves, for whatever reason, eventually die out or become prey for those which can. Some theorists, for example Herbert Spencer, applied these ideas to human development and they are largely associated with the idea of Social Darwinism. This suggested that as the Anglo-Saxon races were superior to all others, they were destined both to rule and help other inferior races rise up as high as they could, while recognizing they could never aspire to the achievements of those of Anglo-Saxon descent. It was the application of survival of the fittest to human history through the evidence of economic and social inequality. In any event, imperialist expansion appeared to be justified by notions of racial superiority and the right of the most advanced groups to both dominate and elevate those lower down the chain.

Social Darwinism became hugely prevalent throughout Europe and the USA. In the latter the idea of Social Darwinism became allied to an idea that the USA was morally superior to all other countries; that the Founding Fathers had enacted a system which was above all other diplomatic and moral standards. Historian Paul Varg wrote that, ‘Americans prided themselves on being the model republican society that the rest of the world would emulate.’
Many politicians and other thinkers including religious groups maintained that not only did Americans have this obligation to raise up ‘inferior peoples’ but, if they faced resistance, they were also justified in using more force than they would have in dealing with people who were ‘civilized’.

**Source F**


[Americans are] … a race of unequalled energy, with all the majesty of numbers and the might of wealth behind it – the reputation, let us hope, of the largest liberty, the purest Christianity, the highest civilization – having developed peculiarly aggressive traits calculated to impress its institutions upon mankind, will spread itself across the earth … If I read not amiss, this powerful race will move down upon Mexico, down upon Central and South America, out upon the islands of the sea, over upon Africa and beyond. And can anyone doubt that the result of this competition of races will be the ‘survival of the fittest’?

---

**Missionary work**

As early as 1810, organizations were founded to support missionary work among non-Christian people. In particular, within the USA there was a belief that this meant spreading Protestant as opposed to Roman Catholic theology. The impetus to do missionary work was tied to the belief that White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) were superior peoples who had a duty to help members of ‘lesser races’ improve their lives by following their example. As with European imperialism, missionaries were often followed by colonists, for example in the case of Hawaii (see page 25). President McKinley argued that the Christianizing impulse was his main motivation behind the annexation of the Philippines in 1899 (see pages 50–53).

**Preclusive imperialism**

Historian William Langer used the phrase ‘preclusive imperialism’ to describe a process by which countries took colonies to prevent others from doing so – there was a particular fear of German expansion as the Kaiser looked to develop a German empire, for example, in Samoa.

Allied to this in the USA was the desire to emulate European powers in colonization. The view that countries such as Britain had grown rich through colonization, particularly in more recent years through the exploitation of the resources of Africa and the Far East, prompted the US Government to join in the race for colonies while there were some areas left to exploit. For example, leading Republican James Blaine saw that, while the opportunities for economic exploitation might become limited in Asia and Africa, the USA should take advantage of its pre-eminent position in Latin America. Here, according to Blaine, Europeans could be excluded from further aggrandizement by the effective application of the Monroe Doctrine.
While historians often see 1898 and the advent of the Spanish–American–Cuban War as a watershed in US imperial expansion, US influence was growing particularly in the Pacific region and its geographical neighbours in Latin America before this date. In this section we will examine US involvement in these regions.

**US involvement in the Pacific**

**Samoa**

The acquisition of the eastern islands of Samoa in the Pacific Ocean act as an example of preclusive imperialism in practice.

**Foreign interests in Samoa**

In 1872, the King of Samoa offered the USA the use of a naval base at Pago Pago on the eastern island of Tutuila in return for US protection from other imperial powers and rebellions at home. While this was initially refused, in 1878 the USA did sign a treaty to mediate Samoan disputes in return for the use of the harbour. The main US interest in Samoa was this port, though Britain and Germany had extensive commercial interests; the German Trading and Plantation Company had helped turn Samoa into the most...
important trading post in the Pacific. With domestic politics volatile, and different factions ever likely to begin war against each other, the consuls of the three powers jointly advised the Samoan king.

**Foreign intervention**
In the event, it was the German military which intervened in the First Samoan Civil War, fought between 1886 and 1894, and a German force which attacked a Samoan rebel-held village in March 1887, destroying American-owned property. As a result, three US warships confronted three German vessels in Apia harbour. Only the onset of a typhoon, which then destroyed all six ships, prevented hostilities. As Samoa descended into a second civil war in 1898, further confrontations were threatened as Britain and the USA supported different sides to the Germans; the former favoured Prince Tanu who had been declared king by Britain and the USA in 1898, while Germany favoured the more popular Mata’afa Iosefo. Because of the ongoing civil strife, the three powers abolished the Samoan monarchy in June 1899. The USA and Germany agreed to partition the islands by the Tripartite Convention, signed by these two nations and Britain in 1899. The formal treaty was signed in Washington DC in November 1899; no Samoans had been consulted. The eastern part of Samoa including Pago Pago became a US protectorate while the western part became a German colony (Britain relinquished any rights in Samoa, having made a deal with Germany about interests elsewhere). While the colony mainly remained a US naval station, it was renamed American Samoa in 1911.

**Hawaii**
The annexation of Hawaii in 1898 shows how several of the reasons for imperial expansion outlined on pages 19–23 came into play with the acquisition of colonies.

**US interests in Hawaii**
Hawaii was an important stopping station on the way to China and Japan. Both its political system and economy were dominated by sugar growers, often the descendants of US missionaries who had taken advantage of the extensive sale of land to foreign purchasers after 1850 when private ownership had been offered for the first time. Since 1875, the USA had imported Hawaiian sugar free of duty in return for the Hawaiian Government refusing concessions (for example, in the importation of manufactured goods) to other countries. This meant that Hawaii was effectively reliant on the USA economically. Additionally, the sugar growers were able to control the Hawaiian Government through domination of the parliament, ensuring that its policies favoured them out of all proportion to their numbers. There were 3000 American growers out of 90,000 Hawaiians living on Hawaii at the time.

**US annexation**
In 1887, the USA established its major Pacific naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. However, after 1890, problems developed. The 1890 McKinley Tariff
removed duties on raw sugar from any source so the Hawaiian growers lost their trading advantage and began to suffer as a result of competition into US markets, particularly from Cuba (see page 36). The next year the Hawaiian king died; his successor Queen Liliuokalani was far more of a nationalist and tried to remove the growers’ undue influence from parliament. The planters overthrew her and asked the USA for annexation. They had been supported by US marines from a ship in harbour summoned by the American Ambassador, John L. Stevens, on his own initiative. The outgoing Republican President Benjamin Harrison was sympathetic to the request for annexation. However, his successor, the Democrat Grover Cleveland, disapproved particularly of the unauthorized deployment of US marines to remove the Queen. His Secretary of State, Walter Q. Gresham, asserted that he would not ‘steal territory or annex a people without their consent’. Cleveland authorized an investigation into the Queen’s overthrow headed by Congressman James Henderson Blount; in July this reported that ‘United States diplomatic and military representatives had abused their authority’.

Cleveland could not restore the Queen to power though and reluctantly recognized a republic under the lawyer Sanford Dole; the ensuing years saw further instability and rebellions while the question of annexation dragged on until President McKinley restored the Republicans to the White House in 1896. Hawaii was finally annexed in 1898 during the Spanish–American–Cuban War (see Chapter 2).

Study Source G and read the caption carefully. What point is the cartoonist making?

**SOURCE G**

Latin America

The USA looked to extend its influence in Latin America in terms of political influence and developing trade links. While there was no intention of annexing regions, nevertheless, US business interests and those who favoured US expansion sought to exploit their southern neighbours and in doing so raise their standards of living and quality of life.

The USA had been quick to realize it had interests in the development of its southern neighbours, hence the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 and the attempts to apply it, as in the case of French involvement in Mexico (see page 15). In 1889, the first Pan-American Conference was held in the US capital, Washington DC, to discuss how to improve political and economic relations in the western hemisphere.

First Pan-American Conference

President Garfield’s Secretary of State, James Blaine, first proposed a Pan-American Conference in 1881. He believed that the USA should act both as a leader across the continent to prevent future wars and conflicts, and that all countries would benefit from greater trade links. While this proposed conference came to nothing after President Garfield was assassinated and Blaine found himself out of office, it was resurrected when he became Secretary of State a second time during the presidency of Benjamin Harrison.

Delegates from eighteen countries met in Washington in October 1889 with the twin goals of a customs union offering free trade across the continent and a system for international arbitration to avoid future wars. However, many Latin American delegates mistrusted the motives of the USA. The proposed customs union seemed contradictory when Congress was at that time preparing the McKinley Tariff, which raised import duties to the highest level in US history. In particular, delegates from Argentina felt that the USA would use arbitration procedures to dominate the continent.

Delegates eventually settled for reciprocity agreements and a weak arbitration system which was signed by less than half of them and gave signatories an opt-out clause if they felt arbitration would threaten their right to independent action. However, they did agree to setting up an International Bureau of American Republics, also known as the Pan-American Union, to organize future conferences. The precedent had been set for some degree of co-operation even if little was achieved by this.

However the USA did pose as the benevolent neutral in attempting to settle disputes and protect its neighbours from European aggression. The difficulties of this position had already been shown in 1881 when Blaine had tried to negotiate a peace in the war being fought between Chile, Bolivia and Peru. Chile, however, had occupied the Peruvian capital Lima and rejected his overtures.

Chile, 1891

Many Chileans felt hostility towards the USA, partly because of Blaine’s attempted intercessions in its war with Bolivia and Chile, and because the

**Why did the USA involve itself in Latin America?**

Pan-American Relating to all the countries on the American continent.

Western hemisphere The continents of North and South America.

Arbitration The process by which parties submit their dispute to an impartial body in order to arrive at a decision.

Benevolent neutral A country that tries to arbitrate between disputing nations without taking sides.
USA had refused to sell weapons to the new revolutionary government which had recently come to power. In October 1891, US sailors on shore leave from the USS *Baltimore* were attacked by a mob, leaving two killed. President Harrison demanded compensation and threatened war when the Chilean authorities were slow to respond. Although Chile eventually capitulated to these demands, the incident only served to reinforce those in Latin America who felt wary of US intentions and were anxious to reduce their influence rather than offer opportunities for it to be enhanced.

**Venezuela, 1895**

In 1895 Venezuela and Britain were in dispute over the former’s border with the British colony of Guiana. US President Grover Cleveland sent an ultimatum to Britain that it must seek arbitration and leave Venezuelan territory. Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, rejected this ultimatum, saying the Monroe Doctrine had no status in international law and that effectively the dispute was nothing to do with the USA. Congress appropriated $100,000 to finance a Boundary Commission to investigate the disputed border but there was talk of war with Britain among some of the more aggressive voices in the USA, and Canada, still tied to the British empire, felt particularly vulnerable to US attack. The USA threatened to send 54 vessels of its growing navy to the disputed area. It was this which may have been instrumental in persuading Britain to back down and agree to the arbitration, which worked in Venezuela’s favour.

If Chile is an example of where US interests were distrusted, the events in Venezuela are illustrative of the Monroe Doctrine being applied to discourage European powers from flexing their muscles in Latin America. One might say that the USA was prepared to defend Latin America against European involvement but saw its own relationships with its southern neighbours in a rather different light.

**Growth in foreign involvement**

In the previous section, a list of reasons for growing US involvement in foreign affairs and imperial expansion was offered. We can see now how these came into play in the examples of Samoa and Hawaii. The idea of Manifest Destiny and Social Darwinism underpinned them; the first US settlers in Hawaii were missionaries tasked with turning the natives into Christians. Politicians such as James Blaine and religious leaders like Josiah Strong spoke of how those in less developed countries could only benefit from their contact with Americans, God’s chosen people. Similarly, the need for new frontiers led Americans into the Pacific region and Far East. The desire for favourable trading conditions and a quest for new markets similarly led them across the world, and the navy was developed to protect this trade. Sometimes preclusive imperialism featured, as in Samoa, where the USA feared German interests, and in Latin America where the Monroe Doctrine had warned Europeans off as early as 1823.

In the next chapter we will consider the impact of the Spanish–American–Cuban War, which is often seen as the prime catalyst for imperial expansion.
and the determination of the USA to be seen as a major world power. However, we can see that the seeds had already been sown and the USA was already involved both in imperialism and world affairs. In a sense the Spanish–American–Cuban War acted as a confirmation of its role, rather than a trigger.

**Chapter summary**

**United States’ expansionist foreign policies**

While many historians have seen the USA as isolationist, concentrating on its own expansion and development within its boundaries in the nineteenth century, it had in fact been involved in foreign affairs since its inception. For example, it went to war with Britain in 1812 and Mexico in 1846.

In 1823 the Monroe Doctrine warned European powers away from involvement in the Americas and was applied against the French in Mexico in 1866. Many in the USA felt the USA was morally superior to other countries and should not have colonies; however, this attitude tended to change towards the end of the century. This was for the following reasons:

- the end of westward expansion
- industrial development and the desire to trade
- naval expansion and sea power
- Manifest Destiny and Social Darwinism
- preclusive imperialism.

The USA became involved with other countries as a result of these factors. Hawaii was annexed in 1898, and movements were made to improve links with Latin America. The USA had disputes with Chile in 1891 and supported Venezuela in its border dispute over British Guiana, when the USA sent an ultimatum to Britain to agree to arbitration.

As the USA grew in wealth and influence, it was perhaps inevitable that it would become more expansionist and involve itself more in foreign and imperial affairs.
Examination advice

How to answer ‘evaluate’ questions

For questions that contain the command term ‘evaluate’, you are asked to make judgements. You should judge the available evidence and identify and discuss the most convincing elements of the argument, in addition to explaining the limitations of other elements.

Example

Evaluate the importance of economic factors in the USA’s increased global engagement after 1880.

1. For this question you should aim to make judgements about the relative importance of economic factors for the USA as it became more globally connected and involved after 1880. You will also need to consider political and intellectual factors that may have also contributed to this trend.

2. Before writing the answer you should produce an outline – allow around five minutes. An example is given below:

**Economic factors:**
- Development of the economy.
- Growing exports.
- Impact of 1893 Depression.
- 1898: manufactured 33 per cent more goods than Britain.
- Higher growth rates than European countries.
- Rich in natural resources. Exploitable after defeating Native Americans.
- Could produce much more than consumed in USA.
- Asian markets required coaling stations across Pacific.
- Exports would translate into increased wealth.
- Open Door policy, 1899.

**Political factors:**
- Government usually hands off. Laissez-faire approach to business.
- Competition with European countries, especially after Scramble for Africa.
- Preclusive imperialism (William Langer).

**Ideological/intellectual factors:**
- Impact of Social Darwinism.
- Impact of Captain Alfred T. Mahan.
- Turner thesis.
- To advance Christianity and American values.
3. In your introduction, you need to state your thesis. It could be that economic factors were at the heart of the USA's increased global involvement. Alternatively, your thesis might be that it was a combination of different factors that was behind the USA's increased activity on the world stage. Remember, there is no one correct answer. Your use of supporting evidence to defend what you write is key here, as is writing a well-structured essay. In your introduction, do not waste time by restating the question. Just be sure to number your answer correctly. An example of a good introductory paragraph for this question is given below.

By the 1880s, the United States had, for all intents and purposes, tamed the American West, the last undeveloped area of the country. Because of its great abundance of natural resources and increasing industrial output, the USA was producing more than it could consume at home. In order to keep its prosperity increasing, the USA looked abroad for new markets with which to trade. However, it was for more than solely economic reasons the country became more involved overseas. Other strong powers, particularly ones in Europe and Japan in Asia, were exerting their will abroad. Some felt they had every right to establish colonies because they were racially superior to others. Other motivations included the desire to spread Christianity and to compete with other imperialist powers through strategic colonization. In the case of the USA, it was a combination of factors that led to its entrance on the global stage, but at the foundation of all these political and ideological factors was the desire to expand the economic power of the country.

4. In the body of your essay, devote at least one paragraph to each of the topics you raised in your introduction. This is your opportunity to support your thesis with appropriate evidence. Be sure to explicitly state how your supporting evidence ties into the question asked. If there is any counter-evidence, explain how and why it is of less importance than what you have chosen to focus on. An example of such a paragraph might be:

The USA, with its abundance of natural resources and growing industries, had an ever-growing need for trade abroad. Its factories were producing more goods than could be sold at home. However, it was not necessarily an easy path to sell its products globally because European empires had begun erecting trade barriers. The USA began to seek new markets in China and Latin America. In the case of the
former, the Secretary of State John Hay issued a series of notes in 1899, which requested that European nations and Japan guarantee the territorial integrity of China and that all nations would be allowed to trade with it. Hay was trying to make sure that the USA would not be prevented from trading with what was hoped to be a lucrative market. Much closer to home, the USA signed a number of reciprocal trade agreements with some Latin American countries. The USA hoped to challenge the large lead European nations such as Britain and France had in exports to Latin America. Again, the USA sought to penetrate and expand in markets in order to sell its products. The politicians and businessmen knew that continued American prosperity depended on these markets. In 1893, a depression in the US brought this point home further. Decreased sales at home meant that new markets were needed or else factories would close and unemployment increase.

5. A well-constructed essay will end with a conclusion. Here you will tie together your essay by stating your conclusions. These concluding statements should support your thesis. Remember, do not bring any new ideas up here.
6. Now try writing a complete essay to the question, following the advice above.

Examination practice

Below are two exam-style questions for you to practise on this topic.

1. Why did the USA become increasingly involved in the Pacific and Asia in the final decades of the 1800s?
   (For guidance on how to answer ‘why’ questions, see pages 57–59.)

2. Assess the importance of ideology in the US’ global expansion.
   (For guidance on how to answer ‘assess’ questions, see pages 192–195.)
This chapter examines the causes, events and effects of the Spanish–American–Cuban War. It considers how far the war signified a major turning point in USA foreign policy, then goes on to consider the causes of the conflict. It will be shown that the war took place on two sides of the world, and the reasons for the extension of the conflict into the Pacific will be analysed. Finally, the reasons for the annexation of the Philippines will be discussed.

As you work through this chapter you should bear the following key questions in mind:

- Why did the USA go to war with Spain in 1898?
- What reasons have been suggested by historians for the outbreak of the Spanish–American–Cuban War?
- How effectively did the USA conduct the war?
- Why did the USA colonize the Philippines?
- What reasons have historians offered for the annexation of the Philippines?

## Causes of the Spanish–American–Cuban War

### Key question: Why did the USA go to war with Spain in 1898?

Many historians agree that the real impetus to the drive of the USA towards global influence and empire was the Spanish–American War of 1898. It exemplified the contradiction many have observed between the widespread US belief in self-determination, that peoples should rule themselves, and the concept of Manifest Destiny, the idea that the US should export their ideal system of government and society for the benefit of humanity (see page 22).

On a more prosaic level, the war saw the USA acquire one of its few major colonies – not in Latin America or the Caribbean, but in the Philippines on the other side of the world. The war was significant in bringing about what Senator Henry Cabot Lodge called ‘the large policy’ of expansion. Indeed, it is a misnomer to call the conflict the Spanish–American–Cuban War, let alone its former nomenclature of the Spanish–American War. As we shall see, it was really two wars on opposite sides of the globe, one between Spain, the USA and Cuba and the second between Spain, the USA and the

### KEY TERM

**Self-determination** The belief that peoples should be free to govern themselves and choose their own form of government.

**Large policy** Name given to the policy promoted by expansionists who advocated that the USA break with any tradition of non-intervention in foreign affairs and take its place among the Great Powers, e.g. Britain and Germany.
Philippines, wars that resulted in hundreds of thousands dead. This section will examine the causes of these conflicts, focusing on the crucial catalyst of the rebellion of Cubans against their Spanish colonial masters and the reaction of the USA to this.

**US–Cuban–Spanish relations**

**Relations between Spain and Cuba**

Cuba had been a Spanish colony since 1511 and by the nineteenth century was the largest producer of sugar in the world. This prosperity was based in part on slavery and many sugar plantation owners supported Spanish rule because it would perpetuate slavery. They feared independence would see its abolition. Nevertheless, there were rebellions against Spanish government throughout the nineteenth century, beginning with the short-lived declaration of independence of 1809 when leaders such as Joaquín Infante took advantage of the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy during the Napoleonic Wars. Most of the plantation owners were of Spanish origin and controlled the infrastructure of the colony; many of those supporting independence were of mixed race and felt excluded from the power structures. However, it was in 1868 that the Ten Years War, the most serious drive for Cuban independence, began. This exhausted both rebels and imperialist masters and led in 1878 to a fragile peace. José Martí, later called ‘the apostle of Cuban independence’, wrote his first attacks on Spanish rule while still a teenager during this war and was temporarily deported to Spain in 1871. He spent the next twenty years moving around Latin America, always joining groups and writing tracts to promote Cuban independence before settling in 1892 in the USA.

**The 1895 rebellion**

In 1895 a major rebellion against Spanish rule was launched by José Martí, who had founded the Cuban Revolutionary Party in 1892. Martí and his supporters used scorched earth tactics, and practised intense cruelty towards Spanish troops and anyone suspected of collaborating, in the hope that independence could be achieved by the efforts of the Cubans themselves, before the USA got involved.

The rebellion was brutally suppressed by the Spanish general Valeriano Weyler who was nicknamed ‘Butcher’. Scores of thousands of Cubans found themselves in prison camps where conditions were inhuman. As many as 100,000 Cubans may have died in these camps, chiefly from disease. Spanish repression was harsh enough to alienate both the Cuban population and the majority of foreign observers, including in the USA, but not harsh enough to suppress the rebellion. The popular press in the USA latched onto this, with crusading articles attacking Spanish brutalities and calling for intervention. William Randolph Hearst’s *New York Journal* vilified Weyler as ‘the exterminator of men’ in February 1896, adding, ‘There is nothing to prevent his [Weyler’s] carnal animal brain from running riot with itself in inventing tortures and infamies of bloody debauchery.’

---

**KEY TERM**

**Scorched earth** A military strategy to destroy everything when forces retreat/withdraw, so the opposing army finds a wasteland lacking in food and shelter, and impossible to exploit.
In the meantime diplomatic moves were being made in the background. Spain agreed to grant some degree of autonomy or self-government to Cuba and Puerto Rico, to take effect from 1 January 1898, and Weyler was recalled to Spain. It appeared that those who advocated intervention had lost the initiative. However, despite the apparent concessions by Spain, by the end of April 1898 the USA and Spain were at war.

**US–Cuban relations**

The USA had long shown an interest in Cuba, because it lay only 90 miles off the coast of the US state of Florida. Indeed, it had offered to buy the island from Spain on no less than three occasions, 1848, 1854 and 1859. The leader of the Cuban rebellion in 1868, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, had no illusions concerning US motives. He believed it sought to take over Cuba and told his supporters in no uncertain terms to find more disinterested friends.

**SOURCE A**

Map of Cuba and the USA.

*What does Source A suggest about the proximity of the USA to Cuba?*

**Economic interests**

The US saw the island as a potential prime source of goods such as sugar and tobacco, and a strategic naval base from which it could control the sea-lanes of the Caribbean. Although there was conflict between the business concerns who wanted to keep Cuban goods out of the USA – particularly, cheap sugar...
– and those who had interests in Cuba who wanted to see them enter, Cuba was increasingly falling under US economic influence.

- In 1850, Cubans exports to Spain valued 7 million pesetas and to the USA 28 million.
- In 1890, Cuba’s exports to Spain had risen to 21 million pesetas, but 40 million to the USA.
- In 1890 Cuba’s imports from Spain were worth 7 million pesetas compared to 61 million from the USA.

The 1890 McKinley Tariff had eliminated duties on Cuban sugar and American interests had largely gained control of the sugar industry there. It was clear that Cuba was becoming economically dependent not on Spain, her colonial master, but on the USA, her geographical neighbour.

By 1895 the USA was the largest market for Cuban exports, and Cuba was the third largest supplier of foreign goods into the USA after Britain and Germany; the total value of USA–Cuban trade exceeded $100 million. This was despite the fact Grover Cleveland’s administration imposed a prohibitive tariff on sugar exports of 40 per cent in 1894, which resulted in a decline of Cuban sugar exports to the USA from 800,000 tons in 1895 to 225,231 in 1896.

Nevertheless, the US had invested as much as $50 million into the Cuban economy and naturally wanted this investment protected – rebellions threatened US-owned interests and property in Cuba.

**USA involvement in Cuban independence**

The USA did not approve of Spain maintaining any vestiges of empire in the Americas, but had done little officially to help the Cubans break away from Spanish rule, despite the general feeling that the Spanish were inefficient, corrupt and fairly brutal rulers.

Individual Americans had often helped Cuban rebels, for example in gun running. Often Americans found themselves in Spanish-run jails as a result.

There was, however, some fear within the USA of a successful Cuban rebellion; the only previously successful example of a revolt in the Caribbean, that of Haiti against its French masters in the late eighteenth century, had seen sickening slaughter and anarchic conditions; with the prevalent racist view that non-white peoples were incapable of governing themselves. Many feared the same would happen in Cuba, to the obvious detriment of US interests.

**Reasons for war**

In 1898 the US intervened in the Cuban rebellion by declaring war on Spain, the trigger being the explosion of the USS Maine in Havana harbour in February of that year. The US intervention was mainly a result of the moral crusade in the US press rather than economic factors. Most businessmen had no interests in Cuba; they were reluctant for the USA to become involved because they feared a detrimental impact on the economy. However, those who did have business interests in Cuba were keen for intervention.
Chapter 2: The Spanish–American–Cuban War, 1898

Propaganda and the Yellow Press

Although José Martí was opposed to US military involvement because, like Céspedes in 1868, he feared the USA sought to annex Cuba, this view was not shared by other colleagues. Gonzalo de Quesada, the self-styled ‘Cuban Revolutionary Charge d’Affaires’, actively campaigned for US intervention and like-minded Cuban exiles sold war bonds and launched campaigns to promote ‘Cuba Libre’ to good effect.

The rebels produced sophisticated propaganda; the Cuban revolutionary group based in New York in particular had influential contacts in the ‘Yellow Press’.

The Yellow Press

The Spanish–American–Cuban War has often been called the first media war. Many Americans were literate and there was a great demand for newspapers. New Yorkers regularly bought the fifteen newspapers published in that city alone. Readers of the popular press were particularly interested in lurid stories and scandals. The so-called Yellow Press met their demand, and there was fierce competition between newspapers to outdo each other in the sensationalism of their journalism.

In particular, the newspapers owned by bitter rivals William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer outdid each other by printing stories about lurid atrocities by the Spanish, for example, the ill-treatment of female prisoners and starving children. Allegedly, when in January 1897 the illustrator Frederic Remington was sent by Hearst to find evidence of atrocities, and not finding any asked to come home, Hearst cabled back, ‘You furnish the pictures and I’ll furnish the war.’ He meant by this that if Remington could find visual evidence of Spanish atrocities, Hearst’s writers would conduct a narrative around them that would lead the readers of his newspapers to demand war.

Typically correspondents sent atrocity stories that were printed without checking. Whether they were true or not didn’t matter; the public lapped them up and called for US intervention.

Yellow Press stories

Richard Harding Davis wrote one of the most notorious stories of three young women being strip-searched by male Spanish officials on a US ship, the Olivette, while waiting to sail. Remington drew lurid pictures to accompany the story. Here the shock was two-fold; the ill-treatment of women and the insult to the American authorities by Spanish officials misusing their power on an American ship. Moreover, when it subsequently emerged that the officials were in fact female, the public didn’t care, and many other Cuban women subsequently testified that they had in fact been strip-searched by men.

Equally famous was the story of a seventeen-year-old political prisoner who had been saved from rape at the hands of the Spanish military governor by other inmates. A New York Journal reporter, Karl Decker, subsequently helped her escape from prison to great acclaim.

KEY TERM

War bonds Loans to pay for the war, to be redeemed after victory.
‘Cuba Libre’ ‘Free Cuba’, the slogan of those seeking Cuban independence.
‘Yellow Press’ Term given to sensationalist journalism in the 1890s. It became known as the Yellow Press after a cartoon character called the Yellow Kid, from Pulitzer’s New York World (who later appeared in Hearst’s New York Journal).
However, the Yellow Press did not necessarily drive influential opinion. Historian George C. Herring suggests that the Yellow Press was actually manipulated by politicians to justify a war they had already decided on. The Yellow Press moreover wasn’t the only factor that drove public opinion. Journalists in areas where the ‘Yellow Press’ did not circulate, for example, in parts of the Midwest, still advocated war against the Spanish.

**Business**

Although most businessmen in the US did not want to intervene in Cuba, those with interests there called for intervention both to protect their concerns and to have preferential access to US markets at the end of the conflict (this access would, it was hoped, result from the closer relationship between the USA and Cuba that would arise from such intervention). While Spain had in the past compensated US business interests for any damage to their assets as a result of conflict, the intensity of the 1895 rebellion persuaded many that US intervention was necessary. This was exacerbated by the ‘scorched earth’ tactics of the rebels who ensured that, if the Spanish did advance, it would be into a wasteland. Inevitably, as part of this process, the rebels attacked US-owned sugar cane fields and mills.

**The insult to President McKinley**

On 9 February 1898, Hearst’s New York Journal had printed a letter from the Spanish Ambassador, Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, to José Canalejas, his friend in Cuba, which had found its way into the newspaper’s hands by dubious means. The letter ridiculed President McKinley as a small-time politician out of his depth in the international arena: ‘It shows once more that McKinley is weak and catering to the rabble.’

Here Spanish apologies and the resignation of the Ambassador meant nothing. The damage was done and the fire was lit. With considerable exaggeration but shared indignation, one journalist called this, ‘the worst insult to the US in its history’.

**The Maine**

The catalyst for intervention was the explosion of the USS Maine in Havana harbour on 15 February 1898, killing 266 of its crew. The US naval vessel had been sent to Havana eleven days after the Cuban autonomous government took power (see page 35). This was ostensibly to defend US nationals after rioting had broken out by Spanish soldiers allegedly offended by Yellow journalism. Although President McKinley had only given the authorities eighteen hours’ notice of the arrival of the USS Maine, evidence suggests that the officers at least were welcomed in Havana, attending balls and bullfights.
The USS Maine is destroyed by an explosion in Havana Harbour, Cuba, 15 February 1898. Contemporary lithograph by Kurz & Allison.

Entry into war

While it has subsequently been hypothesized that the explosion was the result of a terrible accident resulting from the proximity of the coal bunker to the powder magazine, at the time there was little doubt in the USA who was to blame. The Spanish were held responsible, possibly, it was widely alleged, using a mine to explode the ship. Hearst meanwhile published diagrams and plans of a secret torpedo, which he asserted had been used. Despite Spanish denials of responsibility and herculean efforts to help the survivors, the demand for war and retribution was immense within the USA. The Yellow Press maintained its offensive. ‘Remember the Maine, to hell with Spain’ became the popular slogan.

President’s McKinley’s reactions

McKinley’s motives are much debated by historians. It used to be thought he was reluctant to declare war and only did so because, if he hadn’t, the Senate would have pre-empted him. More recently, however, others such as Walter LaFeber have argued he was more devious, recognizing the advantages of making war against a weak foe where victory was more or less assured, but
was reluctant to seem the aggressor (see page 44). McKinley, moreover, was worried about how the Republicans might perform in the mid-term Congressional elections of 1898; an easy victory in war wouldn’t go amiss in gaining votes. He was also a very shrewd political operator, expert in what his Secretary of War, Elihu Root, described as ‘a way of handling men so they thought his ideas were their own’. In other words, he appeared to reluctantly allow himself to be persuaded on an issue he was already, in fact, firmly decided upon.

This is not to suggest, however, that he was a warmonger. McKinley himself was of an age to remember the slaughter of the Civil War, in which he had participated with some distinction, and was reluctant to engage lightly in hostilities. Like most of his nineteenth-century predecessors as president, he had no agenda for foreign affairs. His main electoral aim had been to facilitate recovery from the 1893 economic depression (see page 20). However, there seemed an impasse in the conflict. The rebels were fighting a guerrilla campaign that the Spaniards could not successfully address. Spain itself grew more intransigent. It had suffered decades of political instability and the new regime was insecure. Powerful interests such as the military supported the maintenance of the Spanish empire and would not accept Cuban independence. One Prime Minister, Cánovas del Castillo, had recently been assassinated; the new Government did not think it could withdraw from Cuba without a violent revolution and possibly the overthrow of the monarchy within Spain. Nonetheless, after the Maine incident, which shocked the Spanish authorities, they may have offered terms to avoid US intervention; by this time, however, hoping for such intervention, the rebels grew more confident and demanded full independence. It may well be that, by offering to negotiate, the Spanish were simply employing delaying tactics.

The declaration of war
With Congress itself becoming more determined on war, Vice President Garret Augustus Hobart warned McKinley that the Senate might declare war without his approval, as the Constitution allowed. After alleged sleepless nights and agonising over the issue, McKinley asked for Congressional approval to deploy force. Even though, in response, Spain appeared to give in and announce the cessation of hostilities, the die seemed cast. On 20 April, a joint resolution from Congress authorized the use of US forces to drive the Spanish from Cuba if Spain would not withdraw.

This resolution was accompanied unopposed by the Teller Amendment, which asserted that the USA had no intention of annexing any Cuban territory; the implication was that the fight was solely in support of Cuban independence and the USA had no ulterior motives in expelling Spain from Cuba. The Teller Amendment in fact had originated among a coalition of:

**KEY TERM**

**Guerrilla** Fighter using techniques such as ambush, avoiding large-scale confrontations.

**Teller Amendment**
Amendment to the April 1898 resolution from Congress threatening war with Spain if it did not withdraw from Cuba. Introduced by Henry Teller, Democrat Senator for Colorado, it asserted that the USA would not annex Cuba but would leave Cubans to decide their own future.
Conservatives who opposed the annexation of any territories containing non-white people and Catholics
US sugar producers who feared the influx of cheap Cuban sugar if Cuba was annexed.

Spain, meanwhile, looked to other European leaders for support. This was almost forthcoming from the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, who saw the conflict as a plot by the US to extend its influence in the world. However, his was a voice in the wilderness; European leaders urged caution, which meant, of course, that Spain was on its own.

On 24 April 1898, the USA declared war on Spain.

SOURCE C
A cartoon from the German satirical journal, Kladderadatsch, from April 1898 showing Uncle Sam, the symbol of the USA and Don Quijote, a symbolic hero of Spain, fighting over Cuba.

How useful is Source C in illustrating the issues over which the Spanish–American–Cuban War was fought?
Most historians agree that the 1898 declaration of war on Spain marked a significant shift in US foreign policy. Some have argued that the USA took this as a cue to copy the imperialist policies of rival European powers, while others feel American imperialism took a distinctive form. This theme will be explored further in the next chapter. It is the intention in this section rather to consider why the shift, if such it was, took place, and why the US went to war with Spain.

### US perspectives

Throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, different US historians have emphasized different reasons for why the US went to war with Spain and have debated McKinley’s role in this.

### Key debate

**Key question:** What reasons have been suggested by historians for the outbreak of the Spanish–American–Cuban War?

Most historians agree that the 1898 declaration of war on Spain marked a significant shift in US foreign policy. Some have argued that the USA took this as a cue to copy the imperialist policies of rival European powers, while others feel American imperialism took a distinctive form. This theme will be explored further in the next chapter. It is the intention in this section rather to consider why the shift, if such it was, took place, and why the US went to war with Spain.
Reasons for war

There has been significant debate over the reasons for US intervention in Cuba and the onset of the Spanish–American–Cuban War.

José Martí opposed US military intervention in Cuba because he feared the USA sought annexation. He took note of what Secretary of State James Blaine said in the 1880s: ‘if ever ceasing to be Spanish, Cuba must necessarily become American and not fall under any other European domination’. Blaine connected Hawaii with Cuba; he saw control of the former as key to control of the Pacific and the latter as key to control of the Caribbean. When the movement to annex Hawaii failed in 1893 (see pages 25–26), Martí was under no illusions that this signified the end of the USA’s colonial ambitions. He believed the USA had imposed the 40 per cent duty on imported Cuban sugar in part as a bid to persuade wealthy Cuban planters that annexation would be to their advantage and to win their support for this. Martí said, ‘Once the United States is in Cuba, who will get her out?’ and ‘to change masters is not to be free’.

Writing in the 1950s, historian Carl Degler argued that there were economic reasons, particularly following the 1893 depression, with entrepreneurs seeing the need to expand into foreign markets, and genuine concerns about Spanish atrocities in Cuba. Others, for example, Harold Evans writing in the 1990s, have emphasized the desire to see Spain withdraw from the Caribbean, along with the moral reasons. Most historians mention the impact of Yellow journalism and the impact it had on its readership, although as George C. Herring, writing in 2008, reminds us it did not reach a national audience and many provincial newspapers were equally supportive of war.

Historian H.W. Brands, writing in the 1990s, argued that the USA had no real need to get involved in the Cuban rebellion; its significance was that it showed that the USA would use its power for reasons other than its immediate security. In this sense it was the USA’s first war of the twentieth century, marking a difference from those of earlier periods, which happened because the USA felt threatened. The war signified the intention of the USA to join the ranks of Great Powers; this is particularly true of the extension of the conflict to the Philippines and its subsequent colonization (see pages 49–54).

Writing in 2010, Joyce P. Kaufman was more inclined to look to commercial interests to explain intervention. She argued that McKinley was elected with a pledge to protect American business following the 1893 depression. With so much US capital invested in Cuban sugar, it was incumbent on the USA to prevent instability in Cuba. Kaufman then ties this to the pressure McKinley faced from expansionists who felt the USA needed to assert its power globally, and the ‘war fever’ occasioned by Spanish atrocities and the sinking of the Maine, to effectively leave the president little choice but to declare war.

In the late 1990s, the feminist historian Kristin L. Hoganson offered a gendered perspective in which she argued that many men felt threatened both by the fact
their ‘manliness’ was softened by civilization, and the onset of more assertive women, fighting for the vote, for example. With the closing of the frontiers (see page 11) they sought new outlets for their manliness – in this case war. Hoganson goes on to show how Cuba was depicted in the press as an imperilled maiden and Spain as a ruthless villain so men could experience a chivalric impulse for war, like medieval knights. She argues that ‘politically powerful men drew on their understandings of appropriate male conduct when deciding how the nation should act’. Other historians have subsequently developed this theme, particularly in how far an easy war acted as a spur to restore masculine pride.

Many US historians tend to agree, however, that Cubans could not have won their independence without US help. Not so say those who examine the war from a Cuban perspective. The most influential of these historians has probably been Louis Pérez Jr. who argued that the USA intervened in Cuba because it wanted control over it and feared this would be difficult if Cuba won its independence from Spain by its own efforts. In this context, the sinking of the Maine was seen as a pretext for war. While on the surface McKinley’s government seemed to be responding to popular feeling within the USA, in reality it drove it because it wanted war.

**McKinley’s role**

McKinley’s role in the outbreak of war remains controversial. While traditionally many have depicted him as going reluctantly to war, having wrestled with his conscience and been persuaded that Congress would pre-empt him, more recent analysis has suggested he was a leading player. In 1993 Walter LaFeber argued that McKinley had had his sights on Cuba for some time. He realized the USA could defeat Spain militarily quite easily and Cuba was increasingly fertile ground for profitable US investment and advantageous trade agreements. Herring, as we have seen, felt McKinley was expert in appearing to follow when he was in fact leading. Within this scenario he wanted to seem to give Spain time to respond to his overtures while not wishing to see the rebels win without US support. If Cuba won its independence from Spain through US support, the USA would be well placed to dominate the Cuban economy after the conflict was over. If Cubans won independence by their own efforts, the USA may not be so influential in Cuba. McKinley therefore chose war because it was in the interests of the USA, thus disagreeing in part with the analysis propounded by Brands above.

Historians and other commentators tend to argue within the context of their own period and from their own varied perspectives. Martí could predict what might happen if the USA became involved in the fight for Cuban independence because he was aware of US imperial interests and had evidence of what US leaders had said and done elsewhere. Hoganson offers a perspective that emphasizes gender issues, while Louis Pérez Jr. is more interested in showing the imperial ambitions of the USA. Degler and Kaufmann are more concerned with economic reasons to explain US involvement, while LaFeber and Brands write about the decision-making...
processes, showing how McKinley was able to skilfully drive political opinion, leading while pretending to follow. It is through considering and weighing up all these differing perspectives that the historian can come to his or her own rounded judgement to explain what went on.

**Reasons for Spain’s continued involvement in Cuba**

Laura Rodríguez, writing in 1998, offered a Spanish perspective. She argued that the Spanish Government and people were united in their determination to keep Cuba as a Spanish colony; indeed, they saw it more as part of Spain itself. Of its population of 1.5 million, 200,000 had been born in Spain and a further 800,000 were, at least in part, of Spanish descent. The culture of Cuba was Spanish; officers from the Maine had been watching bullfights before their ship exploded. Spain would not give Cuba up as a matter of honour. It knew it could not defeat the USA, but had to fight because to relinquish Cuba would have been to risk a military coup d’état at home. The Liberal Prime Minister, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta, wrote, ‘We went to war because we had no choice. We were faced with a terrible dilemma … war with all its consequences or dishonor, and dishonor would have meant the end of everything and all of us.’ In his undated Library of Congress website essay *The Spanish-American War of 1898: A Spanish View*, Jaime de Ojeda tended to agree that the premier had no choice but to fight, to forestall a military revolt within Spain. He adds, too, that the Spanish press had whipped up anti-American feeling in the same way that the Yellow Press had attacked Spain, without in any way reflecting on the military imbalance between the two countries.

**The course of the war**

**Key question:** How effectively did the USA conduct the war?

The war was fought in Spanish colonies in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean. This was, as we shall see, to have effects of far greater significance than the war itself.

**The Pacific**

The Spanish–American–Cuban War could also be termed the Spanish–American–Filipino War, because it was a world war in that it straddled two areas of the globe (see map on page 47).

**The Philippines**

Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, had told Commodore George Dewey, Commander of the US Asiatic fleet, to attack the Spanish fleet in the Philippines in the event of war. Dewey went further.
He had already made contact with Emilio Aguinaldo, exiled leader of the Filipino independence movement. Although he did not take Aguinaldo when the US fleet sailed to Manila harbour, Aguinaldo and his supporters weren’t far behind. On the morning of 30 April 1898, Dewey’s four cruisers and two gunboats sank all ten Spanish ships without a single US casualty. Dewey now asked McKinley for troops to invade Manila. Eleven thousand arrived and they and Aguinaldo’s forces, swelled by supporters on the islands, captured Manila on 13 August; in fact, by the time this happened, the entire war had actually been over for six hours (see page 48).

The Philippines and Spain

Spanish explorers had built their first settlement in the Philippines in 1565 and colonized the islands, with Manila, the capital, founded on the island of Luzon in 1571. Until the nineteenth century, the islands were never profitable. They survived on Spanish subsidies, and the Royal Philippines Company, which controlled the economy, was abolished in 1834 because of corruption and incompetence. Thereafter under direct government control the administration improved until the Philippines was felt to be a model of colonial rule. The economy boomed due to increased demand for agricultural products such as abaca, woven into hemp or pulped to make paper products, indigo for dye, and oil from coconuts. The Government improved the infrastructure through, for example, the building of railways, and encouraged education. However, partly as a result of increased expectations, a nationalist movement developed which broke out in open rebellion against Spanish rule in 1895. In December 1897 a ceasefire was agreed by which Spain would grant autonomy within three years if the revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo would go into exile. Some of his supporters distrusted this agreement, however, and continued to fight.

Guam

In July, US naval forces seized the Mariana island of Guam, a strategic point between the Philippines and Hawaii. The Spanish garrison, which hadn’t been told of the declaration of war, surrendered without a fight, apologizing that they had no ammunition to respond to what they believed was a US salvo of salute.

The Caribbean

The USA invaded Spanish possessions in the Caribbean region and although the Spanish often fought bravely it was largely a one-sided contest. US troops were often helped by those seeking independence, for example, Cuban militias.

Cuba

During May, a US expeditionary force mustered at Tampa in Florida in the USA in order to be transported to Cuba later that month. Regular soldiers were augmented by irregular militias such as the Rough Riders – recruited and financed by Theodore Roosevelt who had relinquished his government post to participate in this war action. For many, particularly regulars, equipment was deficient and organization dire. Roosevelt himself said, ‘No words can describe … the confusion and lack of system and the general mismanagement of affairs here.’ Despite the shortcomings, US forces won a series of stunning victories. On 29 May, much of the Spanish fleet was destroyed; the remainder holed out in shallow water until 30 May when they were bombarded by US forces and finally sank.
up in Santiago Harbour, which the US fleet under Rear Admiral William Sampson blockaded. Commodore Winfield Scott Schley meanwhile blockaded the southern approaches. Meanwhile, in June, 17,000 US troops led by General William Shafter landed at Daiquiri, east of Santiago. They were supported by Cuban General Calixto García with 5000 fighters. On 1 July they captured San Juan Hill, from which forces could bombard the port and the fleet anchored there.

When Admiral Cervera attempted to break the blockade by moving the remainder of his fleet out of the harbour on 3 July, it was destroyed within four hours; this time one US sailor also lost his life. US and Cuban forces besieged Santiago until on 17 July, as Calixto García’s rebel troops approached the city, it surrendered.

In the action on Cuba, 379 US soldiers were killed and over 5000 succumbed to yellow fever. This in turn led army doctors to identify the mosquito which caused the disease and led to its eventual eradication in Cuba.

SOURCE D

Map showing the Spanish–American–Cuban War.

Puerto Rico

The USA had taken comparatively little interest in the Caribbean island of Puerto Rico, a Spanish colony since 1493. It was poor with over 80 per cent illiteracy rates, and its agricultural economy was hampered by poor communications and primitive equipment. As in Cuba, there had been sporadic rebellions and in
November 1898 a Charter of Autonomy had been granted offering some degree of independence. The US Naval College, however, in planning war with Spain, had envisaged operations in Puerto Rican waters. When war came this expanded into a full-scale invasion of over 3000 troops led by General Nelson A. Miles. Despite some occasional fierce opposition from the Spanish authorities, the Americans were generally welcomed by the locals; one soldier said the biggest problem was finding enough US flags and another called it a ‘picnic’.

**Peace-making**

On 12 August, the Spanish agreed to leave Cuba with no agreement as to its future status, and also gave up control of Guam and Puerto Rico. The future of these islands and the Philippines was to be settled at a peace conference in Paris to be held from September to the following February. Interestingly, no Filipinos were invited to the peace conference; they were not to be consulted about their destiny. Spain was to call the war ‘The Disaster’, and never regained its former position in the world. This contrasted with the USA where John Hay, then US Ambassador to Britain, echoed the feelings of many when he termed it ‘a splendid little war’. Its impact was to unite the USA under a renewed confidence and confirm its status as a world power.

No Cubans meanwhile were invited to the peace conference either, and the future of Cuba was deferred because the Teller Amendment had precluded US annexation. Many Cuban rebels did not trust the USA and when the peace conference failed to secure Cuban independence, but allowed for its temporary occupation by the USA after Spanish forces left, their fears seemed justified. The post-war history of Cuba will be considered in the next chapter (pages 61–65) but suffice to say that, even with a limited franchise, Cuba’s first elections in June 1900 saw the Cuban National Party, which supported independence, win the most votes. Continued US involvement in Cuban affairs was therefore regarded with considerable anger.

---

**SUMMARY DIAGRAM**

The course of the war

- **The Spanish–American–Cuban War**
  - Fought in Caribbean
  - Cuba
  - Puerto Rico

- **The Spanish–American–Filipino War**
  - Fought in the Pacific
  - Pacific Islands, e.g. Guam, Philippines
4 The annexation of the Philippines

Key question: Why did the USA colonize the Philippines?

The annexation of the Philippines was a type of colonization unique in US history. It was never repeated. In this section we investigate why the Philippines, islands many thousands of miles from the USA, were colonized and how successful that colonization was. The English poet Rudyard Kipling had no doubts where the responsibilities of the USA lay. His poem ‘The White Man’s Burden’, with a subtitle, ‘The United States and the Philippine Islands’, was published in McClure’s magazine, a popular publication during the early 1900s in the USA (see Source E).

SOURCE E


Take up the White Man’s burden –
The savage wars of peace –
Fill full the mouth of Famine
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
The end for others sought,
Watch sloth and heathen Folly
Bring all your hope to nought.

The Paris Peace Conference and Filipino independence

The Paris Peace Conference took place between September 1898 and February 1899. Spain relinquished control over its possessions in the Caribbean such as Cuba and Puerto Rico, and Guam and the Philippines in the Pacific, in return for $20 million. After extensive negotiations, the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico were ceded to the USA, although the Teller Amendment (see pages 40–41) precluded annexation of Cuba. The annexation of the Philippines caused bitter resentment among those who had fought with the US believing they would win independence from Spain. They could not have imagined they would have done so to be colonized by the USA. A Filipino government under Emilio Aguinaldo had already been formed; after annexation, it declared war on the USA and, as we will see (pages 53–54), a bloody war of independence resulted.
Supporters of annexation

The USA’s treatment of the Philippines broke with its former policies and saw the creation of a colony on European imperialistic lines. This needs careful explanation. The successes against Spain had undoubtedly seen the USA rise to the status of a Great Power and many sought to capitalize on this. Political leaders such as Theodore Roosevelt and John Hay were explicit expansionists. Roosevelt, who succeeded McKinley as president, was a keen proponent of empire and sought to develop a naval base at Subic Bay as the main US naval base in the Pacific. Believers in white (and specifically US) superiority over other races were confirmed in their view of the USA’s historical destiny (see page 22). Allied to this was how the creation of an empire and national pride could be deployed to bind Americans together through patriotism – in the same way that empire was used in European countries. McKinley spoke of ‘benevolent assimilation’ by which he meant that subject peoples could only benefit from US governance. He said, ‘Our priceless principles undergo no change under a tropical sun. They go with the flag.’

Reasons for annexation

Various reasons have been given for annexation by contemporaries, including President McKinley and his supporters.

- The islands could not be returned to Spain because the war had, in part, been about prising them away from her.
- Other imperialistic countries such as Germany, Britain or Japan could not be allowed to take them. With hindsight, this would be another example of William Langer’s concept of preclusive imperialism (see page 23). Indeed, at the time the decisions were taken a German fleet was steaming perilously close to the Islands.
- The Filipinos were not considered capable of governing themselves.
- Allied to this was the racist argument that if Filipinos weren’t capable of ruling themselves, equally they were not capable of being absorbed into the USA as a state; therefore the relationship between them and the USA could not be on the basis of statehood. Nevertheless the USA felt some responsibility for the well-being of the Filipinos – therefore the creation of a colony seemed the only option.
- The US had a duty to raise the Filipinos up to higher standards, particularly through Christianization and exposure to the example of the USA.

Of course, the Filipino fighters disagreed. They had assumed the US would support their independence once Spain was defeated. However, the USA argued that Aguinaldo, who came from the upper classes, neither had the support to take power nor the resources to defend an independent Philippines from aggression from the Great Powers. It discounted his announcement of a ‘provisional dictatorship’. McKinley told his military to compel Filipino rebels to accept its authority and made no mention in any of his speeches of Filipino self-government.
President McKinley allegedly agonized over his decision to annex the Philippines.

**SOURCE F**


I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen that I went down on my knees and prayed to Almighty God for light and guidance … And one night it came to me this way … There was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could by them.

That neither McKinley nor anyone else involved in the debates had ever been to the Philippines is perhaps illustrated by the fact that, in giving his main reason for annexation as one of Christianization, either he did not realize that over 7 million Filipinos were already practising Catholics, or else he assumed Christianization was restricted to Protestantism.

As it was, the vote in the Senate to annex the Philippines was close. It achieved the required two-thirds majority by only one vote, that of Vice President Garret Augustus Hobart. Tellingly, two of the Democrat Senators who voted for annexation had recently been offered choice political appointments by McKinley.

One of McKinley’s successors as president, Woodrow Wilson, then recently installed as President of Princeton University, also agreed with annexation.

**SOURCE G**


The East is to be opened and transformed, whether we will it or no; the standards of the West are to be imposed upon it; nations and peoples which have stood still the centuries through are to be quickened and made part of the universal world of commerce and of ideas which has so steadily been a-making by the advance of European power from age to age.

**Opponents of annexation**

However, there was an equally vociferous movement within the USA against the creation of an empire. The Anti-Imperialist League was composed mainly of Democrats but contained groups that otherwise might not have been expected to co-operate, such as union leader Samuel Gompers of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and industrialist Andrew Carnegie – Carnegie indeed offered to
buy the Philippines to give it back to its inhabitants. Many intellectuals such as Charles Eliot, President of Harvard, joined its ranks as did the novelist Mark Twain.

Opponents of annexation put forward various arguments:

- The Filipinos would lose their right to govern themselves.
- The USA had nothing to gain from annexation. Besides the economic costs involved, many of the more learned members cited the Roman Republic, which, they argued, lost its virtue through gaining an empire and became corrupt and decadent as a result – implying, of course, the same thing could happen to the USA. More humorously, the journalist E.L. Godkin wrote, ‘We do not want any more states until we can civilize Kansas.’
- Senator Benjamin Tilman of South Carolina was one of many who rehearsed the familiar arguments of racial mixing diluting the pure Anglo-Saxon blood of Americans as a reason for non-involvement.
- Mark Twain wrote an impassioned argument that the USA should be the protector of Filipinos not their oppressor. He referred to the annexation as a ‘mess’ and a ‘quagmire’ which he could neither understand how the USA could have gotten into nor how it was going to get out of.
- In his 1899 book, The Conquest of the United States by Spain, William Graham Sumner, pioneer sociologist and Vice President of the Anti-Imperialist League, argued that annexation would ruin the US financially as it had helped ruin Spain. The necessary growth of the military would lead, he argued, to higher taxes and a greater and more expensive government role with a concomitant harm to democracy. Sumner was vilified by his opponents, notably Theodore Roosevelt, but few could disagree when he argued that, ‘My patriotism is of the kind which is outraged by the notion that the United States never was a great nation until in a petty three months campaign it knocked to pieces a poor decrepit bankrupt old state like Spain.’

The 1900 presidential election

Opposition to annexation gathered within the USA; the issue of Filipino independence was one of the platforms of the Democrats in the 1900 presidential election. However, Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryan somewhat scuppered the impact of this for reasons of political self-interest. He realized that the USA was still technically at war with Spain until the peace treaty was signed and wanted the question of ending the war, if not that of what to do with the Philippines, resolved before the actual election took place. He advised his supporters in the Senate therefore to approve the treaty, which included the ceding of the Philippines to the USA.

Bryan argued that acceptance of the treaty did not necessarily mean support for annexation of the Philippines because the treaty didn’t actually specify annexation. There was nothing to prevent the USA giving the Philippines its independence, having been ceded the islands. Indeed, the 1900 Democratic manifesto argued along these lines.
Chapter 2: The Spanish–American–Cuban War, 1898


We favor an immediate declaration of the Nation’s purpose to give the Filipinos first a stable form of government, secondly independence and third, protection from outside interferences.

Rather than an election over imperialism, the 1900 campaign came to be dominated by issues of monetary policy, emphasizing perhaps that the US still found domestic concerns far more important. Nevertheless, the popularity of the war and its successes helped McKinley to a relatively easy victory, gaining 51.6 per cent of the popular vote as opposed to Bryan’s 45.6 per cent. The Republicans had 56 Senators to 29 Democrats, and a comfortable majority in the House of Representatives of 198 to 153.

The effects of annexation

The financial and human cost of annexation was high for the US. Four years of warfare resulted. Supporters of independence for the Philippines had not fought the Spanish to swap one colonialist master for another. The financial burden was in the region of $600 million and 126,000 US troops were stationed in the Philippines by 1904. With 1000 US military personnel killed and 2800 injured, the percentage casualty rate of 5.5 per cent was higher than any other overseas war in which the USA had participated. The conflict meanwhile saw the deaths of 20,000 Filipino fighters and 200,000 civilians. It would be difficult to argue that annexation was profitable to the USA; at a distance of 9600 kilometres they were never going to be substantial trading partners, and in 1897 they had taken less than 1 per cent of US exports.

Although Aguinaldo was captured in March 1901 and the conflict was declared over by July 1902, it continued as a guerrilla war, often in dense jungle. Atrocities were committed on both sides. In retaliation for the execution of 48 US soldiers at the town of Batangiga in September 1901, Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith said, ‘I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms.’ This resulted in wholesale massacres on the island of Samar in December 1901, which was turned into a ‘howling wilderness’.


The present war is no bloodless opera bouffe engagement; our men have been relentless, have killed to exterminate men, women, children, prisoners and captives, active insurgents and suspected people from lads of ten up, the idea prevailing that the Filipino as such was little better than a dog.
While US soldiers inflicted water torture on prisoners by pouring filthy water down their throats via a tube, Filipinos themselves tortured and mutilated US troops, for example, by staking them out on anthills. Ironically, in the province of Batangas, US soldiers herded the local population into concentration camps to separate non-belligerents from rebels, where many inevitably died. This was exactly the same policy over which US policymakers said they’d gone to war in part with Spain to stop it happening in Cuba.

**US reaction to the war in the Philippines**

The conflict in the Philippines, with both its cost and stories of atrocities, had a negative impact on any subsequent desire for empire, as we will see in the next chapter. *The New York World*, hitherto a supporter of imperialism through Yellow journalism about the USA going to war with Spain, included the following anonymous parody of Kipling’s poem in July 1899:

*We’ve taken up the white man’s burden
Of ebony and brown
Now will you kindly tell us, Rudyard
How may we put it down?*
Key debate

Key question: What reasons have historians offered for the annexation of the Philippines?

The moral and religious impulse

President McKinley himself, as we have seen, argued that the war was a moral crusade and colonization of the Philippines motivated by religion. However, he also saw other advantages, such as the acquisition bringing the USA more territory and the opportunity to benefit those over whom it would rule.

SOURCE J

An excerpt from a speech by President McKinley in October 1900 (found at www.parapundit.com/archives/002208.html).

Territory sometimes comes to us when we go to war in a holy cause, and whenever it does the banner of liberty will float over it and bring, I trust, blessings and benefits to all people.

British historian Paul Johnson agreed with the importance of Christianization. Writing in the 1990s, he argued that the USA saw a duty to Christianize those places that had not yet seen the light; he quotes a leading US Methodist, John Raleigh Mott, who advocated that the USA should lead ‘the evangelizing of the world in one generation’. In effect, this meant making the world Protestant; most Filipinos were already Christian, but of the Catholic faith.

Historian Walter A. McDougall, writing in 1997, agreed. He argued that religious sentiment was instrumental in winning US support for the war. He quotes an unnamed Methodist leader: ‘Should we go to war, our cause will be just. Every Methodist preacher will be a recruiting officer.’ A Baptist, Robert Stuart MacArthur, agreed; speaking of conquered territories he said, ‘We will fill them with school houses and missionaries.’ Many historians have stressed the moral and religious justifications; however, this is only part of the picture.

McKinley’s role

Writing in 2003, the historian Niall Ferguson felt McKinley genuinely saw the annexation of the Philippines as an onerous duty because there was no alternative:

- They couldn’t be handed back to Spain.
- They weren’t, in the accepted norms of the time, ready for independence.
- If the USA hadn’t annexed them, either Britain or Germany would have.

What moral reasons have been offered to justify annexation?

Rewrite the quotation in Source J in your own words. What could you infer from it about why McKinley supported the annexation of the Philippines?

How significant was the role of President McKinley in annexation?
Economic reasons

George C. Herring argues, on the other hand, that McKinley may have decided to take the Philippines as early as May 1898, seeing the strategic and perceived economic advantages of doing so. In support of this judgement Herring shows that McKinley sent 20,000 US troops to take control of the islands before Dewey had actually defeated the Spanish naval forces.

Additionally, McKinley both supported annexation in his own speaking tours and packed the peace commission sent to Paris with expansionists.

While few with hindsight could argue that there were in fact economic advantages, at the time these were enthusiastically proposed. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge called Manila ‘the great prize and the thing which will give us the eastern trade’.

Popularity of annexation

One common idea is that McKinley acted to annex the Philippines mainly because it was the popular policy. In September 1898, the Literary Digest magazine surveyed 200 journals and found a ratio of 3:1 in favour of annexation. Quite simply there was far more support for it than opposition. Writing in the 1960s, Ernest R. May argued that McKinley’s role was crucial, and rather than primarily following a religious or moral impulse, he was mainly interested in public opinion, which suggested that ‘not just McKinley himself but the United States as a nation seemed to have chosen imperialism as its policy’.

The significance of the annexation

Writing in 2008, historian David J. Silby argued that the annexation was a combination of all the imperialist reasons we have discussed, marking the transition of the USA from a frontier to global state. It signified, in other words, the role of the USA as a world power.

Historian Samuel Flagg Bemis would have disagreed; in 1936 he called the acquisition of the Philippines, ‘the Great Aberration’. However, historians are more inclined to view it today as a culmination of an expansionist policy which had been developing since the Civil War period. Seeing 1898 as a crucial year in the development of the USA, historian David Traxel argued that the events then helped to mould the USA into a Great Power, hence the need for colonies. Most significantly, what happened in 1898 moulded the disparate peoples of the USA into a nation with a common identity and purpose.
Chapter summary

The Spanish–American–Cuban War, 1898

The Cubans rebelled against Spanish rule and the US declared war in support of the Cubans in 1898, leading to war with Spain in its Caribbean and Pacific colonies. A variety of factors led to the declaration of war against Spain, notably the pressure from US business interests, the influence of the media including the Yellow Press, and the sinking of the USS Maine in Havana Harbour.

The role of President McKinley in the declaration of war has been much debated by historians, with many arguing his role was more active and leadership more significant than had been thought previously. The war itself was comparatively easy for the USA and saw it emerge as a Great Power. The Spanish–American–Cuban War of 1898 saw a significant shift in US policy towards war and the acquisition of empire. While it was emphasized at the time that the war was not fought to colonize Cuba, the Treaty of Paris gave the USA colonies in Puerto Rico, the Philippines and various Pacific islands. Filipinos who had fought for independence felt betrayed and a fierce war ensued until 1902.

Examination advice

How to answer ‘why’ questions

Questions that ask ‘why’ are prompting you to consider a variety of explanations. Each of these will need to be explained fully. It would also help to order these explanations in terms of relative importance. In other words, put the most important reasons first.

Example

Why did the USA go to war against Spain in 1898?

1. To answer this question successfully, you should consider the different possible reasons the USA declared war on Spain. These could include political, social, economic and strategic explanations. A question such as this one also lends itself to including historiography. This does not mean dropping as many names of historians as possible. A better strategy would be to explain how interpretations of the USA’s actions differed.
2. Before writing the answer you should write out an outline – allow around five minutes to do this. For this question, you could include supporting evidence such as:

**Political reasons:**
- Impact of Yellow journalism: Hearst, Pulitzer.
- Political pressure on McKinley to be more globally aggressive.
- Pressure after explosion on USS Maine.
- The de Lome letter.
Social reasons:
- US sympathy for Cuban suffering.
- US sympathy for freedom fighters/rebels in anti-colonial struggle.

Economic reasons:
- Protect US investments in Cuba.
- Expand control in Cuba and rest of Caribbean.

Strategic:
- USA wanted to demonstrate its new power and join other strong powers.
- Proximity of Cuba and Puerto Rico to USA.
- Spanish Pacific/Asian colonies important as USA expanded into the region.

Historians’ views:
- Some focused on economic reasons (sugar, new markets).
- Others felt the USA was most interested in imperial expansion (need to compete with European nations, strategic interests).
- Gender issues were also explored: the USA needed outlets for its contained manliness. War and conquest were one way to let off steam.
- McKinley’s role in going to war was also explored.

3. In your introduction, you should cite the major reasons why the USA went to war against Spain in 1898. An example of a good introduction follows:

In 1898, President McKinley declared war on Spain. This precipitated the Spanish–American–Cuban War and led to a defeat the Spaniards referred to as el desastre, or the disaster. Among the reasons the USA went to war were the need to protect large investments in the Spanish colony of Cuba that were threatened by a long rebellion, a desire to join the exclusive club of imperial powers, the increasing jingoistic war fever drummed up by the Yellow Press in the USA, and the explosion on board the USS Maine, which sank the ship and killed more than 200 sailors. Some historians have also suggested that the US President hoped to counter growing calls from his political opponents to be more aggressive as Spain set up concentration camps on the island. McKinley basically goaded the Spaniards into the position of declaring war on the USA by presenting the European nation with demands he knew they would never accept, that of declaring Cuba an independent nation.
Chapter 2: The Spanish–American–Cuban War, 1898

4. In the body of your essay, write at least one paragraph on each of the major themes you raised in your introduction. Your first paragraph should be devoted to the reason you feel most led to war between the USA and Spain.

5. In your conclusion, you need to summarize your findings. This is your opportunity to support your thesis. Remember not to bring up any evidence that you did not discuss in the body of your essay. An example of a good concluding paragraph is given below.

While the conflict between Spain and the USA had many causes, the growing power of the USA was at the heart of the war. The country was wealthy and sought new markets. It no longer wished to be seen or to act as a second-tier power. The USA, with its large navy and imperial pretensions, had reached the point where it felt it needed to extend its power to Asia. Spain represented the older order and was portrayed in the USA as backward. Spain’s colonies, often in strategic locations, were viewed as easy pickings by the USA, and ones that would help advance the march of commerce if they were in the right hands.

6. Now try writing a complete answer to the question, following the advice above.

Examination practice

Below are two exam-style questions for you to practise on this topic.

1. Why did some US politicians describe the Spanish–American–Cuban War as the ‘Splendid Little War’?

2. To what extent was the annexation of the Philippines an aberration in US foreign policy? (For guidance on how to answer ‘to what extent’ questions, see pages 136–138.)
United States’ foreign policies, 1901–17

This chapter examines US foreign policy and imperialism during the period of the so-called ‘progressive presidents’ from 1901 to 1917, when the USA entered the First World War. It will show how they increasingly intervened in foreign affairs and, following ‘the Roosevelt Corollary’ of 1904, assumed the role of a police force in Latin America. It will explain what was meant by the phrases ‘Open Door’ in Asia and ‘dollar diplomacy’, particularly regarding Latin America. It will conclude by examining why the last progressive president, Woodrow Wilson, intervened in foreign affairs more than any previous president, before exploring the debate on what, if anything, was different about US imperialism from that of the other Great Powers.

You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter:

- How far did foreign policy reflect the values of the progressive era?
- How influential was the USA in the Caribbean and Latin America?
- What was Roosevelt’s policy towards foreign affairs?
- To what extent did President Taft practise ‘dollar diplomacy’?
- How effective was moral diplomacy?
- What were the motives for US imperialism?

The progressive era and progressive presidents

**Key question:** How far did foreign policy reflect the values of the progressive era?

The first decades of the twentieth century were known as the progressive era because they were associated with domestic reform and expansion in the role of government. Historians have long debated the precise meaning of **progressivism** but generally agree that it was a very loose and wide-ranging notion that defied easy definition. It has been argued that someone was progressive if others agreed that he or she was. The progressive presidents, Theodore Roosevelt (1901–09), William Howard Taft (1909–13) and Woodrow Wilson (1913–21), expanded the role of government and believed in reform of abuses and improving the lives of all Americans. They felt government was there to do good.
In terms of foreign policy and imperialism, the period saw a growth in US involvement abroad, with renewed emphasis on the belief that US engagement with foreigners was always for the foreigners’ benefit. This idea reached its peak during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson not only involved the USA in the First World War (see Chapter 4) but also sent US troops to more countries more often than any previous president.

US relations with the Caribbean and Latin America under Roosevelt

**Key question:** How influential was the USA in the Caribbean and Latin America?

The USA left no other powers in any doubt that the western hemisphere lay in its own sphere of influence and, while it might be flexible and realistic as to its influence elsewhere (see page 27), it was prepared to impose its will in these countries, preferably by diplomacy and economic muscle, but also by military force if necessary. While the USA did not maintain colonies in the region as such, except in Puerto Rico, many commentators have argued that the protectorates, as they were called, were colonies in all but name.

**Cuba**

Following the war against Spain, and the Teller Amendment against annexation (see pages 40–41), the USA faced a dilemma in Cuba. General Shafer, who had led US forces in Cuba during the recent Spanish–American–Cuban War said, ‘Cubans are no more fit for self-government than gunpowder is for hell.’

**Need for reconstruction**

Cuba had been devastated by the 1895 rebellion in which rebels had pursued ‘scorched earth’ policies and the Spanish authorities had responded with concentration camps and brutal oppression (see pages 34–35). The population had declined by almost 200,000, from 1,850,000 in 1894 to 1,689,600 four years later.

**Impact on the sugar industry**

Sugar production was all but destroyed. The wealthy sugar-producing provinces of Havana and Matanzas saw their production reduced by more than half. Of 1,400,000 acres under cultivation before 1895, only 900,000 were fit to be returned to cultivation after the war was over. In some areas as many as 80 per cent of sugar estates were in ruins. In Las Villas, only 73 sugar mills survived out of a pre-war total of 332; in Pinar del Río, only 7 out of 70.
There was, moreover, no leader strong enough to unite Cubans and no government in place.

**US occupation**

The Treaty of Paris had allowed for the temporary occupation of Cuba by the US after Spanish withdrawal pending decisions as to its future. Many Americans thought, the Teller Amendment notwithstanding, that annexation of Cuba was inevitable. President McKinley himself recognized that the USA would be the most influential factor in Cuban development and hoped that a benign US occupation would make Cubans welcome closer ties. With incontrovertible logic, Secretary of War Elihu Root argued that, ‘It is better to have the favors of a lady with her consent, after judicious courtship, than to ravish her.’

From 1 January 1899, a military occupation ensued, initially with General John R. Brooke as military governor, which saw the US authorities control postal, customs and sanitation services. In December Brooke was replaced by General Leonard Wood, a former US Surgeon General, with improvements in sanitary conditions and reductions in infectious tropical diseases high on his agenda. The endemic yellow fever, which had killed so many US troops, was eliminated. There were also widespread improvements in social conditions, such as the building of schools and hospitals. US school textbooks were translated into Spanish; while one might argue that this facilitated indoctrination in schools it also helped improve literacy rates. However, while Wood’s administration in particular had the well-being of Cubans in mind, and believed that they would benefit from US influence, there was no question that US dominance was all embracing.

**Growth of US influence in Cuba**

The US authorities did prepare for the future, when they hoped to see a prosperous independent Cuba governed by pro-US interests. They courted Cuban elites, particularly those with ties to the USA, whom they dubbed ‘our friends’. However, they offered no financial help to those whose land had been devastated by war. A series of measures made it possible for creditors to collect debts regardless of circumstances; this meant many Cuban farmers had to sell land to repay their debts. Between 1898 and 1900, 7400 small farms were sold. This meant wealthy American interests could invest more and buy more land in Cuba. For example:
In 1899 the Cuban-American Sugar company purchased 77,000 acres.

In 1901, the United Fruit Company bought 200,000 acres at $1 per acre in Oriente.

Milton Hershey invested in sugar concerns to supply his chocolate empire. By 1918 ‘Central Hershey’ was completed with a huge sugar mill and nearby town to house its workforce. By 1922 he had even completed an electric railroad to run between the ports of Havana and Matanzas to transport the sugar.

Americans tended to invest in large-scale concerns. This led to the decline of medium-scale producers. As a result, by 1905 over 60 per cent of Cuban land was owned by US interests and only 25 per cent by Cubans. Beyond the agricultural sector, the New York-based Spanish Power and Light Company had a monopoly on the supply of gas to Cuba, while two US companies supplied all its electricity.

**SOURCE B**


The bank that underwrites the cutting of the cane is foreign, the cutting of the cane is foreign, the consumers’ market is foreign, the administrative staff set up in Cuba is foreign, the machinery that is installed, the capital invested, the very land of Cuba held by foreign ownership … all are foreign, as are logically enough, the profits that flow out of the country to enrich others.

The *Louisiana Journal* in 1903 wrote that, ‘Little by little, the whole island is passing into the hands of American citizens, the shortest and surest way to annexation.’

**Role of the USA in Cuba**

While few would deny that US economic influence was growing and would eventually dominate Cuba, there was little outright enthusiasm within the USA for outright annexation. This was partly because of the fears of what had happened in Haiti (see page 36) and ongoing disillusion with the fighting in the Philippines (see pages 53–54), and also because it increasingly realized the USA did not have to formally colonize to control and to reap the benefits of colonization – it could, in other words, gain power without the responsibility of governance. In a sense the policies of the USA in Cuba served as the model for its future approaches to imperialism – to be the benign friend who offers oversight, guidance and financial support to enable decent rulers to govern wisely, while gaining a stranglehold over the economy and convincing the local population that US friendship is overwhelmingly in their own interests.
The Platt Amendment

Given that the USA was not able to colonize Cuba, its policy was to regard it as an independent nation, which would maintain friendly relations while at the same time benefiting from the advantages of close US economic ties. The priority was for an independent Cuba to create a new system of government – but one acceptable to the USA.

In November 1900, a Cuban Constitutional Convention met in Havana and framed a new governmental system, ostensibly without US interference but in practice supervised by Wood, who allegedly made delegates revise their proposals until he was satisfied. There were significant limitations as to Cuban foreign relations.

- The Platt Amendment authorized future US intervention should it be felt necessary by the USA (as opposed to Cubans). Cuba was not allowed to grant concessions to any other foreign powers or make alliances without US approval. In fact, the Cuban Constitution had to include this as a prerequisite for US troops being withdrawn from Cuba. In the face of anti-US demonstrations, it passed by one vote.
- The US was granted two naval bases, including the one at Guantanamo Bay.

The Platt Amendment was named after Senator Orville H. Platt, who introduced it into Congress in February 1901, though it was written by Secretary of War Elihu Root. It was pivotal in defining US policy not merely in Cuba but also throughout Latin America. It effectively said that the region fell under the US sphere of influence and the USA allotted to itself the right to intervene should it choose. As far as Cuba itself was concerned, Governor Wood said, ‘There is of course little or no independence left [in] Cuba under the Platt Amendment.’ With great sorrow one Cuban nationalist, who met with Elihu Root in Washington to discuss the Platt Amendment, concurred: ‘Cuba is dead; we are enslaved forever.’

Greater economic ties

In May 1902, US forces left Cuba, so supposedly Cuba was fully independent, yet it remained economically tied to the USA. In 1903, a reciprocity agreement strengthened economic bonds. US interests ensured Cuban sugar and tobacco were tied to the US markets through preferential tariffs, while US goods entered Cuba at reductions varying from 25 to 40 per cent. This undoubtedly increased the ability to maintain a US-type lifestyle for those Cubans who could afford consumer goods and luxury items, from chewing gum to automobiles. Cuban sugar, meanwhile, which had produced 17.6 per cent of US needs in 1900, by 1928 produced 76.4 per cent – at a time when American per capita sugar consumption had doubled. The most vociferous objections to the reciprocity agreement within the US came from,
unsurprisingly, US sugar cane and beet growers, notably the American Beet Sugar Association. However, increasingly the USA would import its sugar from Cuba.

**US interventions in Cuba**

The USA intervened in Cuba in 1906 during the fraught 1905 Cuban presidential elections, which led to fighting within Cuba and threats to US economic concerns. After José Miguel Gómez had been elected in November 1908, Cuba was considered stable again and US forces left the following year. The island was occupied by US forces and governed by Charles Magoon, a former Minnesota judge, until 1909.

The US invaded again in 1912 with 500 marines to help the Cuban Government put down a revolt of former slaves whose political party, Partido Independiente de Color (PIC), had been banned. US forces were in Cuba again between 1917 and 1922 to prop up the unpopular president Mario García Menocal, who just happened to be the managing director of the Cuban-American Sugar Company.

**Puerto Rico**

The US captured Puerto Rico from the Spanish in the 1898 war (see pages 47–48) and the Foraker Act of 1900 established the US-dominated system of government there. A US-appointed governor ran the island and was advised by a two-house legislature. One legislature was popularly elected, but the US Government appointed the second. Standards of living fell during the first decades of US occupation. This was, in part, due to a series of natural disasters but also because, as in Cuba, more land became US-owned and there was more concentration on sugar as the main crop. This monoculture advantaged US producers who had access to home markets and low interest rates from US banks. However, as in Cuba, it led to significant problems for smaller-scale Puerto Rican producers who couldn’t compete effectively with US interests and tended to sell out to them, thus increasing US property-holding on the island. This gave rise to the growth of an independence movement led by Luis Muñoz Rivera and José de Diego, but which met with only limited success. In 1906, President Roosevelt visited the island and advocated that Puerto Ricans be made US citizens. However, it wasn’t until the Jones Act of 1917 that Puerto Ricans achieved US citizenship.

**US intervention in the Caribbean and Latin America**

The US involvement in Cuba was used as a model for its relations throughout the Caribbean and Latin America, where governments were often corrupt, weak and exploited by European trading partners. Typically, they would be cheated by European banks and merchants and then refuse to
pay their debts. Often the stronger countries were quick to respond, as the following examples show:

- When German citizens were assaulted in Haiti at the turn of the twentieth century their government sent two warships which threatened to bombard the capital city, Port-au-Prince, until the Haitian government paid $30,000 in damages to the offended Germans.
- In 1902, the Venezuelan dictator José Cipriano Castro refused to honour his debts to Britain and Germany. In response these two countries blockaded Venezuelan ports and destroyed some of their gunships and harbour defences. The USA persuaded Britain and Germany to agree to arbitration.

In Venezuela the USA seemed an honest broker, above exploitation and threats. However, its involvement in the Dominican Republic and Panama was more self-serving. The ‘big stick’ policy was introduced in the Dominican Republic while intervention in Panama became essential as a pre-requisite to the building of the Panama Canal.

**The Dominican Republic**

In 1903, the Dominican Republic defaulted on the payment of bonds to the US Government worth $40 million. While McKinley’s successor, President Theodore Roosevelt, was reluctant to invade, a solution was arrived at whereby the US took control of the Dominican Republic’s customs service; 55 per cent of customs duties were thereby devoted to the debt repayment. Roosevelt called this the ‘big stick’. He had first used this to describe his tactics in political infighting while Governor of New York State, but in this context he meant forcing countries to govern themselves effectively.

**Source C**


> Looking back upon his handling of the incident, Roosevelt thought he ‘never saw a bluff carried more resolutely through to the final limit.’ And writing to a friend a few days later, he observed: ‘I have always been fond of the West African proverb: “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.”’

**The Roosevelt Corollary**

Roosevelt justified this type of intervention in December 1904 with the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine (see page 15). He refused to accept the right of foreign nations to intervene in the Americas but recognized that countries within the Americas had to pay their debts and behave responsibly. In this sense he was setting up the USA as a sort of police force throughout the Americas, both to protect countries from foreign interference and also to ensure responsible behaviour.
Chapter 3: United States’ foreign policies, 1901–17

An excerpt from President Roosevelt’s Annual Address to Congress, 1904 (found at www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/darioroos.htm).

Chronic wrongdoing or an impotence which results in general loosening of ties of civilized society may, in America as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere the adherence of the US to the Monroe Doctrine may force the US, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence to the exercise of an international police power.

This marked a huge shift in US policy and was to have significant repercussions in the future. For example, it was used to justify extensive intervention in Panama to facilitate the building of the Panama Canal.

Meanwhile, many in Latin America regarded the growth of US influence with alarm. Nicaraguan poet Ruben Dario, for example, responded specifically to its intervention in Panama in 1903 (see Source E), and more generally to the Roosevelt Corollary, with a poem attacking the expansionist policies of Roosevelt.

Excerpt from the poem ‘To Roosevelt’, written by Ruben Dario in January 1904, translated by Bonnie Frederick (found at http://public.wsu.edu/~brians/world_civ/worldcivreader/world_civ_reader_2/dario.html).

You are the United States,
you are the future invader
of the naive America that has Indian blood,
that still prays to Jesus Christ and still speaks Spanish.

... Be careful. Viva Spanish America!
There are a thousand cubs loosed from the Spanish lion.
Roosevelt, one would have to be, through God himself,
the-fearful Rifleman and strong Hunter,
to manage to grab us in your iron claws.

The Panama Canal

The USA had long supported the idea of building a canal to link the Caribbean Sea and thereafter the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The most obvious place for this was in Panama, at that time a region of Colombia (see map on page 69), although a route through Nicaragua was also being considered. Without this link, it could take months to sail from the eastern to western seabords of the USA as the route necessitated travelling up and down the whole of Southern America. In 1898, for example, the USS Oregon had to sail all around South America and almost missed the Spanish–American–Cuban War in which it was strategically involved.
Alternatively, travellers could attempt the overland route across the treacherous, disease-infested jungles of Panama. A French company had begun to build a canal in 1881. However, after eight years its work had stalled because of financial mismanagement and the danger to workers from disease and mishap.

**US involvement**

The New French Canal Company took over the option to buy the rights to build the canal from the original company and sent two representatives, a French engineer Philippe Bunau-Varilla, and an American lawyer William Cromwell, to seek US involvement in terms of funding. President Roosevelt in particular supported the scheme but was prepared to act ruthlessly to get the best deal possible. He bought the rights on behalf of the US Government for $40 million, having previously been offered them for $109 million. This was because Roosevelt threatened to build a canal across Nicaragua if the New French Canal Company didn’t agree to the new low price. The Spooner Act of 1902 authorized the US to purchase French rights and therefore begin the construction of the canal.

**Complications**

There were, however, political complications. One was comparatively easily dealt with. The British had signed the Clayton-Bulwer Act in 1850, giving them an interest in any canal that may be built in the future to cross the American continent. However, preoccupied with their involvement in the Boer War and seeking US friendship, they waived their rights in the 1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.

The second issue was more difficult, however. The preferred canal route crossed Panama. The Colombian Government was demanding $15 million from the Company to agree to its construction. Roosevelt likened this Government to ‘irresponsible bandits’. When, in August 1903, he refused to meet their demands, the Colombian Government pulled out of any deal. The US no longer had an alternative route to consider. A site had been proposed at Nicaragua, some 1700 kilometres to the northwest of Panama. It was four times the width of the route across Panama, although it did in part go through Lake Nicaragua and was at sea level, which would have eased engineering problems. However, on 8 May 1902, Mount Pelée exploded on the French Caribbean island of Martinique, killing 30,000 people. When it was realized that an active volcano was situated less than 161 kilometres from the proposed Nicaraguan route, all attention was refocused on the Panamanian option.

**The Panamanian revolt**

In November 1903 Panamanians staged a national revolt to break away from Colombian rule. They were supported by the US, who saw an opportunity to obtain more favourable rates from the prospective new government of a newly independent Panama. Roosevelt sent the battleship Nashville and a
detachment of US marines to support the insurgents. Indeed, on 3 November, claiming their right under an 1846 treaty to a transit route across Panama, US ships prevented Colombian troops from landing in Panama to tackle the rebellion. The rebellion was successful and the Republic of Panama was declared. The US Government recognized the new republic and negotiated a new deal. By the terms of the 1904 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Act, the new government of Panama accepted $10 million and an annual sum of $250,000 for the US rights to build the canal. The USA was also awarded control over the 10-kilometre zone either side of the canal.

Colombia, of course, lost out. Roosevelt was accused by political opponents of using US power to treat the country unfairly. After Roosevelt’s attempt to justify his actions in a Cabinet meeting, Secretary of State for War Elihu Root allegedly replied, ‘You have shown that you were accused of seduction and you have conclusively proved that you were guilty of rape.’

Building the Panama Canal
Political complications over, the construction of the canal still presented a huge technological challenge. It was very dangerous work, with landslides and explosions adding to other problems the workforce faced, such as disease and the extremes of weather. The completed canal cost $375 million, far more than the USA had spent on any engineering project up to that time. When added to previous French costs, the total came to $4639 million. It is estimated that over 80,000 people took part in the construction of the canal from its inception in 1881 and about 27,500 lost their lives, particularly during the earlier French period of construction when 22,000 died. The canal was finally completed in August 1914 with the passage of the SS Ancon through it. Roosevelt said it was ‘by far the most important action I took in foreign affairs during the time I was president’. Within a year over 1000 ships were using it annually.

SOURCE F
Map of Panama Canal.

What can you learn from Source F about the strategic position of the Panama Canal?
It will be seen then that the examples in this section (pages 61–70) show how the USA extended its influence in different ways: controlling the economy as in Cuba; demonstrating a type of colonization as in Puerto Rico; trying to promote effective and accountable government in the case of the Dominican Republic; and ensuring a friendly government to help protect important strategic US interests as in the case of the Panama Canal. Critics might say it was empire building by other means.

SOURCE G

The Panama Canal under construction – the famous Culebra Cut of the Panama Canal, 1907.
US relations with the Great Powers and Asia

Key question: What was Roosevelt’s policy towards foreign affairs?

Roosevelt felt Americans had to become more interested in European and global affairs because they would be affected by a resurgent Germany and Japan. The period of his presidency saw a wider involvement in affairs with the Great Powers in terms of international events and interest in the Far East, particularly China, where the USA did not want to miss out on its commercial potential, which was already being exploited by others. Tensions, however, arose with Japan for a variety of reasons. In 1908, Roosevelt told the future French politician André Tardieu that he feared Americans weren’t sufficiently interested in world events: ‘I wish that all Americans would realize that American politics is world politics; that we are and should be involved in all the great questions.’

Great Power relations

Roosevelt realized that if the balance of power broke down in Europe, Germany would emerge as the strongest nation, and the USA would be threatened.
Roosevelt saw Britain and France as more democratic and less aggressive in terms of ambition than Germany. He feared that if Germany attained dominance in Europe, it would threaten US interests by political and economic expansion, particularly into Latin America but also through its naval power in the Far East. We have already discussed tensions between the USA and Germany in Samoa and areas of Latin America, for example in Venezuela in 1902. For this reason, although publicly he supported strict US neutrality over European conflicts, privately he favoured Britain and France. This led the USA to act favourably towards the latter, as for example in the Algeciras Conference in 1906.

**The Algeciras Conference**

In 1906 a conference was held in Algeciras, Spain, concerning foreign influences in Morocco, where France had colonial interests and Germany seemed to be trying to gain influence. While Roosevelt declared that the USA was neutral, he nevertheless sent Henry White as a US delegate with a brief to do everything he could to maintain peace. Roosevelt moreover told the former US Ambassador to Britain, Joseph Choate, that while he didn’t want to upset Germany, he would always support Britain and France against it.

The Senate supported the subsequent settlement, which saw Germany withdraw, but only with the proviso that a US precedent was not being set, and that it would not in future become involved in purely European disputes.

However, during the first decade of the twentieth century, the USA was more directly involved in events and developments in the Far East, particularly in China, where it sought to extend its influence at a time when other powers were already promoting their own interests to a significant degree. The USA also tried to improve its relations with Japan during this period, and set about its governance of the Philippines.

**China**

The USA applied an *‘Open Door’* policy in the Far East. This focused, in particular, on circumstances resulting from the willingness of other powers to exploit the weakness of China.

In 1895 Japan had easily defeated China in a war over Korea. This encouraged European powers to seek to take advantage of China’s weakness through favourable trade agreements. Germany’s leaders had spoken of ‘slicing the Chinese melon’ in 1897. Various foreign delegations had been set up in China for this very purpose and Germany and Britain acquired territory and concessions there. For example:

- Germany acquired a naval base at Qing Dao and railway and mining concessions
- Britain acquired Hong Kong in 1842.

Clearly the USA was interested in becoming involved in China, if only to acquire its own concessions while there were some left to take. There was concern, moreover, that the Great Powers might partition China and the
USA would be left out. The reasons for US involvement oscillated between economic, moral and religious concerns:

- US missionaries penetrating into the Chinese interior were often attacked by Chinese people who resented the presence of foreigners. They demanded protection from both their own and the Chinese Government. As early as 1895 Secretary of State Richard Olney had said the Chinese Government must protect US citizens and had increased the US naval presence in Chinese waters – this despite the fact that his own Government appeared not to protect Chinese workers in the USA who were often subject to racist attack. Many Americans felt Chinese people needed US involvement to improve their lives and livelihood; that the USA was more morally upright than, say, Germany, with its perceived values of militarism and aggression – the Chinese could only benefit by coming into contact with Americans who were trying to help them.
- It was realized that the economic potential in China was huge; some spoke of China as the new frontier of the USA. When appointed as Secretary of State, Hay had spent considerable time in discussion with old ‘China hands’. They convinced him that China needed to be brought into mainstream Western civilization.
- Hay realized that US involvement in China would gain the support of the expansionists who were hugely influential in US politics (see page 22) and thereby offer Roosevelt’s Government their support.

Open Door policy
US Secretary of State John Hay realized many Americans would oppose the USA, with its high moral purposes, from joining in any possible dismemberment of China. Therefore, in September 1899 he introduced the idea of the Open Door policy with the first ‘Open Door’ note – asking states to respect each other’s trading rights in China, even in each other’s ‘spheres of influence’ there. He also asked that Chinese officials be allowed to continue collecting Chinese tariffs – thereby implying that China could still act independently.

While official responses to Open Door were vague, Hay asserted in March 1900 that they had been accepted. In fact, states did respect each other’s trading rights in China because they couldn’t afford to conflict with each other over them, and there was enough potential profit for everyone from the China trade.

The Boxer Rebellion
China responded to increasing foreign interference with the Boxer Rebellion in which members of the foreign trade delegations were attacked and besieged in northern China. Among their number was the future US president, Herbert Hoover.

The Boxer Rebellion began in 1900 as a result of poor harvests, plague, unemployment and natural disasters – but the rebels’ targets were overwhelmingly foreigners and those Chinese who had assimilated Western lifestyles. Huge gangs roamed northern China, capturing towns, killing 200 missionaries and thousands of Chinese Christians. In June, a force estimated...
as high as 140,000 occupied Beijing where over 500 foreigners were trapped. An international rescue force of 50,000 meanwhile recaptured the city of Tianjin with great slaughter; among their number were 6300 US troops dispatched from the Philippines. President McKinley set a precedent by ordering their involvement without seeking Congressional approval.

In August, the community at Beijing was relieved by 20,000 members of the international force and the rebellion put down throughout China. Supporters were harshly punished in China while the country itself was forced to pay an indemnity of $300 million to the Western powers and accept more foreign troops on its soil.

**SOURCE H**

*A contemporary reaction to the Boxer Rebellion by the Russian revolutionary leader V.I. Lenin (found at www.sacu.org/boxers.html).*

>The European governments have already started the partition of China … They have begun to rob China as ghouls rob corpses and when the seeming corpse attempted to resist, they flung themselves upon it like savage beasts, burning down whole villages, shooting, bayoneting and drowning in the Amur River unarmed inhabitants, their wives and their children. And all these Christian exploits are accompanied by howls against the Chinese barbarians who dared to raise their hands against the civilized Europeans.

**Second Open Door note**

Hay’s immediate response to the rebellion was to announce the extension of the Open Door policy with a second Open Door note, asserting the principle of equal and impartial trade in all parts of China, not just in the existing foreign spheres of influence. It asserted, moreover, that henceforth the US Government would protect the lives and property of US citizens in China while ‘safeguarding for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese empire’.

**US motives in China**

Hay had ordered US officials to act independently from those of other nations, to act as a sort of honest broker above the duplicities of the other powers in China. However, historian George C. Herring, following the work of historian William A. Williams (see page 86), has argued persuasively that the notion that the Open Door policy saved China from further aggression is a myth. While Hay suggested that the USA was defending China from greedy powers, his policies facilitated the USA’s ability to capture more of the China market as the twentieth century developed. The USA, it is argued, was not really concerned with the well-being of China in its policies.

- It didn’t consult with China before issuing the Open Door notes.
- It didn’t refuse its $25 million share of the indemnity following the Boxer Rebellion.
- It didn’t challenge any of the existing treaties in which Chinese interests were negated.

**KEY TERM**

*Indemnity* A fine as compensation for violent acts, e.g. destruction to property.

? How does Lenin show his bias in Source H?
It didn’t prevent China from having to accept a greater foreign military presence.

However, the USA couldn’t even enforce the Open Door policy because it was a voluntary agreement. Perhaps in the end President McKinley should have the last word about his government’s policy towards China: ‘May we not want a slice, if it is to be divided?’ He meant that the USA was entitled to a share of the wealth of China as it was already being divided up among the other Great Powers. Meanwhile, Japan’s influence was growing. For example, in 1899 it had secured an exclusive sphere of influence in Fujian province in which other powers were not allowed to trade. However, Japan’s relations with the USA were becoming increasingly fraught.

**Japan**

In February 1904, Japan went to war with Russia, and defeated Russian forces in the region by September 1905. President Roosevelt brokered the peace conference held in Portsmouth, New Hampshire in the US for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize. While Roosevelt had originally been sympathetic to Japan, he was worried in case Russia lost its influence in East Asia and Japan became too powerful. He spoke of ‘balanced antagonisms’ in which the Great Powers cancelled each other’s influence out, thus allowing some sense of independence for China.

As a result of the peace settlement at the Treaty of New Hampshire, Japan won the rights to Russia’s former sphere of influence around Port Arthur and had a free hand in Korea, which they colonized. Japan had also demanded a war indemnity from Russia, which was not forthcoming within the treaty. Russia argued it could not afford to pay; Japan felt great resentment against Roosevelt for not insisting on it. The Japanese Government had promised their people they would bring a indemnity from the peace conference. They were therefore disappointed and blamed Roosevelt for cheating them. This resulted in considerable anti-American feeling in Japan.

**San Francisco School Board**

In 1906, the San Francisco School Board voted to segregate children of Japanese and Caucasian descent in schools as a racist measure, in the same way that segregation between African Americans and whites was being enforced in the Southern states. This added to the ill feeling in Japan. Roosevelt had no constitutional power to overturn a local School Board decision although he privately deplored its timing. He told members of the School Board they should consider the wider implications of their segregationist policy, and a compromise was reached whereby they agreed to rescind the decision in return for Japan discouraging its citizens from emigrating to the USA. This Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 was an informal agreement whereby Japan would not allow further emigration by its citizens to the USA so long as the US Government didn’t formally exclude them. The Agreement was intended to reduce tensions, with Japan agreeing to informal restrictions rather than having to accept formal measures to limit

---

**How far did US policy towards Japan reflect its fears of Japanese expansion?**

**KEY TERM**

**Nobel Peace Prize**

An annual prize established in 1901 for an individual, group or organization that has done the most to promote peace over the previous year.

**‘Balanced antagonisms’**

Roosevelt’s term for the way rivalries between countries could prevent them from extending their influence; how their determination to protect their own interests could cancel out their ability to expand them.

**War indemnity**

Compensation or reparations from a defeated nation to the victors following war.
immigration, as with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (see page 16). Japan would have found such legislation deeply humiliating; the 1907 Gentleman’s Agreement therefore allowed Japan to maintain its dignity while the USA could still exclude immigrants from the Far East.

**Root–Takahira Agreements**

Although there were tensions, Japan and the USA nevertheless made formal arrangements to try to reduce them. In 1905, for example, the US and Japan had made an agreement by which both acknowledged the other’s sphere of influence in Korea and the Philippines. Three years later, this was strengthened when they signed the Root–Takahira Agreements, named after the US Secretary of State and Japanese Ambassador to the USA, by which the two countries would recognize Chinese independence, respect each other’s possessions and follow the Open Door policy – except in South Manchuria, which had been granted to Japan following the 1895 war with China.

Nevertheless, Roosevelt informed the incoming president Taft that the USA could not defend the Open Door policy against any country prepared to go to war to threaten it. He understood the situation with Japan as with Germany; he sought to keep their friendship and hopefully their ambitions in check but recognized that the USA could do nothing to stop them if they were prepared to fight to satisfy those ambitions. When asked by the Japanese how he intended to carry out the Open Door policy, the original proponent, Secretary of State John Hay, had replied that the United States ‘was not prepared … to enforce these views on the east by any demonstrations which could present a character of hostility to any other power’. While the Open Door policy may have been unenforceable, the USA nevertheless remained a significant player in the Far East not least because of its annexation of the Philippines.

**‘Great White Fleet’ goodwill trip**

In December 1907 Roosevelt sent a US fleet comprising sixteen battleships, known as ‘the Great White Fleet’ because of the predominant colouring of their hulls, on a goodwill trip to Japan, which was well received there despite some Congressmen fearing it might be vulnerable to attack. The success of the tour prompted Roosevelt to send the fleet around the world on a similar goodwill tour; when Congress refused to allocate funds, he sent it anyway knowing that the legislature would not refuse to pay for it to return home when it was halfway around the world.

**The Philippines**

In 1899 the USA had annexed the Philippines following the Spanish–American–Filipino War and subsequently faced a ruthless war against Filipino nationalists to maintain its control (see pages 53–54). The Philippines was governed by a five-man commission headed by William Howard Taft. Taft had no doubt about the efficacy of his role. He said, ‘We are doing God’s work here.’ Indeed, many improvements took place. New roads were built, the port facilities in Manila were modernized, the currency was stabilized and measures were undertaken to eradicate diseases such as cholera and malaria. The US Congress restricted
Americans from buying large chunks of land. Education was improved, the tax system made more efficient and the legal system more fair.

However, the Philippines remained a colony. The Schurman Commission of 1899, headed by Dr Jacob Schurman, President of Cornell University, had been sent out to study conditions in the Philippines and make recommendations as to their future development. While the commission recommended eventual independence, its members argued that Filipinos weren’t ready for this yet. They advocated a civilian government to replace the existing US military authority, with a legislature and the provision of public education to prepare Filipinos for future independence. While there was some political education undertaken, the franchise was limited to property owners and less than 3 per cent of Filipinos voted. As a result an elite group of wealthy landowners dominated; many of these supported continued US control, partly because they feared what might happen if the US left and partly because they were afraid of potential Japanese aggression.

In 1912, a policy of ‘Filipinization’ was adopted in which more Filipinos sat on the governing council and took part in the bureaucracy. The Jones Act of 1916 committed the USA to prepare Filipinos for independence, and set up an elected Senate. However, there were no concrete moves to actually give Filipinos their independence until the 1930s.

**KEY TERM**

‘Filipinization’ Giving Filipinos more say in governing the Philippines.
President Taft and dollar diplomacy

Key question: To what extent did President Taft practise ‘dollar diplomacy’?

William Howard Taft, who succeeded Roosevelt, had been in charge of the five-man commission that governed the Philippines in the years after annexation (see page 76). On his return in 1904 he was made Secretary of War, a position in which he was well meaning but unimaginative and lacking in energy, and then became President in 1909. Some have argued that his huge size made him lethargic – he weighed almost 300 lbs and had a special bath big enough for four people built for himself in the White House. He was a lawyer by profession – he later became a highly respected Supreme Court Judge – and tended to deliberate very carefully before coming to decisions, which were always cautious and lacking excitement.

Taft’s foreign policy

While Taft shared Roosevelt’s desire to expand US influence in Latin America, he was adverse to foreign adventures and preferred economic as opposed to political or imperial muscle. Taft supported those industrialists who believed US influence could most effectively be achieved through investment and economic ties. Taft supported the idea of US investment in Latin America and extending US economic influence without the cost of problems associated with actual colonization. Throughout Taft’s period of office (1909–13) US capitalists began to invest millions in overseas ventures, especially in the Caribbean. It was believed that not only would those ventures bring huge profits for their investors, but the local people would benefit from the results and thereby support and seek to emulate the US lifestyle and systems of government.

This extension of US influence and economic and political power was known as dollar diplomacy. One example of its application was in China where a US banking group headed by J.P. Morgan muscled into a European-based consortium financing the construction of the Huguang-Canton Railroad. Taft realized that control of railroads was crucial to economic power in any region to prevent Japanese or Russian encroachment. If US interests controlled the railroad, potential rivals such as Japan were thereby excluded. The overall level of US exports to foreign countries and overseas possessions meanwhile rose from $1,495,616,000 between 1903 and 1905 to $2,441,254,000 between 1911 and 1915.

However, dollar diplomacy wasn’t always peaceful, as in the case of Nicaragua where the USA intervened militarily to safeguard its interests.

How far did Taft’s foreign policy differ from that of Roosevelt?

Supreme Court Judge
One of nine Justices who make up the Supreme Court, the main judicial authority in the USA.

Dollar diplomacy
The policy of increasing US influence abroad through financial investment, thus making foreign states economically reliant on the US.
Nicaragua

In Nicaragua, President José Santos Zelaya had been trying to orchestrate anti-American feeling because as a nationalist he resented US influence in his country. In 1909, he cancelled economic privileges previously granted to US mining concerns. The USA feared he aspired to dominate Central America. When he threatened to invade his tiny neighbour El Salvador in 1909, Taft sent in the marines to overthrow Zelaya and install a pro-US regime led by Adolfo Díaz, a former accountant with a US mining company. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Philander C. Knox used his influence with US banking interests to extend US economic power in Nicaragua through providing huge funds in return for control of the Nicaraguan National Bank and 51 per cent ownership of the railroads. Within three years, however, a revolution against Díaz saw a full-scale US invasion in support of him, involving almost 3000 troops. US troops then occupied Nicaragua for over ten years in order to support pro-US governments. In 1909 therefore the US had overthrown a president who was inimical to its interests and in 1912 invaded to support one who favoured the US.

As part of his 1912 election campaign, President Wilson attacked dollar diplomacy and promised that during his administration the US would never again seek ‘one additional foot of territory by conquest’. How accurate this turned out to be will be seen in the next section.

**KEY TERM**

**Central America** The geographical region between North and South America including countries such as Mexico.
President Wilson and his Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan genuinely believed that the US had a responsibility to improve the lives of foreign peoples through US example. They spoke of a moral diplomacy in which the desire to do good would govern US policy. To this end, they gave Colombia $25 million in reparations for the role the USA had played in encouraging the Panamanians to rebel from Colombian rule (see pages 68–69).

Nevertheless, Wilson went on to intervene many times in Latin America. In this sense he continued, and indeed extended, the policies of Roosevelt and Taft that he had opposed before taking office.

Wilson’s idealism

Wilson declared on taking office that future co-operation in Latin America would only be possible when supported by the orderly process of a ‘just’ government based on law; the implication being that he would oppose military dictatorships or revolutionary governments. This took the Roosevelt Corollary (see pages 66–67) to a new level. The goal in Latin America became ‘to support the orderly processes of just government based upon law and not upon arbitrary or irregular forces’. Indeed, he went further, saying, ‘I am going to teach [the] South American Republics to elect good men.’ One of his envoys, Walter H. Page, went further still, saying, presumably in an unguarded moment, that US forces would ‘shoot men’ until ‘they learn to vote and rule themselves’.

All this may seem naïve in the world of international relations. However, Wilson’s idealism did achieve some successes:

- He encouraged US bankers to lend to the Chinese Government.
- He fought against special concessions – he insisted that Congress, for example, repeal the 1912 law exempting US coastal shipping from paying tolls to the Panama Canal.
- US interests built highways, bridges, airfields, hospitals and schools, and set up telephone services in many regions of Latin America.

However, Wilson involved the USA in the affairs of foreign countries more than any president in its history thus far.

Wilson’s interventions

Wilson ordered interventions because he felt the countries the US intervened in were badly governed or corrupt. He genuinely felt that the USA had a
moral obligation to force them to improve or else to take them over for the benefit of the local populations. Twelve years before becoming president, he spoke of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico and the Philippines in the following terms: ‘They are children and we are men in these deep matters of government and justice.’ In the intervening years Wilson had not changed this view.

It must be emphasized that Wilson genuinely and unfailingly believed God’s hand was behind his actions. ‘Americans’, he believed, were ‘custodians of the spirit of righteousness, of the spirit of even-handed justice, of the spirit of hope which believes in the perfect ability of the law with the perfectibility of life itself.’

**Interventions in Central America and the Caribbean**

As a result of Wilson’s moral diplomacy, the USA intervened more often than ever in Latin America.

- Wilson ordered intervention in Haiti – in fact, the US intervened in Haiti no fewer than sixteen times between 1900 and 1913 because of violence and insurrection that threatened US personnel, property and interests. After another revolution in 1915, the USA invaded, restored order and effectively supervised the running of the country, remaining in Haiti until 1934.
- Following various revolutions, the Dominican Republic was placed under US military government in 1915. This was, Wilson implied, the least bad solution. Troops remained there until 1924.
- He maintained the US presence in Nicaragua (see page 79). In fact, the US military occupation continued from 1912–25 and 1926–33 (see page 127).

Historian Niall Ferguson has argued that the territories the US actually annexed – Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, purchased from Denmark in 1916 for $25 million – did much better than those in which they had intervened indirectly because the administration was direct, led by Americans without the complications of involving nationals in the decision-making process. Meanwhile the only consistently functioning democracy in the region – Costa Rica – was one of the few countries the US had not tried to influence.

**Mexico**

The USA had extensive mining and other interests in Mexico. In fact, 43 per cent of all Mexican wealth was in the hands of US interests, notably the Aldrich, Guggenheim and Rockefeller concerns, which owned most of the Mexican railways and mines.

**US involvement, 1914**

Following the overthrow of Porfirio Díaz in 1911, there had been considerable instability in Mexico. President Taft did little, and when Woodrow Wilson took office in 1913 he talked of ‘watchful waiting’, but was undoubtedly concerned at events.
The US Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson had little faith in Díaz’s successor Francisco Madero, the first ever democratically elected president in Mexico. He felt that he lacked widespread support and that he wasn’t up to the job of governing Mexico given its problems and divisions. He thought that a strong dictatorial leader was the best option for the protection of US interests and indeed the 40,000 US citizens living in Mexico. For this reason, he supported the strong-arm General Victoriano Huerta whom Madero had entrusted to put down an attempted coup but then turned against him as he wanted to take power himself. Following Huerta’s assumption of the presidency on 18 February 1913, Madero and several of his supporters were murdered. Ambassador Wilson had been influential in Huerta’s assumption of power. In an event that came to be known as the Embassy Pact, the Ambassador summoned foreign diplomats to the American Embassy to introduce them to Huerta, whom he embraced in a seal of approval. This suggested to the diplomats that Huerta was the favoured candidate of the USA.

The president disagreed with his Ambassador and refused recognition of Huerta’s government because he disapproved of the way it had seized power and murdered Madero. His feelings were unequivocal: ‘I will not recognize a government of butchers.’

**SOURCE I**

An excerpt from a US policy document *Our Purpose in Mexico*, dated November 1913. Wilson sent this to a number of diplomatic legations and embassies in order to outline US goals in Mexico.

*If General Huerta does not retire by force of circumstances, it will be the duty of the US to use less peaceful means to put him out ... Beyond this fixed purpose the government of the United States will not go. It will not permit itself to seek any special advantages in Mexico or elsewhere for its own citizens but will seek, here as elsewhere, to show itself the consistent champion of the open door.*

President Wilson demanded Huerta hold free elections. Naturally Huerta, who regarded himself as the only leader strong enough to bring stability to Mexico, resented this interference. Events moved quickly. In February 1914, the US began to sell weapons to the forces of a rival, General Venustiano Carranza, whom it hoped would be more of a democrat. In April 1914, US sailors from the visiting USS *Dolphin* were arrested in the Mexican port of Tampico. Although they were soon released, Wilson ordered the invasion of the Mexican port of Veracruz on the pretext of preventing arms supplies arriving for the use of Huerta’s forces. On 20 April, the president justified this action, saying: ‘There can in what we do be no thought of aggression or of selfish aggrandizement.’ It was the duty of the US to ‘keep our influence unimpaired for the cause of liberty, both in the US and wherever else it may be employed for the benefit of mankind’.

Fine words. However, in 1914 the armed conflict around Veracruz resulted in over 300 Mexican and 90 American deaths. Huerta, facing increasing military
opposition in Mexico and unable to dislodge US forces, relinquished his position as president and went into exile. US forces remained in Veracruz until November 1914. Carranza, meanwhile, while publically condemning the US presence, was their favoured candidate, and benefited from arms shipments and the use of port facilities at Veracruz. A convention held in October to determine the future of Mexico failed to come to agreement and civil war ensued between the forces of Carranza and rival leaders such as Emilio Zapata and Francisco (Pancho) Villa.

**US involvement, 1915–16**

Wilson accepted the offer of Argentina, Chile and Brazil to mediate and to withdraw from Veracruz. At a conference in May 1915 at Niagara Falls in Canada, Huerta, fearing full-scale US intervention, agreed to relinquish power to Carranza. On 14 July he went into exile. However, Mexico was by this time engaged in the full-scale civil war referred to above.

Wilson appeared to have found himself in the position of having supported the wrong side in more ways than one. It appeared that Carranza was unsuccessful both at achieving power and at being a democrat. Neither Wilson nor his officials in Washington DC knew much about conditions inside Mexico. A US businessman, Daniel E. Lowery, who did, told US consular officials that, ‘everywhere I find the Carrancista [supporters of Carranza] forces are dreaded by all classes alike’.

In the north, Francisco (Pancho) Villa, widely regarded as little more than a bandit, enjoyed considerable success through his appeals to the peasantry, and actually seized Mexico City. On 15 October, Wilson recognized Carranza’s government as it wrenched back control of central Mexico, having convincingly defeated Villa at the Battle of Celaya on 15 April. In retaliation, in January 1916, Villa stopped a train at Santa Isabel and executed 17 US passengers and launched attacks inside the USA itself in New Mexico, for example, burning the town of Columbus and killing 19 of its citizens. His motives were simple; in part loot, but also to encourage full-scale US intervention in Mexico, which, in weakening Carranza’s government, he could use to his own advantage. Villa believed that if the US invaded, Carranza would be seen to be weak in having been unable to prevent it and would therefore lose support. Also the presence of US forces would add to the confusion within Mexico, which he could exploit for his own ends – taking advantage of the instability to increase his opportunities to expand his area of influence and exploit its wealth.

Wilson in fact found himself with little choice but to become involved militarily in Mexico. He sent a force of almost 6000 troops under General Pershing to invade Mexico in search of Villa, who meanwhile crossed the border again to kill US inhabitants of Glenn Springs, Texas. With Pershing’s force being dragged ever deeper inside Mexico in search of Villa (in what was effectively a wild goose chase), Carranza, who sought US support, had little choice but to condemn the invasion if he was to be seen as a Mexican patriot.
When a constitutional government was finally set up in October 1916, Wilson was able to order the withdrawal of US troops. Little had been achieved; Mexico remained in a state of war until at least 1920. But by this time Wilson had become more and more preoccupied by the events of the First World War and his efforts to keep the USA out of it.
Key debate

**Key question:** What were the motives for US imperialism?

The USA colonized the Philippines and annexed Puerto Rico but never developed a huge empire on the lines of Britain and France. Nevertheless, the USA exerted a massive influence across the world, possibly more than any other country. This section will consider how historians have explained what motivated US imperialism and examine the relative weighting of the different factors.

**President McKinley’s views**
President McKinley had no doubt that American imperialism was for the good of subject peoples.

**SOURCE K**

An excerpt from a speech by President McKinley in New York City, 3 March 1900 (found at www.christandcountry.net/historic_docs/speeches/mckinley_imperialism_speech.html).

Nations do not grow in strength, and the cause of liberty and law is not advanced by the doing of easy things ... It is not possible that 75 millions of American free men are unable to establish liberty and justice and good government in our new possessions ... Our institutions will not deteriorate by extension and our sense of justice will not abate under tropical suns in distant seas.
Many contemporaries agreed. The USA was acquiring influence over other peoples for their own good, so they might acquire and prosper as a result of American values of decency, Christianity, democracy and capitalism. As Theodore Roosevelt argued concerning the colonization of the Philippines, ‘we will play our part well in the great work of uplifting mankind’. As we will see, some historians share this view but others are more sceptical. They do not see US imperialism as being so fundamentally different from that of the Great Powers in that economic and political factors drove the impulse to expand.

Accidental empire
Some historians have suggested that the USA never actively sought an empire at all. In a chapter entitled ‘Accidental Empire’ in his 1998 book The American Century, journalist Harold Evans argued that there was no real desire for empire, and points to the fact that the vote to annex the Philippines was only passed through the deciding vote of Vice President Garrett Augustus Hobart (see page 51). Evans believed that US capitalists did not need an empire to meet the demand for their surplus products, pointing to the fact that between 1907 and 1911, exports accounted for less than 6 per cent of GNP, with the vast majority of trade being with Britain, as until the First World War (1914–18) producers focused on domestic demand. Evans argued that each acquisition was a special case, as in sugar interests and its strategic naval position in the case of Hawaii (see pages 25–26).

The need for markets
Writing initially in the 1950s, historian William A. Williams, in his hugely influential work, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, argued that the need for markets was the prime motive for expansion and it was felt that this could be met by ‘Open Door’ policies rather than traditional forms of empire-based imperialism. He went on to suggest that a coalition of business and political interests realized that the USA’s economic muscle could achieve domination without the need for colonization as such. This is what acted as the catalyst to USA imperialism. Within it the USA hoped to provide the benefits of civilization, order and democracy to those affected. However, there were in reality problems with this approach. The trade mainly benefited the USA and people were kept subservient in an ‘informal empire’, which also undermined the goal of ‘self-determination’ – in other words, despite appearances, the USA acquired a traditional empire in all except name. This theme has been developed to differing degrees and emphases, by different historians such as Niall Ferguson, since its first appearance.

Niall Ferguson
In his 2003 book American Colossus, historian Niall Ferguson argued that many aspects of US imperialism were similar to those of other imperial powers. Ferguson examined how the USA sought to increase trade on advantageous terms, and reaffirmed the impact of the 1893 depression on the desire to seek new markets. He also discussed the readiness of the USA to deploy its economic and military power to promote its own interests in
relation to those of its competitors. However, he then went on to argue that USA imperialism differed in two main ways:

- Political support for imperialism was quite narrow, being confined to the northern political elites who nevertheless exerted considerable influence in the US decision-making process.
- The economic value of colonies was more seriously questioned in the USA than elsewhere. Many argued that it would not be in the interests of the USA to be inundated with goods it did not require.

Others moreover followed the racist arguments that colonies would cause problems through the influx of inferior racial stock.

**Progressive imperialism**

In 1997 historian Walter McDougall wrote that US imperialism was an extension of domestic progressive policies, with a desire to improve the lives of those affected. He cites the eradication of yellow fever and the building of schools and hospitals in Cuba and quotes the Reverend Alexander Blackburn, who spoke of ‘the imperialism of righteousness’. Progressive politicians believed it was possible to improve society. Most of them supported the Spanish–American–Cuban War and the colonization of the Philippines. Intellectuals agreed; Alfred T. Mahan (see pages 21–22) was elected president of the American Historical Association. Progressive journalist Herbert Croly wrote in 1909 that progressive foreign policy was ‘the pursuit of a perfected American system of states’. This export of decent American values to less developed peoples appeared as the spirit of the age and would, of course, see an even more enthusiastic approach during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. Historian Henry W. Brands, writing in 1999, said American progressivism simply went international – even if it meant through forcing people to be better, for example, the Roosevelt Corollary.

**Desire for world domination**

Writing in 2004, journalist John B. Judis has argued that the USA effectively did become an imperial power. It sought colonies not only for the usual reasons of expanding trade on advantageous terms and increasing its military power, but also because it wanted to dominate the world by creating countries in its own image – that the USA had a unique mission to civilize the world. He quotes Senator Albert Beveridge who argued in 1900 that, ‘God’s hand is in … the movement of the American people toward the mastery of the world.’ Again, President Wilson was the most sustained enthusiastic proponent, at least until the First World War, after which he came to blame German aggression for the conflict and sought to develop structures which would end and reverse colonialism in favour of self-determination by all peoples.

It will be seen then that while US imperialism may have taken different forms from that of, say, Britain and France, who colonized and ran their empires more directly, much of the impetus was similar. Many historians
United States’ foreign policies, 1901–17

The progressive presidents were all motivated by the belief that the USA was a force for good in the world and all peoples would benefit from US contact. This led in effect to colonization by other means. Many countries in Latin America, for example Cuba, had their economies effectively controlled by the USA. President Roosevelt spoke of a ‘Big Stick’ where he said countries must act responsibly, for example, in the payment of foreign debts; if not the USA would force them to. He strengthened this policy in 1904 with the Roosevelt Corollary, which effectively said the USA would act as a policeman throughout the western hemisphere. As a result, during the years 1900 to 1917, the USA intervened directly in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Mexico. The USA meanwhile practised an Open Door policy in China where it was hoped the Great Powers would respect each other’s rights to trade. It did, however, become militarily involved in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion in 1900. President Taft spoke of ‘dollar diplomacy’ in which it was hoped the USA could extend its influence largely by its economic power alone. However, his successor, Woodrow Wilson, believed in moral diplomacy in which the USA had an obligation to intervene for good; his presidency saw more intervention than in any previous period in US history.

Examination advice

How to answer ‘compare and contrast’ questions

For ‘compare and contrast’ questions, you are asked to identify both similarities and differences. Better essays tend to approach the question thematically. It is best not to write half of the essay as a collection of similarities and half as differences. Finally, straight narrative should be avoided.

Example

Compare and contrast the effectiveness of dollar and moral diplomacy.

1. When answering a ‘compare and contrast’ question like this one, you should create a chart that illustrates the similarities and differences.
between the two elements of the question. Take five minutes to do this before writing your essay.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOLLAR DIPLOMACY</th>
<th>MORAL DIPLOMACY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Similarities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive President Taft</td>
<td>Progressive President Wilson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extend US influence through trade</td>
<td>Extend US influence through trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect US investments</td>
<td>Protect US investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervened abroad: Nicaragua (1909, 1912); Cuba (1912)</td>
<td>Intervened multiple times in Latin America: Cuba (1917–22); Haiti (1919–34); Dominican Republic (1915–24); Mexico during Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not seek foreign territory</td>
<td>Did not seek foreign territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Differences</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taft focused on economic expansion</td>
<td>Wilson focused on the USA’s moral obligations to the world – US custodians of spirit of righteousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not greatly involved in Mexican Revolution</td>
<td>Heavily involved in Mexican Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not use military forces often</td>
<td>Sent US marines to occupy several nations often</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taft’s focus was on markets</td>
<td>Wilson’s focus was on doing good: $20 million to Colombia; encouraged US bankers to lend to Chinese government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. In your introduction, briefly and clearly state how the two presidents’ foreign policies were similar and different. It helps to provide historical context for your answer. You should mention that dollar diplomacy is associated with President Taft (1909–13) and moral diplomacy with President Wilson (1913–21). It is also very important to explain what you mean by ‘effectiveness’. ‘Effectiveness’ could mean how either or both presidents’ foreign policies helped the USA project power and increase trade. The word could also suggest the extent to which each met its stated goals. Alternatively, you could discuss dollar and moral diplomacy from the point of view of a Mexican, a Nicaraguan or a Haitian. What impact did US foreign policy have on them?

3. In the body of the essay, you need to discuss each of the points you raised in the introduction. Devote at least a paragraph to each one. It would be a good idea to order these in terms of which ones you think are most important. Be sure to make a connection between the points you raise and the major thrust of your argument. An example of how one of the points could be compared and contrasted is given below.

Taft’s dollar diplomacy and Wilson’s moral diplomacy both professed to avoid military interventions if at all possible. In the case of the former, economic expansion abroad was viewed as preferable to the much more expensive proposition of sending in US soldiers to force...
foreign governments to comply with US wishes. During President Taft’s term in office (1909–13), investments abroad, particularly in the Caribbean and in China, grew. President Wilson (1913–21) sometimes used the economic might of the USA to obtain what he considered moral ends. For example, he persuaded US bankers to lend money to a new Chinese government and paid $25 million to the Colombian government for the loss of Panama. He also sought to protect the substantial US investments in Mexico by ensuring that Mexico would choose a president not hostile to its northern neighbour. In terms of economic effectiveness, both presidential diplomatic policies were fairly successful. The US expanded its trade with Latin America and Asia and safeguarded US business interests abroad. However, there were other actions the country took which would seem to contradict the core of each president’s diplomatic efforts, although neither president would have seen military intervention in this light.

4. In your conclusion, you will want to summarize your findings. This is your opportunity to support your thesis. Remember not to bring up any evidence that you did not discuss in the body of your essay.

5. Now try writing a complete answer to the question, following the advice above.

Examination practice

Below are two exam-style questions for you to practise on this topic.

1. Evaluate the success of US intervention in the Caribbean.
   (For guidance on how to answer ‘evaluate’ questions, see pages 30–32.)

2. Why did Roosevelt issue his Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine?
   (For guidance on how to answer ‘why’ questions, see pages 57–59.)
The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement

This chapter considers the role of the USA during the First World War (1914–18): how hard the USA tried to maintain its neutrality between 1914 and 1917, why it joined the war in April 1917, and how historians have interpreted the reasons for its entry. It examines the impact of the war on the home front, particularly in terms of the growth in governmental power, and then goes on to discuss the attempts by President Wilson to get Congress and the American people to accept the peace. The chapter then considers how far the USA was able to pursue isolationist policies in the 1920s and to what extent it became involved in foreign affairs. Emphasis is subsequently given to relations with countries of Latin America, where US influence was considerable and growing. Finally, the debate analyses how far historians agree about the level of US involvement in foreign affairs during the 1920s.

You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter:

- To what extent did the USA adopt a policy of neutrality?
- Why did the USA enter the war in April 1917?
- What reasons have been offered by historians for the entry of the USA into the First World War?
- In what ways did the USA change during the First World War?
- How influential was Wilson in the post-war settlement?
- To what extent was the USA isolationist during the 1920s?
- How did the USA penetrate Latin America after the First World War?
- How extensively did the USA involve itself in international agreements?
- How far do historians agree about the level of the USA’s involvement in foreign affairs in the 1920s?

US neutrality, 1914–17

**Key question:** To what extent did the USA adopt a policy of neutrality?

At the onset of war in August 1914, the USA ostensibly adopted a policy of neutrality which was maintained until April 1917, when it entered the war as an associated power on the side of the Allies. During the 1916 presidential elections, Woodrow Wilson campaigned to keep the USA out of war; yet a few months after his electoral victory he had joined the conflict. This section

**KEY TERM**

**Associated power** Power not formally allied to other countries fighting against a common enemy, therefore having independence as to military strategy and the subsequent peace settlement.

**Allies** Name given to the countries fighting Germany, e.g. Britain, France, Russia.
looks at the reasons for the USA’s initial and continued neutrality and why it proved a contentious issue.

**Reasons for neutrality**

There are various reasons why the USA tried to be neutral in August 1914 including the weight of public opinion, and *Wilsonianism*, a term that refers to Wilson’s idealism in foreign affairs discussed in the previous chapter (see pages 80–81).

**Public opinion**

The prevailing mood in the USA was that the war in Europe had nothing to do with them. One Boston newspaper smugly reported, ‘The worst has befallen us in this cruel war. The price of beans has risen.’ Politicians had to reflect and respond to this reluctance to become involved in events thousands of miles away. One of President Wilson’s biographers, Ray Stannard Baker, wrote that the people were ‘not only uninformed but largely uninterested in the war’.

There was a widespread feeling that wars were wrong and achieved little. On 29 August 1914, 1500 women marched down Fifth Avenue in New York in black robes to the beat of drums to protest the war. Various influential leaders including Wilson’s Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan began to organize campaigns against the war.

**Wilsonianism**

The onset of war coincided with President Wilson’s grief over the death of his first wife. Nevertheless, his apparent inactivity matched the mood of the American people. Wilson himself sought neutrality. He regarded himself as an honest broker who could negotiate a peace settlement (see pages 99–100), a view consistent with Wilsonianism.

To succeed in this and gain the trust of all parties Wilson had to be above reproach in terms of neutrality. In his *Declaration of Neutrality* of 19 August 1914 he offered to mediate. He was desperate not only for the USA to stay out, but also for the conflict to end. Wilson, it must be remembered, was guided by a sense of Christian morality that found war abhorrent – despite the number of times he had intervened in Latin America (see pages 81–83). Wilson also feared the war could escalate and the USA be sucked in so he was anxious from the start to support moves to end the conflict. If the USA was to have influence in peace-making, it would need to be beyond reproach in its neutrality. When he discovered in autumn 1915 that his Army General Staff had been discussing war plans in the event of US involvement he threatened to have them all dismissed. Hearing about *military war games* planned by the *War College*, he told his Secretary of War Newton Baker, ‘That seems to me a very dangerous occupation. I think you had better stop it.’
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement

SOURCE A

An extract from the Declaration of Neutrality by President Wilson to Congress, 19 August 1914 (found at www.firstworldwar.com/source/usneutrality.htm).

The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefly from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the conflict.

Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility, responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and affection to think first of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion if not in action.

Such divisions amongst us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend.

Tensions concerning neutrality

There were, however, problems with neutrality:

- pro-British and anti-German sentiments
- issues of trade
- issues around freedom of the seas.

Pro-British feeling

While Wilson genuinely sought neutrality, he and many of his advisers actually favoured the Allies, and the British in particular. This was in part due to Wilson’s natural predilections; he enjoyed British culture and customs. He maintained all his life fond memories of cycling around the English Lake District as a young man and saw Britain as a centre of civilization and decency.

Anti-German feeling

More significantly, however, Wilson agreed with his advisers, particularly his close friend Colonel Edward House and Robert Lansing (Legal Advisor to the State Department, and from June 1915, Secretary of State), that Germany posed a threat to US interests and it would be better to help the Allies fight the Germans now than have the USA potentially fight them alone one day. The USA had had confrontations with Germany in Samoa in 1889 (see pages 24–25) and over Venezuela in 1902 (see page 66). Wilson worried about Germany’s growing interests in Latin America, especially in Mexico.

What is Wilson warning US citizens against in Source A? According to the extract, explain why he is issuing this warning.

To what extent was US neutrality threatened?

KEY TERM

State Department The US branch of government responsible for the implementation of foreign policy.
In his message to Congress in December 1915, Wilson attacked German-Americans for disloyalty to the USA, and refused to allow legislation introduced from politicians from states in the Midwest with large German-American populations, which would ban the sale of munitions to either side in the conflict (see below).

**SOURCE B**

An extract from Wilson’s State of the Union address to Congress, 7 December 1915 (found at [http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3794](http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3794)).

*I am sorry to say that the gravest threats against our national peace and safety have been uttered within our own borders. There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life; who have sought to bring the authority and good name of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to debase our politics to the uses of foreign intrigue … They have formed plots to destroy property, they have entered into conspiracies against the neutrality of the Government, they have sought to pry into every confidential transaction of the Government in order to serve interests alien to our own.*

There was also considerable anti-German propaganda in the popular press. Stories of German atrocities abounded such as the rape of nuns in Belgium, spearing babies on bayonets and wholesale murder of civilians. That there was little truth in any of these allegations hardly mattered; the *Hun* was depicted as cruel and bestial.

To a certain extent Wilson’s partiality affected the judgement of his administration. Despite the genuine desire for US neutrality and a fair peace settlement, Wilson’s policies were never really neutral as such and always favoured the Allies.

**Support for the Allies**

The USA was secretly giving diplomatic help to the British – for example, the US Ambassador to Britain helped the British Foreign Office draft replies to *US diplomatic notes*, while the head of the *British Secret Service* in Washington DC was surreptitiously given access to secret documents.

The Allies also benefited more than the *Central Powers* from trade with the US.

**Trade**

By 1914, the USA was one of the world’s major trading nations. In that year it exported $549 million worth of goods to Britain and showed a trading surplus of over $300 million. It also sold over $344 million worth of goods to Germany, with a trading surplus of $154 million. Some Americans favoured the prevention of trade with any of the countries at war because of the
complications it could cause. Others argued its continuation would bring prosperity to the USA as all sides needed to buy US goods because of the demands of war. The Government wanted to maintain trade if only because it received 40 per cent of its revenues from foreign commerce and loss of trade could see a $60 to $100 million deficit in government spending over income.

At first, commerce was looked at with a case-by-case approach.

- In August, Bryan asked Wilson to prevent J.P. Morgan and Co. from floating a $100 million bond for the French Government.
- In November, Bethlehem Steel was prevented from selling submarines to Britain.

However, Wilson realized that by using case-by-case considerations the US could be accused of bias. He turned, therefore, to the rules of international law, which ultimately said neutrals could sell to countries at war. Indeed, three international lawyers asserted that any embargo would in fact be illegal, and in December 1914 Germany admitted that traffic in arms was legal. Wilson agreed that it would be wrong to stop selling arms to those who most needed them – in October 1915 for example he didn’t stand in the way of France obtaining a $10 million loan from National City Bank to buy weapons from US interests.

Trade favoured the Allies much more than the Germans, in part because of the effectiveness of the British blockade of Germany. Trade with the Allies, much of which was in munitions, stood at $3.2 billion by 1916. This was ten times that of trade with the Central Powers. By 1916 US trade with Germany was only 1 per cent of what it had been in 1914. In its trade policies therefore the USA could hardly be seen to be neutral – it was selling far more to the Allies than to the Central Powers.

**Borrowing**

The Allies had by the end of hostilities in 1918 borrowed nearly $7 billion from the USA, which after the war they would need to repay. By the time of the peace settlement, Allied war debts to the USA amounted to $10.5 billion.

**Freedom of the seas**

The laws of the sea allowed countries at war to blockade enemy ports, as the British were doing to German ports, and seize cargo classified as ‘contraband’, which could loosely be defined as anything useful to the enemy. At first this caused conflict between Britain and the US because, during the early stages of the war, Britain began seizing US ships and confiscating their cargoes destined for neutral ports, even when they only carried foodstuffs. Britain declared many commodities including food and textiles as contraband and blacklisted foreign firms who traded with the Central Powers. The situation seemed similar to the British blockade during the Napoleonic wars, which had led to the 1812 war between Britain and the USA (see page 14).
Read Source C carefully. Explain why the USA was angry with Britain.

**SOURCE C**

An extract from a letter from Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to the Ambassador to Britain Walter Hines, 26 December 1914 (found at http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/U.S._Protests_Against_Maritime_Warfare).

The Government of the United States has viewed with growing concern the large numbers of vessels laden with American goods destined to neutral ports in Europe, which have been seized on the high seas, taken into British ports and detained sometimes for weeks by the British authorities. During the early days of the war this Government assumed that the policy adopted by the British Government was due to the unexpected outbreak of hostilities and the necessity of immediate action to prevent contraband from reaching the enemy. For this reason it was not disposed to judge this policy harshly or protest it vigorously, although it was manifestly very injurious to American trade with the neutral countries of Europe. This Government, relying confidently upon the high regard which Great Britain has so often exhibited in the past for the rights of other nations, confidently awaited amendment of a course of action which denied to neutral commerce the freedom to which it was entitled by the law of nations.

Wilson could justifiably have made far more of a protest because the British seizure of neutral ships verged on illegality. However, Wilson faced the dilemma that, while the British actions might have been unfair on neutral nations, he nevertheless wanted the Allies to win the war. It was true also that American crews were treated with courtesy, and there were no deaths. This was in contrast with the German development of submarine warfare in which vessels might be attacked without warning and loss of life was considerable.

**Unrestricted submarine warfare, February–August 1915**

In February 1915, Germany declared British waters a war zone and reserved the right to sink any ships travelling to Britain – including those flying the flags of neutral countries. They would deploy their new submarine fleet to destroy merchant ships containing essential supplies as they crossed the Atlantic Ocean. This policy of **unrestricted submarine warfare** was Germany’s attempt to break the deadlock of **trench warfare** in western Europe, through wresting control of the seas from Britain and starving her into surrender.

Wilson immediately responded by warning Germany he would hold them responsible for the loss of any American lives on ships sunk by Germany. Nevertheless, at the time, some Americans felt unrestricted submarine warfare was a reasonable tactic, and the answer to it was to ensure US ships and civilians weren’t headed to Britain. Wilson’s Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, actually said that merchant ships carrying war supplies couldn’t rely on the presence of women and children to protect them from attack – ships were vulnerable to attack whoever might be among their passengers. The German Embassy took out advertising campaigns in the USA to warn Americans not to travel to Britain.

**KEY TERM**

**Unrestricted submarine warfare** Attacking any ship en route to an enemy port.

**Trench warfare** The defensive network used on the Western Front and elsewhere in which millions died.
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement


NOTICE!
Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.
IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 22, 1915.

The controversial policy of unrestricted submarine warfare came to a head with the sinking of the British ship RMS Lusitania in May 1915, with 128 Americans among the 1200 dead. Wilson issued a strong protest, demanding that Germany abandon the policy. Bryan resigned as Secretary of State over the uneven handling of the issue. He argued that Wilson did not protest British violations in seizing neutral ships as described above – although many historians have noted that these did not result in American deaths. Germany was surprised by Wilson’s vehemence, particularly after their well-publicized warnings. Nevertheless, after another British ship the SS Arabic was sunk in August, with the deaths of two Americans, they agreed to abandon unrestricted submarine warfare. From now on submarines would only attack the ships after giving due warnings and ensuring their crew and passengers had been placed in lifeboats.

It might be argued that if the USA had banned its citizens from travelling to Britain, the issue of unrestricted submarine warfare would not have been a major issue there. In March 1916 the anti-war Texas Representative Jeff McLemore introduced a resolution, which the Senate tabled, to ban American citizens from travelling on any neutral or belligerent ship carrying contraband cargo; Wilson insisted it be rejected. Some historians have argued his personal pride was at stake – the president should be able to protect his citizens wherever they travelled to.

Sussex Pledge
In March 1916, after the sinking of a French ship with the same name, Germany signed the ‘Sussex Pledge’ in which it promised to evacuate all capital ships before sinking them – so long as the USA could induce Britain to relax the blockade, which was resulting in starvation in Germany. However, Britain did not relax the blockade and Germany was to resume unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917.
The US 1916 presidential election
As might be expected, the issue of the war dominated the campaigns. Wilson was in a difficult situation; the Democratic Party was campaigning on his neutrality and during the Convention in which he was renominated, supporter after supporter applauded the fact that ‘He kept us out of the War’. This indeed became one of the campaign slogans. Wilson, however, was not so sanguine. As he told his Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, ‘They talk of me as though I were a god. Any little German lieutenant can put us into the war at any time by some calculated outrage.’

Wilson won the election by 9.1 million to 8.5 million votes against a respected but uncharismatic opponent, Charles Evan Hughes, who had much the same policies towards the war. The election was close, and had as much as to with Hughes’ political failings as with popular enthusiasm for Wilson. For example, Hughes was indecisive on various domestic issues and upset the popular Governor of California, Hiram Johnson, by not meeting him when he campaigned there, thereby losing his support.
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement

US entry into the war

Key question: Why did the USA enter the war in April 1917?

When the Germans announced the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare on 31 January 1917, Wilson still wanted to remain neutral, although he was losing patience with the British over various issues:

- Their self-defeating response to the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin, in which they had executed and thus made martyrs of the ringleaders. This made thousands of Irish-Americans even more anti-British.
- Britain’s refusal to relax the blockade on Germany.
- Britain’s refusal to discuss peace terms brokered by Wilson.

Wilson’s focus thus shifted from brokering peace to full-scale involvement in hostilities. It is important to remember, however, that Wilson still saw himself as the main influence on the post-war peace settlement. While earlier he had seen US neutrality as the key factor in garnering the respect of all the countries at war to promote peace-making, he increasingly saw US involvement as the best guarantee of the USA’s right to influence the post-war peace settlement. For this reason Wilson was speaking of a post-war world even before the US entered the war.

Wilson’s ideas for a post-war settlement

An end to war

Wilson was increasingly considering a post-war world without future war. As early as 1912, he had spoken of four ideas necessary for the survival of humanity:

- some sort of international association for nations to join
- a guarantee of rights of all peoples
- internationally agreed sanctions for aggressors
- the removal of the manufacture of munitions from profit-making private concerns to governments.

In his State of the Union address in December 1915, he had linked the security of the USA with that of mankind. Clearly he was thinking that the USA would have to be an active partner in a post-war world: ‘What affects mankind is inevitably our affair.’

Wilson gave a speech in May 1916 in which he outlined the factors that lead to war such as secret diplomacy, which led to distrust between nations, and increasing expenditure on armaments, and went on to speak of the need for the consent of the peoples affected before territories could be transferred and the need for an international organization to keep the peace. This last idea was hardly new – the former president Theodore Roosevelt had advocated it – but it became the cornerstone of Wilson’s plans for a lasting peace.

What measures did Wilson hope would maintain peace in the future?

Key term

Secret diplomacy Secret agreements between countries.
Wilson still wanted to remain above the conflict to maintain his credibility as a peacemaker. He asked both sides on what basis they’d consider a truce. On 22 January 1917 he spoke in the Senate about the need for ‘peace without victory’. He realized a lasting peace was unlikely if any former belligerents were resentful. Any settlement would have to bypass any desire for revenge. He spoke of a post-war world with the following conditions:

- freedom of the seas
- armaments’ manufacture and distribution by an international organization
- no entangling or secret alliances
- self-determination for all nations.

**SOURCE E**

An extract from Wilson’s ‘Peace Without Victory’ speech to the Senate, 22 January 1917 (found at www.firstworldwar.com/source/peacewithoutvictory.htm).

Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor’s terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace, the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

Wilson was, in other words, formulating what would become his **Fourteen Points** (see pages 116–117) as a basis for a lasting peaceful settlement in which the USA would set the example of international relations to which all nations aspired. Referring to Wilson’s ‘Peace Without Victory’ speech, French premier Georges Clemenceau said, ‘Never before has any political assembly heard so fine a sermon on what human beings might be capable of accomplishing if only they weren’t human.’

**Failure of peace initiatives**

However, by April, the USA had cast neutrality aside and entered the war. Wilson realized that if the USA did join the war he would lose credibility as a peacemaker, but no-one seemed interested in his efforts to broker peace anyway. He had sent his envoy Colonel Edward House twice to Europe in 1915 and 1916 to negotiate a truce but neither side responded very enthusiastically. Although Wilson found the British attitude annoying, he was still more partial to their cause and increasingly both sides knew it. Before the 1916 presidential election Wilson informed the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, that if Germany refused to attend a peace conference, the USA would probably have to enter the war on the Allied side. This sort of talk was doubtlessly influential in informing Allied hopes about eventual US intervention and their reluctance to negotiate a truce. Germany meanwhile increasingly distrusted Wilson for the same reason.
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement

Reasons for US entry into the war
In April 1917, the USA entered the war on the Allied side. Various reasons have been offered for this:

- resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare
- German activities within the USA
- the Zimmermann telegram.

Resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare
On 31 January 1917, Germany gave eight hours’ notice that it intended to sink all ships found within the war zone around British waters. With this they resumed the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. There was a sense in which they were making a final gamble on victory. The Kaiser wrote a memorandum to his Admiralty, saying, ‘Now once and for all, an end to negotiations with America. If Wilson wants war, let him make it, and then let him have it.’ The German Government believed it was in a position where it could starve Britain into surrender by intensifying the U-boat campaign. If the USA declared war as a result, the German gamble was that the Allies, both lacking foodstuffs and war materials imported from the USA and other American countries, would surrender before the Americans could cross the submarine-infested Atlantic in sufficient numbers to make any difference.

While Wilson privately considered the Kaiser insane, and on 3 February broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, he still hoped to avoid entry into the war. However, on the same day, the US ship Housatonic was sunk, on 12 February the Lyman M Law, and on 27 February the Italian armed liner Laconia, with the deaths of a further two Americans. On 12 March, the US steamer Algonquin was sunk without warning; in the following few days, three further US vessels were sunk. Wilson ordered the arming of US merchant vessels that same month.

German activities within the USA
We have already seen that Wilson distrusted many German-Americans (see pages 93–94) and accused them of espionage and sabotage. Some Germans were undoubtedly spying and committing acts of espionage within the USA. While the extent and impact of their activities may have been exaggerated, the presence of internal traitors undoubtedly fuelled further resentment against Germany.

Black Tom’s munitions plant
On 30 July 1916, Black Tom’s munitions plant in Jersey City Harbour mysteriously exploded, causing $20 million worth of damage and smashing windows as far as 26 kilometres away. Some fragments from the explosion lodged in the Statue of Liberty. It has been estimated that as much as 907,000 kilograms of ammunition went up in the explosion. German saboteurs were blamed for the explosion although no-one was ever brought to trial.
The Zimmermann telegram
The Zimmermann telegram was a cabled telegram from German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann to the German Ambassador to Mexico Heinrich von Eckhart, sent on 16 January 1917. It told von Eckhart to propose a secret alliance with Germany to the Mexican Government in which, if they went to war with the USA, the latter would receive back Texas, Arizona and New Mexico. British intelligence intercepted the telegram and passed it on to the US Ambassador in Britain, Walter Page. In February 1917, he sent a copy of the telegram to the State Department. The Ambassador had not in fact acted on the instruction, and Mexico knew nothing of it. With a civil war raging there Mexico was hardly in a position to make full-scale war on the USA. Nevertheless, Wilson was affronted by this telegram and it afforded him a further pretext for war.

Declaration of war
In April 1917, Wilson asked Congress for the authority to make war on Germany. He realized quite simply that he had little choice; the USA had been provoked until its credibility was threatened. The Allies, moreover, were in trouble:

- In December 1917 Russia had withdrawn from the conflict.
- In February and March 1917, 1 million tons of Allied shipping was sunk by U-boats.
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement

**SOURCE G**

The joint resolution by the President and Congress of the declaration of war on Germany, 6 April 1917 (found at www.firstworldwar.com/source/usofficialawardeclaration.htm).

Whereas the Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America; Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, that the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

CHAMP CLARK  
Speaker of the House of Representatives  
THOS. R. MARSHALL  
Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate  

Approved, April 6, 1917  
WOODROW WILSON

Wilson feared the defeat of the Allies was increasingly likely if US involvement wasn’t forthcoming. By now he realized that only belligerents could possibly have any influence in negotiating the post-war settlement. However, the USA fought as an associated power, not as a formal ally of Britain and France. Wilson still hoped his independent status would give him a predominant role in being able to help negotiate a lasting peace based on fairness and justice for all – peace without victory. However, not everyone supported Wilson in his wider reasons for joining the conflict. Many felt the reason should simply be the need to defeat Germany and its allies, and then bring the US troops home and avoid further foreign entanglements.

**SOURCE H**


I join in no crusade. I seek or accept no alliance; I obligate this government to no other power. I make war alone for my countrymen and their rights for my country and its honor.

Others, for example many of those of German origin, supported Germany and argued that the USA had never been neutral; the German-American poet George S.Viereck had written in 1915 that, “Wilson prattles on about humanity while German orphans and widows mourn graves marked,”Made in America”, implying that US equipment was already helping to kill Germans in the conflict.
**Key debate**

**Key question:** What reasons have been offered by historians for the entry of the USA into the First World War?

Historians have emphasized differing reasons for the entry of the USA into the war. In this debate we will reflect some of the perspectives and foci from which they argue.

**The economic and isolationist debate**

During the inter-war period between 1918 and 1941, when reaction to the horrors of the First World War had set in, many commentators such as C. Hartley Grattan and Walter Millis saw Wilson as a dupe, someone who had been swayed by a special relationship with big business, including bankers and munitions manufacturers, into going to war so these powerful and wealthy interests could continue to enjoy huge profits. They cite evidence such as how exports to the Allies brought the USA out of depression in 1914 and that Bryan resigned because he felt loans and exports were
compromising neutrality (see page 97). Historian Charles Beard developed the argument further, stressing that the pressures for entry into war came from ordinary business interests.

Many of these historians supported isolationism during the inter-war years; they deployed their arguments to reason that entry into the war had been wrong and the USA should not repeat this. Given the subsequent rise of Nazi Germany and the entry of the USA, belatedly many felt, into the Second World War, their arguments became somewhat discredited after that conflict. Of late, however, historians such as Benjamin O. Fordham have reconsidered them, using more refined economic data to suggest they may have validity. US exports doubled as a percentage of GNP between 1914 and 1916, and 70 per cent of them went to Europe. Within this context, the German renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare was a real catalyst for war.

However, historians no longer tend to see economic reasons as significant. By 1916 the US economy was so healthy as a result of jumping into markets no longer met by the belligerents that, even if Allied trade had been severed, it wouldn’t have made a significant difference to US prosperity.

The moral crusade

President Wilson himself saw self-interest as unimportant in his declaration of war. ‘There is not a single selfish element, so far as I can see, in the cause we are fighting for. We are fighting for what we believe and wish to be the rights of mankind and for the future peace and security of the world. To do this great thing worthily and successfully we must devote ourselves to the service without regard to profit or material advantage and with an energy and intelligence that will rise to the level of the enterprise itself.’

Since the mid-twentieth century, historians have tended to view US involvement in terms of variations on this theme.

Neutrality rights

Writing in the 1950s, historian Carl N. Degler argued Wilson’s main reason for involvement was legalistic. Wilson’s concept of neutrality rights followed established international law and asserted that the USA should be free to trade non-contraband goods with any belligerent it chose and American citizens should be safe to sail in any ships. Wilson saw unrestricted submarine warfare as illegal in international law – a crime against humanity.

A fair peace settlement

In an article called ‘Woodrow Wilson as Commander-in-Chief’, in History Today (Vol. 43, April 1993), historian Christopher Ray argued that Wilson entered the war in part to ensure there would be a fair peace settlement. Germany should be allowed to surrender with dignity and become part of any post-war organization to ensure peace. Wilson came to realize that a negotiated settlement was unlikely without US involvement – and he ensured that the USA entered the war as an associated nation not as a full
ally, to be able to maintain its independence during the peace negotiations. Wilson hoped that the allies could win without full US involvement – with the USA sufficing as the provider of war material. However, this wasn’t possible. By 1917 Wilson realized that ‘the world cannot be removed from the slaughter and destruction by any other means than a major exercise of the great martial force of the Republic’.

Many historians would concur with this analysis. In the 1990s, Harold Evans argued that Wilson followed a moral principle, believing that the USA needed to fight in order to make the world a better place. He contrasted Wilson with Theodore Roosevelt, who, he argues, would have gone to war earlier than Wilson in order to defeat the aggressor nation (Germany), remedy US grievances and restore the balance of power. Wilson, however, went to war to destroy the old forms of diplomacy and introduce a new world order based on rights and respect for all peoples. Ross Kennedy, writing in 2008, developed this theme. He argued that Wilson blamed the old European reliance on the ‘balance of power’ for the military expansion which had led to war. However, Wilson also recognized that the collective security he favoured could only come about if countries trusted each other. He particularly believed Germany must return the lands it had taken and become a democracy before it could be trusted to maintain the peace. Therefore, argues Kennedy, Wilson shared the Allies’ war aims. There was always a contradiction in Wilson’s earlier neutrality because he favoured the Allies over Germany.

In the 1960s, Hugh Brogan felt the Germans left Wilson no choice but to go to war. He argued that Wilson’s alleged neutrality was anything but, and eventual involvement of the USA was inevitable. He went on to suggest that the actual timing of the entry of the USA lay with Germany. In February 1917, Germany took the decision to renew unrestricted submarine warfare, hoping it would result in the defeat of Britain and France before the USA was ready to fight. This gamble failed. Once it entered the struggle, however, the aims of the USA became wider. It was fighting for a better world, where there would be no more war, rather than simply to defeat Germany and its allies. According to Brogan, the USA did not necessarily share the Allies’ war aims. Brogan quotes one editor who argued that the Allies were thieves and the Germans murderers: ‘On the whole, we prefer the thieves but only as the lesser of two evils.’

Niall Ferguson, in his book *Colossus* (2003), felt that Wilson the idealist sought to construct an entirely new international order based on fairness and justice for all peoples. As early as December 1914 he had asserted that any peace settlement ‘should be for the advantage of the European nations regarded as peoples and not for any nation imposing its governmental will upon alien people’. In May 1915, he went further: ‘every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live’. While the sinking of RMS *Lusitania* and unrestricted submarine warfare were undoubtedly triggers, Wilson had something more sublime in mind when he declared war.
Should the USA have gone to war?
Most historians in the later years of the twentieth century have concentrated on why the USA went to war rather than on whether or not it should have. However, in 2003, Thomas Fleming wrote a revisionist work, The Illusion of Victory: America in World War I, which addressed this issue. While agreeing that Wilson may have meant well, he argues that the involvement of the USA was unnecessary and prolonged the suffering. Wilson’s idealism was destructive. He clearly wasn’t neutral. Prior to entering the war, all his measures favoured the Allies and as a result his reputation as a peacemaker lost credibility. Fleming argues that if Wilson had been truly neutral, he could possibly have negotiated a peace in 1916. Worse, his idealism was based on ignorance of prevailing conditions. He had been so sure the Allies were winning that at one point he had hoped that the USA could enter the war without committing troops to the conflict. Wilson, in short, twisted the facts to depict the war as a struggle between good and evil, and his sense of moral judgement meant that the USA entered a war it should have stayed out of.

The USA during the First World War

Key question: In what ways did the USA change during the First World War?

Having reluctantly gone to war, Wilson oversaw an effective mobilization for the war effort and a drive to unite Americans in its support. This section will look at the impact of the war on the US economy and society. It will also consider how far personal liberties were restricted under the guise of the prevention of treason. Some historians have argued that the rights of individuals to hold opinions different from those of the government in the USA were never so restricted as during the First World War, with socialists and African-Americans being particular targets.

War production and finance
The USA was not prepared for massive war production as it would be in the Second World War. The gigantic Hog Island Shipyard in Philadelphia, for example, employed 3400 workers and failed to complete its first vessel until after the war ended. Of the 8.8 million artillery rounds fired by US troops, fewer than 8000 had been manufactured in the USA. Historian David Kennedy wrote, ‘America was no arsenal of democracy in the First World War; the American doughboy in France was typically transported in a British ship, wore a steel helmet modelled on a British Tommy’s and fought with French ordnance.’

However, the economy was prepared for the conflict.
Paying for the war

The war cost $33.5 billion in addition to the $7 billion lent to the Allies, which was expected to be recouped after the conflict. Two-thirds of this cost was raised by loans such as Liberty and Victory Loans whose drives were very successful. There were five bond issues between April 1917 when the USA joined the war and April 1919, six months after it ended. Movie stars such as Charlie Chaplin, Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks Jr. were deployed to encourage people to buy bonds and the Army Signal Corps organized aerial displays during drives in particular places. The country was plastered with bills and posters – for the third loan issue in April 1918, 9 million posters and 5 million window stickers were issued. The Government also collected $10.5 billion in taxes in part through a steeply graded income tax with a top level of 75 per cent. A 25 per cent inheritance tax was also introduced.

War Industries Board

Wilson created the War Industries Board in July 1917 to co-ordinate the tasks of finance and supplies. It had power to direct scarce resources, standardize production and fix prices but still allow firms to make large profits. US Steel, for example, made $1.2 billion in two years, which led to accusations of war profiteering in the post-war years.

Railroads

The railroads were run as a single centralized system to co-ordinate and simplify what was a vital transport system for the movement of goods and troops during wartime. Director General of Railroads William G. McAdoo pooled all railway equipment, standardized accounting practices, raised wages for employees and increased passenger rates.

Agriculture

Wilson appointed Herbert Hoover as his Food Administrator after entry into the war in 1917. Hoover had co-ordinated relief efforts in Europe for refugees in the first years of the war. In 1917, the Lever Food and Fuel Control Act gave him the power to:

- set wheat prices at $2.20 per bushel to encourage production
- establish a government corporation to buy US and Cuban sugar to maintain supplies
- organize a voluntary campaign to eat sensibly, thereby avoiding the need for rationing – for example, ‘Wheatless Mondays’ and ‘Meatless Thursdays’. Chicago residents were so successful in using leftovers that the amount of garbage in the city fell from 12,862 to 8386 tons per month.

Food production increased from 12.3 million to 18.6 million tons per year and farmers’ incomes grew by 30 per cent between 1915 and 1918.

**Key Terms**

- **Liberty and Victory Loans** Loans to raise money to pay for the war effort.
- **War profiteering** Making excess profits during wartime, for example, by charging artificially high prices.
Workers

Various government agencies were set up to facilitate industrial relations and effective working arrangements.

- The National War Labor Board was set up in April 1918 to settle industrial disputes, considering over 1200 cases until its demise in May 1919.
- The War Labor Policies Board set wages and standards of employment. Wages doubled in the steel industry. The Board consulted labour unions as well as employers. This gave unions greater influence and acceptance, as it had been difficult to establish unions in the USA before then. Union membership rose by 2.3 million during the war years, an increase of 15 per cent.

Although conditions for many workers improved during the war years, women and African-Americans still experienced problems within the workforce.

Women

Most women supported the war but they were not mobilized into war production as they would be in the Second World War. While 1 million men were called up, comparatively few women replaced them in munitions production and only 6000 women were engaged in aircraft manufacture. Their role was seen mainly as encouraging people to buy war bonds and sending comforts to the troops abroad. Labour unions did not support the hiring of women because they thought they depressed wages. Indeed, women did suffer unequal pay, poor promotion prospects and little job security. Those who had found jobs in wartime production or in replacing men recruited into the armed forces were generally discharged when the war ended.

African-Americans

The period saw a flood of migrations of African-Americans from the South to northern cities such as Chicago – as many as 500,000 migrated between 1914 and 1918. The African-American population of New York grew from 92,000 to 152,000 and that of Detroit from little more than 5000 to 41,000 between 1914 and 1918. However, while pay in industrial plants in the North was considerably better than in the cotton fields of the South, discrimination continued and there were serious riots against the African-American presence in several northern cities such as East St. Louis when 39 African-Americans were killed in the summer of 1917. The military, meanwhile, was strictly segregated with most of the 200,000 African-American troops confined to labour battalions. Nevertheless, their experience of less racist attitudes, particularly among the French, led to changes in their own perceptions and was to add to considerable racial tensions as they returned home.

Propaganda and civil liberties

It was in the area of civil liberties that government policies were most controversial.
Committee on Public Information
The Committee on Public Information (CPI) was created in April 1917, with the goal of uniting Americans behind the war. Headed by journalist George Creel, it sent 75,000 speakers – the ‘Four Minute Men’, so-called because they were trained to give short speeches lasting that length of time – to argue the case that the war was a crusade for freedom. Those who refused to buy war bonds were attacked both verbally and physically and the earlier anti-German propaganda (see page 94) was renewed vigorously so the Germans were depicted as barbarous. This resulted in petty changes in nomenclature (sauerkraut, for example, became ‘liberty cabbage’ and hamburgers ‘liberty sandwiches’), and, even if unwittingly, encouraged attacks on German-Americans and businesses with German-sounding names. The German language was removed from school curricula. One of the motives behind prohibition was the implication that Germans controlled the brewing industry. It was widely believed that many German-American-owned concerns such as Ruppert, Pabst and Lieber, which had helped finance the national German-American Alliance to promote German interests before the war, would now be sending profits to finance the German war effort.

**SOURCE I**
An anti-German propaganda poster by H.R. Hopps, 1917 (Everett Collection, USA), commissioned by the US Government.

**KEY TERM**

**Nomenclature** Names used to refer to something.

**Prohibition** A constitutional amendment that placed a ban on the manufacture, transportation and sale of alcoholic beverages. It became law throughout the USA in 1919 and lasted until 1933.

How might an American audience respond to the image of Germans shown in the poster in Source I?
Espionage Act, 1917
The Espionage Act was a draconian measure which could impose fines of up to $10,000 and twenty years’ imprisonment for those suspected of supporting the enemy or attempting to send literature deemed seditious through the mail. It was used specifically to attack those who vocally opposed the war. By the terms of qualification for second-class mail, journals had to be published regularly. Journals that appeared only intermittently or irregularly couldn’t be delivered by the regular US mail. Hence if one edition was suppressed, the cycle of regular publication was broken and future editions could be stopped, even if they didn’t contain any material deemed offensive.

Through this method, by 1918 all socialist journals in the USA were closed down, not through actual suppression as much as by lack of profitability as they no longer qualified to be sent out by US mail. If they couldn’t be sent to subscribers across the country through the mail, they couldn’t be delivered – so subscriptions were cancelled and the magazines lost both readership and revenues until they were forced to cease publication. Once it began to operate, it was felt that some clauses of the Espionage Act were imprecise. The Act was strengthened and clarified in May 1918 by the Sedition Act, which was an amendment to it.

Sedition Act, 1918
The Sedition Act was passed in May 1918 listing eight precise criminal offences, such as written attacks on the Government or indeed even opposition to the sale of war bonds. Socialist newspapers such as The Masses were suppressed and socialist leader Eugene V. Debs was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for making an anti-war speech – he was released when hostilities ended.

SOURCE J

Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States, or to promote the success of its enemies, or shall willfully make or convey false reports, or false statements, … or incite insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct … the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, or … shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the military or naval forces of the United States … or shall willfully display the flag of any foreign enemy, or shall willfully … urge, incite, or advocate any curtailment of production … or advocate, teach, defend, or suggest the doing of any of the acts or things in this section enumerated and whoever shall by word or act support or favor the cause of any country with which the United States is at war or by word or act oppose the cause of the United States therein, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.
Effects of the Acts
Over 2000 prosecutions were made as a result of these two pieces of legislation. Charles Schenk, a socialist, was jailed for attempting to distribute anti-war leaflets. One strike organizer faced twenty years in prison. An African-American editor G.W. Bouldin of the *San Antonio Inquirer* was sentenced to two years in jail for protesting in print about the execution of African-American military personnel who rioted in Houston. He wrote that death by firing squad was preferable to black Americans going to Europe to fight for liberties they could not enjoy at home.

Impact of the war on African-Americans
Many Americans feared African-Americans would not support the US in a war ‘to make the world safe for democracy’ when they clearly faced prejudice and discrimination at home. Few African-Americans in the South could vote; how could they be expected to fight for the rights of foreigners who could?

Moreover, the opportunities for African-Americans seemed to be diminishing rather than increasing. In 1913, Wilson, a Southerner with all the common prejudices of his region, had extended segregation of federal employees and reduced their chances of advancement. Little was done to prevent lynching in the South and Midwest, which averaged 65 incidents annually between 1910 and 1919. However, the Government could not allow 10 million Americans to be hostile or at best indifferent to the war effort. With the aid of civilian vigilante groups it tried to suppress dissent using the full force of the Espionage and Sedition Acts (see page 111).

Black press
The Government was prepared to give credence to rumours that German agents were about to subvert the loyalty of African-Americans and authorized the Bureau of Investigation of the Justice Department, and military intelligence, to track down pro-German feelings among African-Americans. These investigations focused particularly on the **Black press**.

The Black press included about 200 weekly papers and six monthly magazines embracing a wide variety of styles and viewpoints, from the conservative *New York Age* to the more radical *Crisis* and the *Cleveland Gazette*. The latter stressed that black Americans were expected to be patriotic and support the war yet faced unfair and unequal treatment at home; it cited in particular the refusal of the Government to investigate the murders of African-Americans in East St. Louis, where photographs showed whites gloating over burning bodies.

Historian Mark Ellis has argued that the Government adopted three policies towards the Black press: propaganda, flattery and suppression, all with the intention of marshalling their readership behind the war effort.
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement

Propaganda
Emmett Jay Scott, Special Advisor on black affairs to the Secretary of War, was tasked by the Government with selling the war to African-Americans. He spent much of his time denying tales of ill treatment of African-American troops; there were rumours, for example, that they were used as shock troops. There was only one black agent in military intelligence, Walter H. Loving, who launched his own propaganda campaign in January 1918; this included the charismatic speaker Roscoe Conkling Simmons, who embarked on a nationwide tour with the theme, ‘My Country and My Flag’. The Committee of Public Information (CPI) also targeted African-American audiences; indeed, the Four Minute Man Bulletin No. 33 told African-Americans that defeat of Germany would lead to racial equality – although it didn’t specify how.

Flattery
Flattery involved making African-American leaders feel valued and therefore ‘buying’ their loyalty. In June 1918, George Creel of the CPI staged a three-day conference of leading African-American editors who, in the words of Emmett Jay Scott, should lead ‘negro public opinion … along helpful lines rather than along lines that make for discontentment and unrest’. He went on, ‘This is not the time to discuss race problems. Our first duty is to fight and to continue to fight until the war is won. Then we can adjust the problems that remain in the life of the colored man. This is the doctrine we’re preaching to the Negroes of this country.’ Scott did, however, ask for grievances to be addressed. The request resulted in two documents:

- The Bill of Particulars: this suggested ways in which the Government could gain the support of African-Americans – by passing anti-lynching legislation, for example, abolishing segregation on railways and improving the treatment of African-American soldiers.
- Address to the Committee on Public Information: this was written by African-American leader W.E.B. Du Bois and stressed that improved conditions and reforms would make African-American soldiers more effective in their duties. They were not attaching a price to loyalty – but it would be in the Government’s own interests to improve conditions, Du Bois argued.

Suppression
The Espionage and Sedition Acts (see page 111) were used to full force in monitoring the African-American press. The Post Office Solicitor William H. Lamar, tasked with the role of censoring seditious material, searched for hidden meanings in ostensibly uncontroversial articles. He even banned one journal for quoting the view of Thomas Jefferson, Founding Father and former President, that Ireland should be a republic. Editors came to realize that their periodicals weren’t being judged on what was meant by the content but on how officials interpreted that content within the context of the time.
The periodical of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), The Crisis, came in for particular attention, in part because it was the most influential liberal African-American mouthpiece – between 1917 and 1918 it increased circulation from 41,000 to 74,000. It was warned ‘to publish only facts and constructive criticism’ and avoid anything that might cause dissatisfaction among African-American troops. The Socialist Messenger meanwhile faced problems when it suggested that African-Americans shouldn’t volunteer to make the world safe for democracy because ‘We would rather make Georgia safe for the negro’. Its editors, A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen, found themselves briefly jailed for such comments; they were released because they were presumed to be the dupes of white socialists who told them what to write.

**Patriotism of African-Americans**

The patriotism of African-Americans in wartime could not reasonably be questioned – over 360,000 volunteered for service, of whom 200,000 served abroad. The propaganda disseminated by men like Emmett Jay Scott, however, was clearly skewed. By July 1918, most African-American organs were supporting the war. However, their experiences abroad did help develop a sense of black consciousness and determination to improve conditions on their return.

**SOURCE K**


*It is our fatherland. It was right for us to fight. The faults of our country are our faults. Under similar circumstances, we would fight again. But by the God of Heaven, we are cowards and jackasses if now that that war is over, we do not marshal every ounce of our brain and brawn to fight a sterner, longer, more unbending battle against the forces of hell in our own land.*

*We return. We return from fighting. We return fighting. Make way for Democracy! We saved it in France, and by the Great Jehovah, we will save it in the United States of America, or know the reason why.*
Woodrow Wilson and the post-war peace settlement

Key question: How influential was Wilson in the post-war settlement?

Wilson realized that there could be no actual winners in so destructive a war, and if those responsible for military victory entered peace negotiations with an extended sense of revenge or retribution, the stage would be set for a re-run of the military conflict as soon as the belligerents were ready. The peace settlement, in other words, had to lead to lasting peace. To this end, Wilson proposed a settlement based on his Fourteen Points.

The Fourteen Points

Wilson’s Fourteen Points were first elucidated in a speech on 8 January 1918, although they had been gestating for some time; as early as the onset of war, Wilson had set up an enquiry of 150 academics to prepare for peace-making. In the event, however, the 1918 speech was planned hurriedly to forestall the pronouncement by the Russian revolutionary leader Lenin that any peace settlement should be based on self-determination.

The Fourteen Points were roughly grouped into three categories:

- The first five considered general principles to maintain orderly relations between countries, based on part on what had gone wrong and led to war. Hence:
  - there should be no more secret agreements between nations as these led to insecurity and double-dealing – diplomacy should be open and above board
  - the seas should be free to the traffic of all nations
  - there should be no barriers to international trade
  - armaments should be reduced
  - the interests of the Great Powers and hopes of colonial peoples should be balanced.

- The next eight dealt with matters of self-determination, with borders being redrawn according to the wishes of local populations. Included in this was the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France and renewed guarantees for Belgian independence.

- The fourteenth point announced the setting up of a League of Nations, an international organization for peacekeeping and mutual co-operation, which all signatories of the treaties should join.

There is little doubt that the Fourteen Points caught the imagination of people in the belligerent nations. Sixty million pamphlets explaining them were produced; millions lit candles for Wilson, who was blessed as a saint. German leaders saw them as their best chance for peace and embraced them as the basis of a settlement. Indeed, they believed that Wilson was offering
them a blueprint for peace. Nevertheless Clemenceau, the French premier, voiced the cynicism of many when he said that God only gave humans ten points (the Ten Commandments) and humans had already broken those, implying Wilson’s fourteen were too idealistic.

It is a myth that the peace settlement was ever fully based on the Fourteen Points. Wilson undermined the points himself by making a secret agreement with Britain and France on 29 October, in which he accepted German war guilt and the need for compensation, and the loss of territories held by Germany and its allies. On a wider level, ideas such as self-determination couldn’t please everyone – some nations would necessarily lose land and populations. Nevertheless his efforts did win him the 1919 Nobel Peace Prize.

The Peace Conference

A peace conference was convened in Paris in January 1919 to create a lasting peace settlement. Wilson made the decision to go to Paris himself. This was momentous, not least because no previous president had ever left the United States while in office. Wilson decided to go for two main reasons:

- He believed he would have the charisma and influence to drive through a lasting agreement.
- Politically he had been weakened at home and he hoped he could both avoid domestic arguments such as conditions in agriculture and restore his domestic popularity by leading the Conference:
  - There was a domestic problem with western farmers arguing they had been discriminated against during the war because wheat prices had been pegged while the price of cotton rose from 7 cents per pound in 1914 to 35 cents by 1919. This meant Wilson had one significant set of farmers dissatisfied and demanding government action to rectify their problems.
  - The Democrats had lost control of both Houses during the 1918 mid-term elections – the Republicans had a majority of two in the Senate, and in the House had 237 representatives to the Democrats’ 190. This meant it might be difficult for Wilson, a Democratic president, to get legislation through a hostile Congress.

Wilson’s gambles

Wilson clearly staked his career on the success of the Conference and it could be argued he ignored political realities both at home and abroad in his determination to drive a lasting peace. Having been fêted and cheered to an almost embarrassing degree on his journey to Paris, he was at his most imperious and aggressive during the actual Conference. At one point, during a discussion on veterans’ pensions, he burst out, ‘Logic! Logic! I don’t give a damn for logic!’ He chose four delegates to accompany him, none of whom was a current Republican politician, even though the Senate (with its Republican majority) would have to pass any agreement. This was particularly resented by Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Moreover, Wilson was so determined to see a lasting settlement that he gambled with his own health. He had the first of the strokes that would finally incapacitate him on 3 August, but before this he was already showing signs of extreme stress and paranoia, working eighteen-hour days squatting uncomfortably over huge maps spread out on the floor, with areas and regions cut out like jigsaw pieces, and being obsessed with French spies. He seemed exhausted and increasingly illogical in his views. Overall, Wilson’s behaviour suggested he was losing self-control and colleagues began to fear for both his mental and physical health. Poor health and illness probably clouded his judgement and ability to tolerate any opposition. As will be seen, Wilson was to make some poor decisions and tactical errors in his battle to sell the peace and League of Nations to Americans.

The process
The peace-making process was very fractured, with delegates from different countries sometimes coming to blows. Germany itself hadn’t been invited to the negotiations; a settlement would be imposed upon it. In the event most decisions were made by the ‘Big Three’: the USA, Britain and France. Each had a different agenda. The war on the Western Front had largely been fought on French soil. France therefore sought a harsh settlement both so that Germany would have to pay for its reconstruction and so that it would never be strong enough to attack France again. The British leader, David Lloyd George, saw the problems and resentment from Germany that would accrue if the settlement were too harsh, but the British population largely wanted some form of revenge. Wilson’s idea of a lasting peace settlement based on fairness and moral principles did not necessarily receive a sympathetic audience within this atmosphere.

Wilson, moreover, faced two significant disadvantages in his attempts to influence proceedings:

- The USA had not suffered like France and other countries over whose lands the war had been fought and so their priorities were different. France, in particular, sought to weaken Germany both for purposes of retribution and to ensure Germany would not be strong enough to attack it again.
- Wilson’s priority was to gain acceptance of the League of Nations. In order to achieve this he would have to compromise over other issues such as self-determination and German war guilt.

With the disjointed peace-making process and widespread accusations that Germany was being treated badly, many in the USA were increasingly cynical not only about the whole peace-making process but also the involvement of the USA in foreign affairs generally. Wilson got a forewarning of the problems he would face at home when he returned to the USA for a short visit. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge had organized a petition signed by 39 of his Republican colleagues, hoping to delay any consideration of the League of Nations until the peace settlement was signed. Wilson, however, had insisted that acceptance of the League of Nations should be part of the peace settlement and therefore it was to be written into all the treaties.
The peace settlement

The peace settlement was a series of treaties imposed on the defeated countries. They concerned reparations to be paid to the victors, territorial adjustments and limits on rearmament. The main treaties were:

- the Treaty of Versailles made with Germany
- the Treaty of San Germain made with Austria
- the Treaty of Trianon made with Hungary
- the Treaty of Sèvres made with Turkey.

The peace settlement has been much debated since its conclusion, but suffice to say here, it pleased few at the time. Germany in particular felt it had been unfairly treated. It lost 12 per cent of its pre-war territory, including 15 per cent of its arable land and 75 per cent of its iron ore deposits. Severe restrictions were placed on its military, and it was forced to pay reparations of $33 billion. The notion of self-determination could not be fairly applied and millions of ethnic Germans found themselves in a newly delineated Poland and newly created Czechoslovakia.

Many in the USA opposed the settlement as unfair. Wilson himself said, ‘If I were a German, I think I should never sign.’ However, it was the reaction to the League of Nations that saw Wilson fight his toughest political battle.
Wilson returned to the USA in July 1919 determined to gain Congressional approval for the treaties and membership into the League of Nations.

**Opposition within the Senate**
Wilson found senatorial opposition to membership of the League divided into three broad groups:

- Twelve ‘irreconcilables’, led by Senator William Borah of Idaho, who opposed membership outright and sought an isolationist foreign policy.
- Moderates who were prepared to listen to the debates and possibly agree with some reservations concerning US membership before making up their minds.
- Those associated with Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who had stronger reservations but would have been prepared to join the League if various terms were met. This group was particularly influential, as Lodge was Chairman of the Committee referred to above which controlled the debate in the Senate. They drew up fourteen reservations, notably concerning Article 10 of the **Covenant of the League of Nations**, which required members to come to the aid of others who were threatened. This, they argued, weakened the sovereignty of the USA, committing it to intervention whether it agreed with the case or not.

It is important to note here that only twelve senators were definitely opposed to US membership. At no time during the debates did members of the other two groups refuse to consider membership; they simply had reservations and wanted space for negotiation. This Wilson would not accept. When asked to compromise he said, ‘Never!’ He also told his second wife, ‘Better a thousand times to go down fighting than to dip your colors to dishonorable compromise.’ By this he meant it is better to continue to fight for the values in which you believe than to make deals and weaken them.

**US membership of the League of Nations**
Wilson decided, against his doctors’ advice, to tour the country to persuade people to accept US membership into the League of Nations. The tour, which began in September 1919, initially seemed successful – although opponents shadowed him, speaking against his proposals after he’d moved elsewhere. The desperation in Wilson’s argument can be caught in this extract from one of his speeches: ‘I can predict with absolute certainty that within another generation there will be another war if the nations of the world do not concert the methods by which to prevent it.’

Wilson visited small towns throughout the Midwest where he empathized with the people, particularly those who had lost relatives in the war. The itinerary was, however, exhausting and on 25 September he collapsed after a speech at Pueblo in Colorado. His campaign was effectively over.
was his refusal to compromise that finally lost him the battle. Lodge had introduced a compromise bill into the Senate in November, which Wilson told Democrats to oppose; it therefore failed, by 53 to 38 votes. When the original peace settlement with the Covenant in its original form was presented to the Senate in March 1920, it passed by 49 to 35 votes. This, however, was seven votes short of the required two-thirds majority needed for approving treaties. Had Wilson been able to win over seven Democrats who possibly held only moderate reservations, the USA would have joined the League of Nations and the ensuing history of the world may have been very different.

**Knox-Porter Resolution**

Because the Covenant of the League of Nations was attached to all the peace treaties, in rejecting this, the USA was effectively refusing to sign the peace treaties ending the war. This obstacle was overcome by issuing the Knox-Porter Resolution declaring the war was over, and in October 1921 the Senate passed the peace treaties with the exception of the clauses relating to the League of Nations.

Wilson tried to make the League of Nations a major issue in the 1920 presidential election, and the Democratic candidate James M. Cox promised, if elected, that the USA would join. However, he was defeated and the subsequent Republican presidents of the following decade became very much associated with isolationism.

**SUMMARY DIAGRAM**

The battle for the League of Nations
Many commentators at the time spoke of US foreign policy in the 1920s as a return to isolationism (see page 10), citing in particular its refusal to join the League of Nations and avoidance of foreign entanglements – a return in other words to the ideas of the Founding Fathers with which we began this book (see page 11). The decade saw two Republican presidents, Warren Harding (1921–1923) and Calvin Coolidge (1923–1929), who were very much committed to *laissez-faire* policies at home and wary of commitments abroad. In this they were supported by the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Henry Cabot Lodge from 1919. The USA had, for example, begun informally to co-operate with the League of Nations, particularly in terms of combating trade in opium, slavery and armaments. The Senate did on several occasions, however, refuse to join the World Court, feeling it could result in unnecessary foreign commitments.

According to Source L is Cabot Lodge an isolationist? Explain your answer carefully.


*He believed that the essence of American foreign policy should be to keep the country clear of foreign entanglements unless our honor was involved, to be ready to fight and fight hard the moment it became involved, and when the fight was over to disentangle ourselves once more, stand aloof and mind our own business. As Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Lodge considered it to be his duty to see that the United States was not drawn into any international agreement which would endanger this policy.*
grow in the western hemisphere in Canada and Latin America both in terms of economic and cultural influence and, especially in the latter, in terms of political influence, too.

**League of Nations**
Although it did not join the League of Nations, it was involved in many of its activities and had official representation at the League’s headquarters in Geneva from 1925. In 1924, the Rockefeller Foundation gave $500,000 to the League of Nations’ health service.

**Trade**
Trade was vastly important to the USA. The value of exports rose from $3.8 billion in 1922 to $5.1 billion in 1929. The automobile industry was particularly important; it accounted for 10 per cent of manufactured exports in 1929. In 1920 the Merchant Marine Act allocated $125 million to finance the construction of merchant ships that were to carry US goods all over the world.

**Investment**
The decade saw the development of multinational companies often dominated by US interests. The USA had $4 billion invested in 1300 foreign firms. Its main markets were Canada, western Europe and Japan. US investment in the Canadian car industry had effectively destroyed domestic manufacture.

### US influence in Latin America

**Key question:** How did the USA penetrate Latin America after the First World War?

In this section we will examine the influence of the USA in Latin America following the First World War, moving from economic penetration to political involvement. The former belligerent countries of Europe were largely bankrupted and deeply in debt as a result of the cost of the war. They were in no position to resume their former level of economic involvement in Latin America; the USA as the largest creditor nation as a result of the war was in a position to supplant them. The USA also helped nations in Latin America through philanthropic ventures, for example, the work of the Rockefeller Foundation.
US economic involvement

US investment in Latin America soared during the 1920s. Between 1924 and 1928, Latin America absorbed 44 per cent of its investment in new concerns. Brazil saw the USA become its biggest source of new capital. To facilitate financial arrangements, 61 branches of US banks were opened across the western hemisphere. In monetary terms US investment in the region grew from $1.5 billion in 1924 to $3 billion five years later.

- US companies dominated the media such as movies, radio and telecommunication services.
- Their role was significant in the provision of utilities. The US company General Electric set up the American and Foreign Power Company in 1923; by 1929 it controlled the provision of electric power in eight Latin American countries. International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) controlled the telephone systems of Argentina, Chile, Peru and Mexico by 1930.
- US automobile firms had penetrated the Latin American market to a considerable extent. By 1926 General Motors was manufacturing vehicles in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay.

One might argue that this involvement fulfilled the ideal of Republican governments and businessmen that foreign policy should be profitable and cheap, echoing the dollar diplomacy of President Taft (see page 78) which

| Source M |


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>US investments 1913</th>
<th>US investments 1929</th>
<th>British investments 1913</th>
<th>British investments 1929</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>2140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>1162</td>
<td>1414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What can be inferred from the figures in Source M about US and British investment in South America between 1913 and 1929?
proposed that the USA should extend its influence through its economic power while keeping military costs to a minimum. The State Department employed experts such as economist Edwin Kemmerer to take a lead in Latin America. When countries asked for US investment, Kemmerer and his colleagues would draw up plans to stabilize the economies – the so-called Kemmerer Plans – and US personnel would usually remain to supervise their implementation. Often the plans would involve setting up a central bank while officials would put local entrepreneurs in touch with US financiers. The aim was that US investors could profit but local populations would also benefit from a stronger economy through rising living standards and greater economic security.

**SOURCE N**


We expanded economic research, transportation, information on credit rating of foreign firms, and a score of other activities.

The actual increases in sales abroad, brought about through personal service or information we provided ran into hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Not only were our foreign agents hounds for possible American sales, but they made themselves welcome abroad by helping the merchants of the countries to which they were assigned. They sought out raw materials and commodities which were less competitive with American industry, and stimulated their export to the United States.

**Problems of US involvement**

This involvement did come at a cost and the USA had to intervene to protect the investments, the property and sometimes the physical safety of its citizens. It sought to avoid loans being spent fraudulently on luxuries for corrupt officials or on armaments, and there was always concern that a recipient country would get so much in debt that the loans couldn’t be repaid. It genuinely hoped its investments would help countries develop sound economies with rising standards of living for all citizens.

US military intervention, when it was felt to be necessary, was always expensive and unpopular with taxpayers. Many in Congress followed the lead of Senator William Borah who argued that the USA should withdraw its military forces where appropriate and let the countries govern themselves. Secretary of State Hughes argued in 1923 that the USA should only use military force to protect the Panama Canal (see pages 67–69) and then only as a last resort.

The decade therefore saw agreements including the settlement of old disputes and the withdrawal of US troops where possible, to be replaced by local militias loyal to the USA.
How far did the USA settle outstanding disputes?

**Settlement of disputes**

In this section we will consider how far the USA settled outstanding disputes with its Latin American neighbours.

**Colombia**

In 1921, the USA gave Colombia $25 million in compensation for its role in the 1903 revolt, which saw the independence of Panama, clearing the way for the construction of the Panama Canal (see pages 67–69).

**Mexico**

The Mexican Civil War had ended in 1920 with the presidency of Álvaro Obregón. However, the USA withheld official recognition of his Government because of outstanding debts and the issue of compensation for US citizens whose property was destroyed during the conflict. One of Obregón’s major problems was to achieve some degree of financial security. Mexico had defaulted on its international debts as early as 1914, after which the USA and other countries withdrew recognition of the Mexican Government. In June 1922 the then Finance Minister, de la Huerta, agreed to repay $500,000 but it was left to his successor, Alberto Pani, to sign the Bucareli Accords in August 1923 in which compensation for damaged foreign property was agreed. As a result, the USA did restore recognition, and Mexico was allowed to borrow again on the international markets.
The Good Neighbor policy

While Latin American countries were increasingly dependent on the USA, they did from time to time exert anti-US sentiments. One example was the pointed criticism of the US by El Salvador, Mexico and Argentina at the Triennial Conference of Western Hemisphere Countries, held in Havana in 1928. They condemned the right of any state to intervene in another and criticized US delegate Charles Evans Hughes’ speech about the need for order and stability across the region.

Conscious of the unpopularity of the USA, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg asked his chief legal advisor, J. Reuben Clark, to investigate how this could be eroded. Clark argued that Theodore Roosevelt had been wrong in 1904 when he invoked the Roosevelt Corollary to justify intervention through the Monroe Doctrine (see page 15). He argued that the Monroe Doctrine referred to the actions of European nations not those of Latin America. Although he fell short of arguing that the USA would not be justified in direct intervention in the internal affairs of Latin American states, the inference was clear that, if it did, the legal justification was dubious. The answer was to improve relations with Latin American countries – in other words, to become a good neighbour.

Recruitment of local forces

While the formal Good Neighbor policy was put forward by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933, its ideas predated the 1930s. The USA wanted to withdraw military presence from Latin American countries where it had troops stationed, and replace these with US-trained local troops and US-supported dictators. They did this in some countries more successfully than others. Nicaragua is a good example of this policy being put into practice.

Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic

In 1925 US troops were withdrawn from Nicaragua to restore good relations. However, following their departure, civil war broke out between rival political factions. In 1926, 5000 US troops were sent back and veteran US diplomat Henry Stimson was appointed to try to broker a peace agreement. His idea was to bring two of the major warlords together in the hope they could come to an agreement. Hence Adolfo Díaz and José Moncado agreed, in the Peace of Tipitapa, to form a coalition government and organize a new security force, the National Guard, trained by US forces. One general, Augusto César Sandino, repudiated the treaty and fought both the National Guard and US troops. He advocated widespread social reforms and had considerable support among the peasantry.

However, in November 1928 elections of a sort were held, at the cost of the deaths of 43 US marines and 3000 Nicaraguans. When Juan Bautista Sacasa finally took office in 1933, the US troops went home. Sandino was murdered after attending a ‘peace conference’ in February 1934, and Anastasio Somoza, Sacasa’s nephew, increasingly used the National Guard to impose a dictatorship, which survived until the 1970s.
SOURCE O

Augusto Sandino (in the centre) on his way to Mexico in June 1929 to canvass support (from the US National Archives and Records Administration).

A similar pattern emerged in the Dominican Republic where Rafael Trujillo assumed power and ruled brutally until his assassination in 1961 but maintained friendly relations with the USA for much of the period of his regime. These dictators were tolerated because they were anti-communist and pro-American. They allowed US investment and economic interests to flourish in their countries. As Franklin D. Roosevelt allegedly said of Somoza in 1939, ‘he may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch’.

One critic of US policy in Latin America was Uruguayan journalist Eduardo Galeano whose book *Open Veins of Latin America* was a devastating critique of European and US exploitation of the region.

SOURCE P


The United States occupied Haiti for twenty years and, in that black country that had been the scene of the first victorious slave revolt, introduced racial segregation and forced labor, killed 1500 workers in one of its repressive operations (according to a U.S. Senate investigation in 1922), and when the local government refused to turn the Banco Nacional into a branch of New York’s National City Bank, suspended the salaries of the president and his ministers so that they might think again. Alternating the “big stick” with “dollar diplomacy,” similar actions were carried out in the other Caribbean islands and in all of Central America, the geopolitical space of the imperial mare nostrum.
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement

The USA signed international agreements with various degrees of commitment and enthusiasm during the 1920s. As well as the formal agreements the USA was often prepared to exert its influence less formally. This section examines both of these.

**Informal influence**

The Locarno Conference was to be held in 1925 to settle existing problems arising from the post-war peace settlement. When preliminary discussions stalled however, the US Ambassador to Britain, on his own initiative, threatened to withdraw further US loans to the participants unless they came to an agreement. This undoubtedly helped focus their minds. President Coolidge supported the Ambassador in his effort to influence the proceedings.

**Formal agreements**

**Washington Naval Agreements**

In 1922 the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (see page 163) was up for renewal. The USA was not keen for it to continue. It saw Japan as its main rival in the
Pacific and preferred to detach Britain from Japanese friendship. Britain, however, was keen for renewal, as was the dominion of Australia, because they believed the treaty acted as a stabilizing factor on Japan and prevented Japanese aggression.

The Washington Naval Conference was a compromise, to detach Britain from a Japanese alliance while creating assurances for future stability. While it has been criticized for its limitations, it was the first disarmament agreement, setting an important precedent.

The Agreement was made between four powers in 1921: the USA, Britain, Japan and France. Italy became a signatory in 1922.

- It froze battleship strengths at immediate post-war levels, persuading Japan to accept less tonnage than Britain and the USA. In 1922, Italy also signed to accept parity with France. The agreement stipulated that Britain and the USA were to have 525,000 tons, Japan, 315,000 and Italy and France, 175,000.
- Britain, the USA, Japan and France signed the Four Power Treaty in which they agreed to respect their respective interests in East Asia and re-affirm the Open Door policies in China (see page 73).
- There were specific agreements – Japan, for example, promised to remove its troops from the Chinese province of Shantung while the USA agreed not to reinforce its military presence in Guam.

**Limitations**

President Harding, in his speech asking for Senate ratification of the agreements, assured his audience that acceptance implied ‘no commitment to armed force, no alliances, no written or moral obligation to join in defence’. The agreements, in other words, had no force and no sanctions would be forthcoming if any signatory broke them. A second attempt to reduce naval strength in 1927 failed to come to any agreement.

**International debt**

International debt was at the heart of the international tensions of the 1920s. The priority of the USA was for European countries such as Britain and France to repay the loans they had taken out to finance the First World War. When the problem of their ability to repay came up, President Coolidge is reported to have said, ‘They hired the money, didn’t they?’ Although the quotation is possibly fictitious, it did accurately express the sentiment of many Americans that the countries should repay their loans. However, most European countries, still suffering from depressed economic conditions arising from the war, simply could not afford to repay them.

**The problems caused by Germany**

Repayment of debts was only part of the problem. Germany had, by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, been forced to pay reparations of $33 billion to the victorious nations of Europe. Under the Dawes Plan of 1923 the USA lent Germany the money to pay, and in the Young Plan of 1929 the amount
of reparations was scaled down to $26 billion, to be paid over a period of 59 years. With this money, the European victors repaid the USA what they could of the loans. The USA was thus effectively paying itself back with its own money. Indeed, the $250 million it lent to Germany under the Dawes Plan corresponded to the amount Germany paid the Allies in reparations, which in turn corresponded to the amount the USA received from the Allies in debt repayments.

This situation became even more confused through the Dawes and Young Plans scaling down of German reparations. With Germany paying the European victors less, this meant that they in turn could repay fewer of their own debts to the USA. All in all, no-one gained from an incredibly complex situation that, according to one commentator, would have made more sense if ‘the US had taken the money out of one Treasury building and put it in another’.

**Treaty of Paris – the Kellogg–Briand Pact**

In the USA, as elsewhere, there was a strong movement for peace in the 1920s. President Coolidge spoke for many when he said, ‘The people have had all the war, all the taxation and all the military service that they want.’ Peace societies gained lots of interest and support. In 1923 Edward W. Bok, journalist and former editor of the *Ladies’ Home Journal*, offered a $100,000 prize for the best workable plan for international peace; among the unsuccessful entrants was future President Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose proposals were written when he was recovering from polio. This impulse led in part to the signing of the Kellogg–Briand pact, between the US Secretary of State and French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, in 1928.

This pact was an international agreement to outlaw war, which 15 countries eventually signed. It had come about as a sort of compromise. French foreign ministers had spent much of the 1920s seeking an alliance with the USA. US State Department officials suggested a multilateral agreement to prevent this level of commitment to one country. The signatories agreed not to wage war except in self-defence and to seek peaceful means to resolve disputes. As one might expect it was vaguely worded and largely meaningless. There was no mechanism for sanctions should any signatory default and indeed some did as the 1930s progressed.

While the Senate ratified the pact by 85 votes to 1, it was only after the Foreign Relations Committee insisted on the right of the USA to defend itself if attacked or if the Monroe Doctrine was threatened. The Committee nevertheless insisted that the pact didn’t actually sanction the use of war even if attacked or commit the USA to help any country that was threatened. Perhaps Senator Carter Glass of Virginia perhaps best expressed the attitude of the Senate when he admitted he would vote for ratification but hoped his constituents wouldn’t take this too seriously.
An excerpt from the hearings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in December 1928 concerning the Kellogg–Briand Pact (found at avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbhear.asp).

Senator SWANSON. As I understand from what you say, if this multilateral treaty is violated by any other nation, there is no obligation, moral or legal, for us to go to war against any nation violating it?

Secretary KELLOGG. That is thoroughly understood. It is understood by our Government; and no other government made any suggestion of any such thing. I knew, from the attitude of many governments, that they would not sign any treaty if there was any moral obligation or any kind of obligation to go to war. In fact, Canada stated that. The other governments never suggested any such obligation.

What can be inferred from Source Q about the commitment of Secretary of State Kellogg to the Kellogg–Briand Pact?
Key debate

Key question: How far do historians agree about the level of the USA’s involvement in foreign affairs in the 1920s?

The myth of isolationism
In his 1955 book, America’s Rise to World Power, 1898–1954, historian Foster Rhea Dulles asserted that American foreign policy was isolationist. He was echoing journalist Arthur H. Vandenburg who, in 1926, wrote that the main reason for the recent rejection of the League of Nations was ‘the incalculable obligation of a subtle Covenant which bound us like soldiers of fortune into all the wars of the world – a perpetual recruit for Mars’. This motive was echoed by F.L. Allen (see page 122) in 1931 in his classic account of the 1920s, Only Yesterday. Writing specifically about why Henry Cabot Lodge rejected the post-war peace treaties, he argued that, ‘he did not believe that the nations of the world could be trusted to spend the rest of their years behaving like Boy Scouts; he knew that, to be effective, a treaty must be serviceable in eras of bad feeling as well as good; and he saw in the present one, an invitation to trouble’. Allen went on to assert that Americans were sick of war and weren’t prepared to make any more sacrifices for Europe. It was best to remain aloof.

While commentators have widely suggested that the USA followed isolationist policies in the 1920s, and historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., as late as 1995, wrote that during the 1920s the USA retreated into a ‘womb’ of ‘familiar and soothing isolationism’, most historians would now argue that it was impossible for the USA, with its international and economic influence, to be fully divorced from events elsewhere in the world. Many would agree, however, that Americans were weary of foreign involvement. For example, in Alistair Cooke’s America, written in 1973, the author argues that Americans were disenchanted with Europe and its continuing crises, felt that many of their own domestic problems resulted from their intervention in the First World War, and ‘wanted to backslide into a bath of nostalgia for the good old days before the war and Wilsonian internationalism, for the nineteenth century America that had obeyed its first president and avoided all “foreign entanglements”’.

Arguments against isolationism
William A. Williams (see page 86) called isolationism a myth, arguing in an article in the journal Science and Society that the Republican presidents of the 1920s were distinguished by the level of their involvement in the affairs of other countries. In 2008 historian George C. Herring developed this point, arguing that the Republican presidents of the 1920s assumed an unprecedented leadership in world affairs, but preferred to let private
individuals and concerns implement their policies. He goes on to quote the use of what Joseph Nye of Harvard University described in 1990 as ‘soft power’ – global influence emanating not from military might, but economic and cultural influence and technical superiority. Others have argued similarly. Michael Parrish, writing in 1992, argued that the hope was to gain the benefits of economic influence with minimum cost in terms of both budget and military involvement – hence the recruitment and training of groups friendly to the USA, such as the National Guard in Nicaragua.

Historian Paul A. Carter in the 1960s argued that foreign entanglements continued in the face of isolationism. He gave the example of the navy, which expanded despite budget cuts elsewhere because of the growing fear of Japan. Carter cited historian Alexander DeConde in support of his arguments; DeConde had suggested isolation was a geopolitical fact of life in the USA for much of the nineteenth century, but isolationism was an attempt to maintain the policy despite the nineteenth-century conditions no longer being applicable. The expansion of US global trade, and faster ships and communication, also contributed to the increasing impracticality of isolationism.

While acknowledging its impracticability, historian Selig Adler wrote in the 1950s that isolationism persisted because it had a wide group of adherents, particularly in the Midwest where the geopolitical argument based in the geographical isolation of the USA from world events might still be relevant and where there was strong anti-British feeling. This argument echoed that of journalist John Gunther in Inside USA, published in 1947, who felt that Midwesterners still sympathized with the isolationist impulse even after – or because of – the Second World War.

**Foreign policy achievements in the 1920s**

Historian Niall Palmer, writing in 2006, emphasized the difficulty facing the incoming President Warren Harding in 1921 in terms of the horrendous post-war conditions in Europe, the Russian Revolution, and the flu epidemic which killed millions. While many countries looked to the USA for leadership, the strong coalition against foreign involvement worked against this. Palmer praises the triumvirate of Harding, Secretary of State Hughes and Secretary of Commerce Hoover for all they did achieve and notes that because Harding shared his power with his appointees, foreign policy was no longer subject to the sole purview of the president as in the days of Wilson. Herring, too, is complimentary about the achievements not just of Harding but all three Republican presidents; among other things, they began to withdraw militarily from Latin America, restored good relations with Mexico, achieved naval reductions, assumed leadership in addressing the problems of European economic recovery from the war and set the seeds of a less racist policy towards China.
Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement

Chapter summary

The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement

The USA initially adopted a policy of neutrality when war broke out in 1914. This became difficult to maintain, however, because of disruption to trade and government support for the Allies. When Germany began a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1915, tensions ran high. However, Germany rescinded the policy and, in the 1916 presidential election campaign, Wilson appeared as the candidate most likely to maintain neutrality. The rejection of Wilson’s peace initiatives and Germany’s return to unrestricted submarine warfare saw the USA enter the war in April 1917. The country geared up for war to an unprecedented extent, with the galvanization of the economy towards war production and significant restrictions on civil liberties, for example through the Sedition Act of 1918.

Wilson sought a lasting peace on the basis of his Fourteen Points. However, these were compromised during fractious peace negotiations in Paris. Moreover, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee led a battle to reject the Covenant of the League of Nations in its proposed form, with the result that the USA did not join the League.

It is largely a myth that during the 1920s the USA returned to isolationism. Although there was strong support for this policy among many groups in the USA, the country was too powerful and influential for it to be possible. The USA took part in international agreements, particularly in terms of naval reductions, but these agreements had no sanctions. It was, however, wary of international entanglements. The USA was also instrumental in helping Germany manage its debts, although the cycle of international debt resulting from the war was made more complex by the USA insisting on repayment. Historians tend to be in broad agreement now that the USA did not pursue isolationist policies and achieved positive results within the context of the time.
Examination advice

How to answer ‘to what extent’ questions

The command term ‘to what extent’ is a popular one in IB exams. You are asked to evaluate one argument or idea over another. Stronger essays will also address more than one interpretation. This is often a good question in which to discuss how different historians have viewed the issue.

Example

‘The US decision to enter the First World War on the side of the Allies was mainly in response to unrestricted German submarine warfare.’ To what extent do you agree with this statement?

1. First, take at least five minutes to write a short outline. Here you can list the different reasons the USA entered the war and what, if any, connection there was with unrestricted German submarine warfare. An example of an outline is given below:

Context:
- USA declared its neutrality as Europe went to war in 1914.
- USA favoured Allies over Central Powers. Wilson’s top advisers tilted towards Allies.
- Anti-German propaganda in US press.
- USA had previous confrontations with Germany (Samoa, Venezuela) and feared Germany’s growing interests in Mexico.
- Nonetheless, public was generally anti-war and had elected Wilson in 1916 on his anti-war platform.
- Previous unrestricted German submarine warfare (1915) had not pushed the USA into war.

Economic reasons:
- Big business (banks and munitions makers) wanted USA to win.
- Most US trade was with Allied countries.
- Importance of trade with both Allies and Germany: 40 per cent of government revenues came from tariffs.
- Some historians state that USA had found other markets and that its economy was strong.

Moral reasons:
- Wilson wanted to go to war to ensure a fair peace and introduce a new world order.
• Peace Without Victory speech, January 1917.
• Need to act after resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917.
• Fear Allies would lose without US intervention.

Other reasons:
• German espionage activities in USA.
• Zimmermann telegram, February 1917.

2. In your introduction you should touch on the major reasons President Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany in April 1917. You should also mention that there were other reasons that might have pushed him to desire war against Germany in addition to attacks on US shipping. Be sure to include relevant dates and a brief definition of what unrestricted submarine warfare was. An example of a good introductory paragraph for this question is given below.

In April 1917, President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany. The major reason he gave was that the resumption of unrestricted German submarine warfare had forced the USA to defend itself and the notion of free trade. The German empire had clearly stated that it was legally permitted to sink any and all ships that were trading and sustaining its mortal enemies, most specifically Great Britain. Other reasons that may have prompted Wilson to act was his desire to bring the war to a quick conclusion so that the USA could promote a peace that would be long-lasting and one that would not punish the Central Powers excessively. Wilson did see himself as a peacemaker and one moved by moral considerations. It is also possible that an Allied victory would help ensure that the billions that had been loaned to France and Great Britain would be repaid. A stalemate or a victory by Germany would have put the repayment of those loans at risk. Other factors that may have prompted Wilson to act include the notion that Germany was meddling in Mexico and that German agents were carrying out acts of sabotage against the USA within its borders. Wilson won re-election in 1916 on an anti-war platform but within a couple of months of his inauguration he brought the country into direct conflict. Some historians have made the point that since the beginning of the war in 1914 the USA had sided with the Allies and was not neutral in the least.
3. In the body of the essay, you need to discuss each of the points you raised in the introduction. Devote at least a paragraph to each one. It would be a good idea to order these in terms of which ones you think are most important. Be sure to make the connection between the points you raise and the major thrust of your argument. You will be assessed according to your use of evidence to support your thesis. You may well argue that you do not agree with the idea that it was mainly German unrestricted submarine warfare that drove the USA to war in April 1917 as long as you are able to offer supporting historical evidence.

4. In the conclusion, be sure to offer final remarks on the degree to which you agree or disagree with the idea that German U-boat attacks on US ships was the main reason the USA went to war in 1917. Do not add any new information or themes in your concluding thoughts. An example of a good concluding paragraph is given below.

**In conclusion, it is clear that President Wilson, fearing a victory by the Central Powers in Europe, used the resumption of German submarine attacks on US shipping as an excuse to enter the war formally on the side of the Allied powers. The USA had supported the Allies since war broke out in Europe in 1914, both economically and materially, although it maintained it was neutral in the conflict. President Wilson felt he needed to step into the conflict to ensure that a peace without victory was possible, in other words, to help ensure that an Allied victory would not bring about punishing and destabilizing terms for the vanquished.**

5. Now try writing a complete answer to the question, following the advice above.

---

**Examination practice**

Below are two exam-style questions for you to practise on this topic.

1. Analyse the social impact of the First World War on one country in the region.
   (For guidance on how to answer ‘analyse’ questions, see pages 167–169.)

2. Evaluate the reasons the USA did not join the League of Nations.
   (For guidance on how to answer ‘evaluate’ questions, see pages 30–32.)
When Britain declared war on Germany in 1914, it did so on behalf of itself and its empire. As a British dominion whose foreign policy was controlled by the British, Canada entered the First World War as a result of this declaration. However, there was little opposition within Canada to joining the conflict. On 18 August 1914, parliament agreed to an initial overseas force of 25,000, funded by an appropriation of $50 million. As we have seen, the USA remained neutral in 1914. Canada was equally distant from any war zone. However, it was bound by such close ties with Britain that its entry into the war was a formality.

This section will look at the changing relationship between Canada, Britain and the USA, during which Canada had often seen Britain as a protector against US influence. While efforts were being made to loosen the bonds, Canada was still far more influenced by Britain than the USA in 1914 and the focus of its foreign policy was towards Britain, rather than the USA. Attempts to move closer to the USA, through trade agreements for example, were defeated in parliament.
Canada’s political status

Canada was governed according to the British North America Act, which had granted it dominion status in 1867. The intention had been to create a strong central government based in Ottawa with national responsibilities such as oversight of the economy and weaker provincial authorities tasked with more localized issues. In effect, however, the provinces rigorously defended their own powers, such as responsibilities for the health and welfare of their citizens and the federal authorities were limited in what actions they could take when faced with national issues. Also, ultimate authority as to the division of powers lay with the Privy Council in Britain. If, therefore, Canadians wished to change their Constitution they had to appeal to the British Government. In addition, there was an annual Imperial Conference in which matters appertaining to the British empire, its colonies and dominions were discussed.

Canadian governance was complicated by the fact that it was divided into English- and French-speaking areas. The inhabitants of the latter were largely descendants of settlers to the original French colonies in Canada, located mainly in the south-eastern province of Quebec. Often tensions would arise between the different groups in Quebec and sometimes there would be nationalist movements seeking at least partial independence from the Canadian Federation.

Canadian foreign policy, 1896–1911

As the nineteenth century developed, there was an increasing tension between the desire of many Canadians for more autonomy from Britain and the recognition that Britain had protected Canada from the encroachment of the USA. Many Canadians feared the concept of Manifest Destiny (see page 22). If the USA was extending its influence across the Pacific and in Latin America, then why not also into Canada itself? When Britain argued with the USA, as, for example, over Venezuela in 1895 (see page 28), there was always the fear that Canada would be vulnerable to US attack in the event of war. A tension in policy can, of course, be discerned here. While Canada felt vulnerable in that it might be drawn into Britain’s disputes with the USA, it also saw Britain as a protector against US influence.

Clearly, too, this relationship with Britain had to be balanced with the recognition that Canada could not develop as a nation unless the ties with Britain were loosened. The problem was compounded by the existence of recent British emigrants who still felt very close ties to Britain, were proud of their heritage and felt it was the duty of Canada to support Britain in any disputes. These people supported the British empire and British imperial development. Critics argued they were British first and Canadians second, and their influence thwarted Canada’s development as an independent nation.

Wilfrid Laurier

In 1896 the leader of the Liberal Party, Wilfrid Laurier, became Prime Minister. He distrusted British imperialism. While he accepted a knighthood...
in 1897 when in London for Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee, he
nevertheless rejected a proposal to set up a permanent Imperial Council with
powers to regulate tariffs within the empire and effect closer military ties. He
also negated any notion that Canada should contribute towards the cost of
Britain’s defence of its empire. Laurier sought Canada’s right to independent
action. If Canada were to support Britain it would be because Canada
believed Britain’s cause was just, not because Britain forced it to.

**SOURCE A**

An extract from Wilfrid Laurier, defining Canada’s status in 1900 during
debates on whether it should join the Boer war, quoted in ‘En Route to
Flanders Fields: The Canadians During The Great War’, by Diane

I claim for Canada this, that in the future Canada shall be at liberty to act or not
to act, to interfere or not to interfere, to do just as she pleases and that she
reserves the right to judge whether or not there is cause for her to act.

To this end:

- Canada did not formally support Britain during the Boer War, although
  Laurier agreed to the recruitment of 2000 volunteers who went to
  fight in two separate *contingents*. This angered the *anti-imperialists*,
  who feared a precedent had been set that Canada would fight in
  British wars.
- In 1904 Laurier dismissed the British head of the Canadian armed forces,
  asserting that in future such a post should be filled by a Canadian. Even
  this was contentious. Canadian troops cheered the departing British
  Commander when he said, ‘Men of Canada, keep both hands on the
  Union Jack.’

**Dispute over the Alaskan–Canadian border**

The issues came to a head during the dispute over the border between the
far north-western US territory of Alaska and Canada. During the *Gold Rush*
to the Yukon region in Alaska in the closing years of the nineteenth century,
the only accessible route crossed the Lynn Canal, a territory disputed
between the USA and Canada. At stake was the control of the supply route
to the gold fields. If the two key ports of Dyea and Skagway at the head of
the canal were Alaskan, the merchants of the US port of Seattle would
benefit because Alaska was part of the USA. If the two key ports were
Canadian, then the merchants of the Canadian port of Vancouver would
benefit. Britain, as the colonial power, accepted that the dispute should be
submitted to a six-person judicial tribunal, with three US delegates, one
British and two Canadians, which met in the early years of the new century.
The tribunal annoyed the Canadians for two main reasons:

- They felt that the British could have gained concessions over this issue
  from the USA as a result of their having given up any treaty rights to the
  Panama Canal (see page 68).
US President Roosevelt insisted he would only accept a favourable verdict. He sent US marines to Alaska and threatened Canada with war unless the US case was vindicated.

**SOURCE B**

Map of Lynn Canal, Skagway and Vancouver.

Indeed, a favourable verdict was what Roosevelt received with the British member of the Judicial Tribunal Commission, Lord Alverstone, voting with the US. While this confirmed many Canadians in their distrust of the USA, they also felt betrayed by Britain, who appeared to give in to the US and betray Canadian interests without much of a fight. However, the British Governor General, Lord Minto, said that if Canada wanted to conduct its own foreign policy it would have to be prepared to fight to enforce it. Canadian leaders realized they would have little chance of success in any armed conflict with the USA.

**Canadian navy**

At the 1909 Imperial Conference, Britain returned to the idea of a unified imperial military force, this time an imperial naval command. Canada rejected the idea but assured Britain that an independent Canadian navy would help in any crisis. In 1910 Laurier passed the Naval Service Act, which effectively created an independent Canadian navy albeit with only two cruisers. The Conservatives, led by Robert Borden, supported the maintenance of military ties with Britain and attacked this policy by saying Canada’s navy would remain too small to have any impact. Borden famously
referred to it as a ‘tin pot navy’ and felt it would be better to help the British Government fund naval expansion in the face of the threat from German naval expansion. This issue became part of the federal electoral campaign of 1911, which the Conservatives won (see pages 144–145).

**Reciprocity agreement with the USA**

Laurier was given notice of the growing unpopularity of his government by the defeat of the Liberal candidate in a previously **safe seat** in the province of Quebec, a Liberal stronghold, in November 1910. Meanwhile, 1000 protestors from the Canadian Council of Agriculture demanded a reduction in tariffs which they argued stifled their ability to sell their produce abroad. Many farmers spoke of a golden age in the mid-nineteenth century when reciprocal tariffs with the USA had brought prosperity.

Laurier hoped a reciprocity agreement would win him the support of western farmers. The USA supported the idea as it increasingly imported Canadian raw materials. A reciprocity treaty was drawn up calling for free trade in **natural products** and some manufactured goods, such as farm machinery, and lower duties elsewhere.

**Opposition**

Many businesses opposed the treaty. Sir Edmund Walker, president of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, led the attack because, he argued, it placed US interests ahead of those of Britain. Canada should focus on trade with Britain and the empire rather than the USA. Others feared the precedent and saw an end to **protection**, which they felt they needed for Canada to survive in the face of the economic wealth and structures of the USA:

- Canadian business feared it could not compete with unprotected goods from the USA.
- Fruit growers in British Columbia also feared competition from the USA.
- Railways workers in Canada’s already imperilled railway system feared job losses as the axis of trade was altered. The main routes from west to east across the prairies to the ports of eastern Canada, which facilitated trade with Britain and Europe, would be reduced and those mainly from the north to the south would be increased as Canadian and US goods were exchanged.
- The Premier of Manitoba, Tobias Crawford Norris, feared the American Midwest would become the centre of the North American wheat industry and Canada would lose its control of markets.

Ultimately many Canadians feared the influence and motives of the USA, and feared closer ties could see the absorption of Canada into its southern neighbour. They heard with trepidation the speech of the **Speaker of the House of Representatives**, James Beauchamp ‘Champ’ Clark, during the US debates on the reciprocity treaty, in which he looked forward to the day when ‘the American flag will float over every square foot of the British North American possessions, clear to the North Pole’, adding, ‘I do not have any
doubt whatever that the day is not far distant when Great Britain will see all her North American possessions become part of this republic.’

**Defeat of reciprocity**

Reciprocity was defeated because the Conservatives who opposed it won the 1911 election. In that election, a major Conservative slogan had been, ‘No truck with the Yankees.’ One Toronto student newspaper even argued its rejection would be an opportunity to ‘wipe the eye’ of the USA.

Inevitably, the issue of reciprocity became entangled with that of the navy and focused on whether Canada should maintain close ties with Britain or show more autonomy through reciprocity agreements with the USA. These issues dominated the 1911 federal election, and at its heart was the debate about Canada’s relationship with Britain.

**The 1911 election**

The 1911 election saw an unprecedented alliance between the Conservatives, who traditionally sought close relations with Britain, and French Canadians, who did not. It would appear that the latter hoped they could hold the balance of power in a minority government. Their support would just about help the Conservatives to win narrowly, with a very powerful Liberal opposition. Some Liberals meanwhile, led by Clifford Sifton, had left the party to fight against reciprocity.

**SOURCE C**


*A mutual regard for racial sympathies on both sides, and a proper discharge of our exclusive duty to this land of ours, such is the only ground upon which it is possible for us to meet so as to work out our national problems … We do not hope that our English speaking fellow countrymen should help us to draw closer to France; but on the other hand, they have no right to take advantage of their overwhelming majority to infringe on the treaty of alliance, and induce us to assume, however freely and spontaneously, additional burdens in defence of Great Britain.*

Henri Bourassa was an influential spokesman for French Canadians through his newspaper *Le Devoir*. It favoured fewer ties with Britain and attacked English-speaking Canadian institutions, which it felt discriminated against the French.

**Aims of the Conservatives and French Canadians**

According to historian Desmond Morton, Robert Borden’s ideal was to see Canada as one of the leaders of a British imperial federation dominated by Britain and the white dominions of its empire. Clearly, this severely disagreed with the aspirations of French Canadians.
Nevertheless, many French Canadians supported the Conservatives because they disagreed with Laurier’s policies that reflected his desire for closer ties with the USA through trade, but also perceived that he was too close to Britain. A minority government would be stymied, unable to pass any legislation without their support and forced to lessen ties with Britain while having to recognize and respond to their interests.

Laurier, meanwhile, couldn’t win. English-speaking Canadians felt he had betrayed Britain by his naval policy and were very wary of a trade reciprocity policy with the USA, while French speakers argued he was a tool of Britain. Laurier said, ‘I am branded in Quebec a traitor to the French and in Ontario as a traitor to the English … I am neither. I am a Canadian.’ In the event, the 1911 election saw a victory for the Conservatives, winning 134 seats to the Liberals’ 87.

**SUMMARY DIAGRAM**

Canada, Britain and the USA
Canada’s involvement in the First World War had a huge impact both within the country in terms of economic and social factors and on its development as a nation. Some have even gone so far as to say that the war helped create Canada as a nation. This section will examine both the impact of the war on Canada at the time and the longer-term effect on Canadian national identity.

Initial responses

There was a wholehearted patriotic response both from English- and French-speaking Canadians to Britain’s declaration of war on Germany on 4 August 1914 – Britain and France were allied against a common foe. Borden relied on 200 local militias to recruit volunteers. By 4 September 32,000 had answered the call; the majority of these were British Canadians, only one-third of whom had actually been born in Canada. There were insufficient resources to house or train these initial numbers – a huge training camp at Valcartier near Quebec City was still under construction – so it was decided to send thousands of them directly to Britain to be trained. Many worried they would miss the fighting; they expected the war to be over by Christmas.

The impact of war on Canada

As the war developed into the terrible attrition of the trenches, lasting for four years, it had a long-lasting impact on Canada, leading to:

- greater political and military autonomy from Britain
- resentment and divisions caused by conscription
- economic progress
- social developments
- civil liberties.

We will consider each of these in turn in this section.

Greater political and military autonomy

Canadian soldiers had joined the British army as imperial troops and were under British military command. Borden visited Canadian troops in Europe in 1915 and was appalled both by the level of care for the wounded and the apparent incompetence of Imperial High Command. Half of the original draft of volunteers had been killed, wounded or captured at the Second Battle of Ypres in 1915, where many had been forced to discard their
Canadian-made Ross rifles, which were of limited use in trench conditions. Borden was further incensed by the fact that most British ministers spent much of August 1915 away from their desks grouse shooting, and he determined that the Canadian authorities should have more say in military strategy and the deployment of Canadian troops. Canadian soldiers, meanwhile, were suffering unimaginable horrors in the trenches and yet many acted with incredible fortitude, as Source D shows.

**SOURCE D**

An extract from a letter from Frederick Joseph Bird, 1st Canadian battalion, to his sister-in-law, Lallie, dated 15 September 1916 (found at www.pastvoices.com/canada/fbird19161509.shtml).

Frederick Joseph Bird  
No. 401306  
1st. Batt. Canadians

Hut 11, Frensham Military Hosp.,  
Nr. Farnham, Surrey,  
England  
September 15, 1916

Dear Lallie:-

You will see by the above address that I am back again in England and in hospital. But am thankful to say I have no open wounds. Just a severely sprained back and my nerves are badly shaken up. I was buried in the trenches, and you may be sure I thought my last moment had come. My chum next to me was killed – instantly killed. Something seemed to tell me the day before that I was going to get it.

Borden’s anger at the sacrifice made by Canadian soldiers and the seeming indifference of the British High Command can be judged by Source E.

**SOURCE E**


It can hardly be expected that we shall put 400,000 or 500,000 men in the field and willingly accept the position of having no more voice and receiving no more consideration than if we were toy automatons.

In December 1916 David Lloyd George replaced Herbert Asquith as British Prime Minister and agreed that the dominions should have more say in the running of the war. He argued that they were fighting with Britain, not for it. ‘We need their men’, he said, ‘We must consult them.’ The result was the setting up of the Imperial War Cabinet in spring 1917.
The Imperial War Cabinet

The Imperial War Cabinet set a precedent concerning power sharing, even though Lloyd George and his war cabinet dominated decision-making, mainly because the dominion premiers couldn’t be there all the time. This precedent paved the way for the independent status of the dominions at the 1919 Peace Conference. This was significant in that they were treated as countries separate from Britain with their own voice. Borden and his South African counterpart, J.C. Smuts, hoped for a special conference after the war to formalize relations and consultations between Britain and the dominions, but this was not to happen as other developments such as the difficulties in the post-war peace settlement appeared to make it less pressing. Historian Desmond Morton suggested the war had ended Borden’s dream of an imperial federation.

The impact of conscription

Amid fierce debate, conscription was introduced in 1917.

Background

After three years of war, over 600,000 Canadians had volunteered to fight, almost 50 per cent of all those eligible. Nevertheless, volunteers could no longer make up the losses. Canadians had been in the thick of the fighting, earning acclaim for their sacrifice, often used as shock troops. This had led to horrific losses. For example:

- After the first day’s fighting at the Battle of the Somme on 1 July 1916, only 68 members of the Newfoundland Regiment answered that evening’s roll call; 710 had either been killed or wounded, or were missing.
- In April 1917, the Canadian Corps, fighting together for the first time, captured Vimy Ridge at a cost of 10,600 casualties. The attack was part of the Battle of Arras and the ridge needed to be captured so the Germans couldn’t rain fire on Allied troops below. The success of Canadians in capturing the Ridge was regarded as a significant achievement in the face of fierce German resistance, and won widespread respect for the Canadian forces. It is also regarded as a defining moment in the creation of a Canadian identity (see page 165).

Encouragement to enlist

The Government had a number of strategies to encourage a greater number of volunteers.

- Poster campaigns were carried out to sustain enlistment numbers, from posters attacking alleged German atrocities to those encouraging women to pressure their menfolk. As in other countries, there was a mixture of appeals to patriotism and attempts to induce shame at not volunteering.
- Medical standards were lowered, including the establishment of special ‘bantam’ units for men less than five feet tall.
People from the same areas were promised they could serve in the same units.

From 1916 First Nations and blacks were recruited, having been rejected earlier when they volunteered; 3500 First Canadians and 1000 blacks enlisted and served with distinction.

By mid-1916, however, the number of volunteers was drying up. In July 1916 just over 8000 enlisted and, following the news of Vimy Ridge, just over 10,000 in April and May 1917. Many preferred the high wages in war production where jobs were readily available. However, the widespread knowledge of the horrors of war was the most likely reason for the shortage of fresh manpower.

**SOURCE F**

A recruitment poster, *Your Chums are Fighting: Why aren’t YOU?* published by the Central Recruiting Committee, Canada, 1917.

How effective do you find the poster in Source F in its attempt to persuade men to enlist?
The battle for conscription

In December 1914, Borden had assured his audience at the Halifax Conservative Club that ‘there has not been and there will not be compulsion or conscription’. However, to maintain Canada’s right to be involved in decision-making concerning the progress of the war, he had made more and more commitments – from the initial 25,000, to 250,000 in 1915, and finally to 500,000 troops. The numbers required were huge given that Canada, with an entire population of around 8 million, had a reservoir of less than 2 million eligible men for selection. As the number of volunteers began to diminish, Borden believed he would either have to impose conscription or to reduce the Canadian commitment to the war effort, and therefore lose influence in the Imperial War Cabinet. He chose the former and on 29 August 1917, the Military Service Act was passed, requiring all men from the ages of 20 to 45 years to register for conscription for the duration of the war. There were exemptions for those in reserved occupations and conscientious objectors. Twenty Liberals supported the Conservatives to ensure the Bill was passed. Laurier unsuccessfully demanded a referendum on the issue.

Many French Canadians in particular opposed the Military Service Act:

- They were increasingly reluctant to fight for a country in which they believed their interests were ignored. They felt provincial legislation was destroying their culture. In 1916, for example, the province of Manitoba eliminated bilingual schools, while in Ontario, where there were concerns about the growing French-Canadian population, the use of French in state schools was restricted by Regulation 17.
- Sir Sam Hughes was the minister in charge of enlistment until late 1915; he was known for his anti-French Canadian and anti-Catholic views and these appeared to have surfaced in his policies towards French-Canadian volunteers. They were rarely placed in French-speaking units and, with orders given in English by English-Canadian officers, they increasingly asked why they should fight for a system that appeared to deny them their rights. They did not expect better treatment under conscription.
- French Canadians tended to marry and have children younger than English speakers and so had more family commitments. They were more reluctant therefore to join the armed forces where they would be separated from their families at best, and at worst be killed or badly injured and leave them without an adequate income.
- French Canadians did not have such strong ties with France as English speakers had with Britain. Many were descendants of those who had emigrated following the creation of the Third Republic, which they saw as radical and anti-clerical. They did not have the ties with their home country therefore that British recruits had and weren’t motivated to fight on the side of the ‘mother country’, in this case, France.
Chapter 5: Canada and the First World War: participation and impact

SOURCE G


We have enlisted for the European war six per cent of our population. That is the equivalent of an army of 2,400,000 for France and 2,700,000 for the United Kingdom. How many French soldiers or even British soldiers, would they send to America if Canada was attacked by the United States?

The 1917 federal election

By rights, there should have been a federal election in 1916. Borden postponed this, citing the war as the reason, and sought a coalition government to give the impression of unity across the political parties in the face of the conflict. However, Laurier refused to join any coalition because of his opposition to the conscription issue. This caused a split within the Liberal Party as others, particularly those of British origin, supported Borden. Borden and his supporters renamed themselves as the Unionist Party. Borden therefore formed a Unionist government made up of Conservatives and Liberal defectors and called a federal election for December 1917 for the voters to endorse this.

SOURCE H


Our first duty is to win, at any cost, the coming election in order that we may continue to do our part in winning the War and that Canada will not be disgraced.

Borden ensured electoral support to ensure victory for the new Unionist Party through two electoral reforms in autumn 1917, prior to the federal election:

- **Wartime Elections Act**
  - Enfranchised the female relatives of Canadian military personnel serving overseas.
  - Took the vote away from immigrants from any of the Central Powers who had entered Canada after 1902.
- **Military Voters’ Act**
  - Extended the vote to all military personnel including women – nurses for example – irrespective of their period of residence in Canada.

These measures undoubtedly manipulated the results of the election; military personnel could only vote yes or no to record their support or otherwise of the Government. Unless they specified otherwise by asking for their votes to be added to those of the relevant candidate in their home.
constituency, these votes were allocated to specific candidates as the Electoral Officer chose, thereby increasing the votes cast for marginal candidates. It is estimated that in this way, Borden was able to manipulate 25 per cent of the total votes cast. One critic said, ‘It would have been more direct and at the same time more honest if the bill (the Military Voters’ Act) stated simply that all who did not pledge themselves to vote Conservative would be disenfranchised.’ Indeed 90 per cent of military personnel supported the Unionists.

The election results showed the polarization within Canada. The Unionists won by 842,000 votes to 750,000, but the Liberals controlled all but three of the seats in Quebec and only held 20 in the whole of the rest of Canada. This meant 75 per cent of the electorate of Quebec voted one way and 64 per cent of the rest of Canada the other. Inevitably, Quebec felt close to secession and indeed a debate on the issue was mooted in the Quebec parliament.

The impact of conscription

Conscription was to lead to longstanding resentments that fed into the divisions within Canadian society during the inter-war period and beyond. Of the 404,385 men liable for military services as conscripts, 385,510 sought exemption. In Quebec there were riots in Easter 1918 that left four dead, many injured and damage to property estimated at $300,000. Over 1000 troops – largely English-speaking, Protestant troops from Ontario – were sent to stop the disorder.

In April 1918, in the face of a major German offensive on the Western Front, Borden abolished all exemptions so all men aged between 18 and 45 could be eligible for the military. However, due to the relatively sudden ending of the conflict its actual impact on the war effort was minimal – 48,000 conscripts were sent abroad, of whom 50 per cent served at the front. A further 50,000 were still in Canada at the time of the Armistice in November 1918.

Creation of a Canadian national identity

Canada won enormous respect for its efforts during the conflict; 620,000 Canadians served in the armed forces, over 60,000 were killed and 155,000 wounded. All sides testified to the tenacity and commitment of the Canadian armed forces. Many historians saw the war as helping create Canadian nationhood, a bonding of the disparate regions under the collective aegis of Canada with a greater autonomy from Britain. Many commentators have argued that the war created a Canadian identity through the scale of the conflict and Canada’s enormous contribution and sacrifice. We have seen above that its contribution in terms of manpower was significant. The argument goes that the common experience created Canadians, where formerly there had been different groups who owed primary allegiance to the provinces in which they lived. The examples most commonly offered are Canada’s role in the horrific battles of Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele in 1917.
when the four Canadian divisions first fought as one unified command. The respect in which Canadian troops were widely held helped give the country pride in its achievements, and the increasing autonomy that it gained from Britain in terms of command of its troops helped create a national consciousness.

However, others disagree, pointing to how the conscription crisis divided Canadians, and how the opposition of French Canadians in particular precluded any consensus about national identity. The issue is therefore more complex than suggested by the arguments of shared experience and will be referred to in the debate (see pages 165–166). While no-one would doubt its impact and importance then, the effects of the war on Canada are now more in dispute. All, however, remain shocked by the cost and sacrifice.

**Economic progress**

The Canadian economy flourished during wartime. It saw the export of wheat and grain double and significant increases also in the exports of wood pulp, paper, meat and livestock. Canada became a recognizably industrial nation as a result of wartime production. This was achieved without government controls such as *food rationing*.

After initial attempts to rely on private initiative, the Federal Government became more and more involved in the economy until it had established an unprecedented influence. The result was that the Canadian economy grew in capacity and efficiency so that it became a major supplier of *materiel* for the Allied war effort.

**Finance**

The war was paid for by a combination of taxes and loans. Initially, when it was expected the war would be over quickly, the Government relied on the usual wartime expediency of raising loans abroad, particularly in the USA, as its usual creditor Britain was in no position to advance funding. However, the nature of the conflict made unprecedented demands on the economy. Before the war Canada’s federal budget had been $185 million. Business and personal taxation was minimal – 85 per cent of the Government’s revenue came from tariffs and postal rates. As expenditure quadrupled, clearly radical changes in raising revenue were required.

**Taxes**

Many groups thought that taxes should be increased, particularly for those who could afford to pay. Church groups and labour organizations called for ‘conscription of wealth’. In 1916 the Federal Government responded with the first taxes on business profits and in 1917 with the ‘temporary’ imposition of an income tax of between 4 and 25 per cent on the incomes of the wealthy. The Minister of Finance explained the case: ‘There has arisen a very natural, and in my view, a very just sentiment that those who are in the enjoyment of substantial incomes should substantially and directly
contribute to the growing war expenditure. Only the wealthy paid anything. It was estimated that someone in receipt of an income of $10,000 would pay $420 and one of $200,000 would pay $4400. As a result, by 1919 taxes accounted for only 3.4 per cent of federal government revenue and the vast majority of Canadians remained untaxed by the Federal Government. Most revenues were raised by loans.

**Victory Bonds and Victory Loans**

Victory Bonds were issued in Canada as in the USA (see page 108). They were hugely successful, with the first issue of November 1915 raising $100 million, twice what had been expected. While the interest rate of 5.5 per cent over a twenty-year period may have been some incentive, the bonds were also marketed very effectively particularly through tying them directly into the support and welfare of troops. The bonds, issued each year, grew in size and ambition; in 1917 the fourth issue was renamed Victory Loans and raised $398 million. Those who could not afford to take out the bonds bought War Savings certificates, to be repaid after the conflict was over.

Altogether, throughout the war, $2 billion was raised in Victory Loans. While a significant amount of money was borrowed from the USA, most was raised at home through these bonds. At the end of the conflict the burden of debt was such that Canada needed to maintain its economic growth to sustain it and income tax was never rescinded. The Canadian national debt rose from $463 million to $2.46 billion between 1913 and 1918.

**Industry**

Canadian industries responded to the war with three successive policies:

- by moving into markets abandoned by Germany
- by promoting ‘Buy Canadian’ campaigns
- by convincing the Imperial War Cabinet that Canada had the industrial capacity to supply the Western Front with shells.

Canadian munitions manufacturers liaised directly with the British Government concerning supply. By March 1915 over 200 Canadian firms had converted to munitions manufacture. Canada embraced wartime production and by 1916 there was effectively no unemployment.

**Problems with munitions**

However, there were initial problems with the production of artillery and shells, which led to tensions with Britain. The Canadian Minister of Munitions and Defence, Sir Sam Hughes, had set up a Shell Committee to co-ordinate production, but companies often failed to deliver their contracts amid allegations of inefficiency and corruption. Hughes himself was accused of giving contracts to friends and cronies. He was also associated with promoting Canadian weapons that functioned badly, thus endangering the lives of Canadian soldiers unnecessarily. For example, the Ross rifle frequently jammed in trench conditions.
In November 1915, Hughes resigned and an Imperial Munitions Board was set up under the chairmanship of businessman Joseph Flavelle to replace him in terms of responsibility for war production.

**The Imperial Munitions Board**

By 1917 the Imperial Munitions Board had an annual budget treble that of the entire federal government in 1914. Flavelle employed professional managers to co-ordinate its activities and brought in 30,000 women to replace office and factory workers serving in the armed forces. Canadian production rose significantly with the value of exports rising from $68.5 million in 1915 to $4.44 billion by 1917 when it oversaw the production of $2 million worth of goods every day. By the end of the war, the Imperial Munitions Board was producing one-third of all the shells fired by the Allies on the Western Front. In addition, it oversaw the production of ships and aircraft and even the construction of airfields to train pilots. By 1918 the 600 factories it co-ordinated had produced over 100 naval vessels, 30 **flying boats** and 2600 training aircraft. With 289,000 employees it was Canada’s largest employer.

**Halifax disaster**

One domestic tragedy during the war was the Halifax explosion of 6 December 1917, the biggest man-made explosion before the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan in 1945. The port of Halifax in Nova Scotia was a major setting-off point for Atlantic convoys. Here, through human error, the Belgian relief ship *Imo* collided with *Mont Blanc*, a French munitions vessel, whose holds contained tons of TNT, picric acid and benzene. The resulting explosion killed 1963 and injured 9000 of the 50,000 residents of Halifax. Six thousand were made homeless. The USA immediately sent a relief train with medical personnel and supplies, which arrived almost before the fires were out. Britain and Canada spent millions on reconstruction. Despite the carnage, the convoys from Halifax resumed within a week.

**Government organizations to co-ordinate the economy**

Various organizations were set up to ensure the smooth running of the economy:

- To co-ordinate other war contracts, except munitions, the War Purchasing Committee was set up in May 1915 under a Toronto manufacturer and MP, Albert Edward Kemp. It was given the responsibility of overseeing all contracts for war supplies except munitions.
- In 1917 William John Hanna was given the responsibility of regulating food production and supply while Charles Alexander Magrath was given a similar task in relation to fuel.
- Two of Canada’s transcontinental railways were nationalized under the aegis of Canadian National Railways.

**Agriculture**

1914 saw Canada in the throes of economic depression. That summer saw the second year of drought while the two transcontinental railroads were heavily in debt and forced to make thousands of their workers unemployed. Although
the onset of war exacerbated the situation with short-term disruption through loss of overseas contracts, in the longer term it led to a prolonged boom in the Canadian economy. An increased demand from Britain for wheat, for example, helped stimulate the **prairie economy** out of depression.

There was a huge demand for Canadian wheat and grain, although the efforts to meet it contributed to the drought and **dustbowl conditions** of the inter-war years by leaving the soil exhausted. Of the three prairie provinces of Manitoba, Alberta and Saskatchewan, acreage increased from 9.3 million in 1914 to 16.1 million by 1918, with wheat and oats being sown in 90 per cent of the fields. The number of prairie farms increased by 28 per cent – but with a sign of what was to come, the yields per acre fell.

**Food production**
The Government was anxious to maintain food production and ensure profitability for farmers. Some measures were popular while others were not.

In 1917 the Board of Grain Supervisors was set up to fix wheat prices across the country and guarantee prices for farmers. It later took control of marketing and in 1919 was renamed the Canadian Wheat Board, taking control of all aspects of wheat production and sale. This was popular with farmers because it set fair prices, and they feared if it was abolished and with it the guarantees, then prices might collapse.

However, farmers opposed conscription (see pages 150–151) because they needed their sons to help them farm. Initially Borden had complied with their demands. However, in April 1918 as losses mounted and in the face of a major German offensive, he rescinded this decision. Various recruitment strategies were employed to replace conscripted agricultural workers:

- **Soldiers of the Soil (SOS)** was an organization for young adults who volunteered to work on farms for periods upwards of three months. They were exempted from school and exams during their term of service, which may have provided an incentive for them to join. Many were city dwellers for whom service was a real adventure.
- **Farm Service Groups** were various groups set up to encourage volunteers to work in farming. The State of Ontario specifically encouraged females to volunteer to enable men to join the armed forces. For example, under its aegis in 1918, 24,000 women were picking fruit around Niagara. Other organizations such as the Young Women’s Christian Association also set up camps for volunteers to help with wartime agriculture.

**Social developments**
The war saw various changes in society such as:

- welfare provision for the dependants of troops fighting overseas
- the roles of women
- the introduction of prohibition
- increasing government control over people’s lives and opinions.
Canadian Patriotic Fund, 1914

The Canadian Patriotic Fund was set up to preserve the economic status of the families of those who had volunteered to fight. It specifically raised money to cover any discrepancies between service pay and peacetime wages. Such was the response that it was almost able to maintain the average income for skilled workers. However, through its network of local volunteers, it was also accused of meddling in the lives of families through, for example, giving nutritional advice. ‘Undeserving’ cases, presumably those who did not co-operate in terms of accepting advice or resenting intrusion, received little help. The Patriotic Fund was a precedent in accepting responsibility for the welfare of dependants of those who had volunteered to fight, but many did see it as interfering in lifestyles, with its volunteers, mainly middle class, assuming attitudes of patronage and superiority over its recipients.

Women

There was little concerted effort to recruit women to fill the vacancies left by men except, as we have seen, in agriculture. However, because of the sheer number of vacancies, by 1917 women made up 12 per cent of the 300,000 workers involved in war production. In September 1917 female relatives of serving military personnel gained the right to vote in federal elections (see page 151), and the vote was extended to all women in 1919.

Prohibition

Prohibition was introduced throughout Canada in April 1918. Apart from Quebec, the provinces had already taken the initiative. The main impetus came from a desire not to waste precious resources such as grain in wartime, although there were also the moral arguments about young recruits not being open to temptation. As in the USA, although drink-related crimes diminished, enforcement was difficult and illegal production and consumption proliferated. The Canadian provinces repeated prohibition laws during the 1920s although they continued in the USA until 1933.

Civil liberties

Various measures were passed which, as in the USA, appeared to threaten civil liberties and the right to hold views at variance with those of the Government. This was justified in terms of national emergency but nevertheless led to considerable resentment among those affected.

Internment of ‘enemy aliens’

As early as August 1914 the Federal Government had passed the Wartime Measures Act, which allowed it to suspend civil liberties in the interests of the war effort. This included censorship and the suppression of material deemed to be unpatriotic, and the arrest, imprisonment and possible deportation of those felt to be a threat to national security.

This was specifically used against those seen as enemy aliens, or Canadians of German descent. While we can see in hindsight that the threat from
potential traitors was slight, it was a real fear at the time. There was also a fear that Irish-Americans might launch terrorist-style attacks within Canada in opposition to British rule in Ireland, and when part of the parliament building burnt down in Ottawa in 1916 unfounded suspicions were raised. In fact the only serious threat from Irish-American nationalists appears to have been a plan to attack bridges in Canada, which was soon quashed by the authorities.

Sir William Otter, a former soldier, oversaw the internment of over 8500 ‘enemy aliens’ in camps where they were set to work on massive public works projects, such as the development of the Banff National Park, working in difficult conditions for as little as 25 cents per day. In addition, 3138 Canadians suspected of being threats to security were designated ‘prisoners of war’ and closely supervised. A further 80,000 Canadians had to register and abide by strict regulations, including reporting regularly to police stations. Many of these were of Ukrainian extraction because part of the Ukraine lay in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany’s ally. However, other parts lay in Russia, the ally of Britain, France – and Canada.

Anti-German feeling
In addition to these official measures there was considerable anti-German feeling, with riots against German Canadians and their property in cities such as Winnipeg and Montreal. The city of Berlin in East Ontario was forced to change its name to Kitchener. Here soldiers from the 118th battalion ran amok attacking German businesses, and a bust of the Kaiser was thrown into nearby Lake Victoria.

Berlin was also home to a Mennonite community. These received especial opprobrium because they were pacifist. Although the Military Service Act had allowed churches to claim exemption from conscription, it hadn’t specified whether their members could still be conscripted into non-combatant service. It wasn’t until July 1918 that specific churches were named for exemption, including the Mennonites and Society of Friends (Quakers).

**KEY TERM**

- **Mennonite** A Christian group that lives a simple life in small communities without any use of modern technology; it is opposed to war and so members would not enlist in the First World War.
- **Pacifist** Opposed to war and violence.
- **Quakers** Like the Mennonites, the Quakers are a Christian denomination opposed to war, but unlike the Mennonites they might volunteer to serve on the battlefield in non-combatant roles, for example, as stretcher bearers or ambulance drivers.
In the previous section we considered the impact of the war on Canada during the period of the conflict. Now we will go on to consider longer-term effects that developed in the immediate post-war period and into the 1920s.

Following the end of the war there was a desire for a quick return to peacetime conditions – except, of course, nothing could ever be the same after such a catastrophe. Wartime controls were dismantled – in 1919, for example, the Wheat Board was abolished even though farmers asked for its continuation. This section will consider the post-war impact of the conflict on Canada in terms of:

- how quickly troops were repatriated and reintegrated into society
- political and economic effects
- effects on foreign affairs.
An attempt to curb wartime inflation through the introduction of the Combines and Fair Prices Bill 1919 was defeated by the British Privy Council on the grounds that it exceeded the power of the Federal Government to regulate commerce.

As in Latin America, the post-war period saw US economic influence increase. Its firms came to control Canadian motor vehicle production, for example one of the largest Canadian manufacturers, McLaughlin Motor Company, had sold out to General Motors of the USA in 1918 and others followed suit. Industries in the south-east of Canada increasingly sought their coal from the USA. Canadian coal prices fell by 40 to 50 per cent during the 1920s. While the decade saw unparalleled prosperity, many were concerned at this increasing economic dependence on the USA.

Demobilization and re-integration of military personnel

The transportation of military personnel back to Canada was the biggest migration of Canadians up to that point. With over 267,000 troops and 54,000 dependants it proved a logistical nightmare, especially as some of the early ships proved unseaworthy. It was difficult to ask soldiers awaiting demobilization to be patient, given what they had been through. Nevertheless, delays were inevitable, exacerbated by poor weather and strikes in Britain including those at British ports. Serious unrest followed, with rioting in Kinmel Park in North Wales on 4–5 March 1919, leaving five soldiers dead. The British authorities, afraid of this unrest, made Canadian repatriation a priority, and the vast majority had left for home by August 1919.

Re-integration

The Canadian authorities were clearly aware of the sacrifice made by their troops, and schemes to help the disabled and award pensions were among the most enlightened in the world.

- By 1920 veterans’ pensions absorbed a staggering 20 per cent of the federal budget compared with 0.5 per cent in 1914.
- The Khaki University had been established in 1917 to offer soldiers pre-university education; by 1919, 50,000 had taken advantage of its services and were ready to move on to higher education should the opportunity arise.
- The Department of Soldiers’ Civil Re-establishment provided vocational training.
- For soldiers seeking careers in agriculture, the Soldiers’ Settlement Board was set up to buy agricultural land and issue loans for stock, equipment and buildings. However, of the 43,000 who took advantage of its services, only 25,000 remained by 1921; much of the land purchased was unsuitable for wheat growing.
However, the immediate post-war Canadian economy was too weak to provide ex-servicemen with all they wanted. For example, their demand for a $2000 bonus to compensate for lost earnings during their service period was repeatedly rejected as being too costly.

**Post-war unrest**

The war affected people’s attitudes. As a result of the suffering it caused and its magnitude, they demanded a greater voice in future and were less prepared to tolerate policies they considered detrimental to their interests. In Canada, as elsewhere, the immediate post-war period saw protests from farmers and considerable industrial unrest. This was compounded by dissatisfaction in different regions.

**Farmers**

At the end of the war, conditions remained difficult for farmers. They had increasingly felt dissatisfied during and immediately after the war despite the expansion of wheat exports:

- They opposed the conscription of their sons, saying they were needed at home (see page 156).
- They felt government favoured big business, pointing to tight credit and high tariffs. They argued that they found it difficult to get loans and mortgages from the banks, while imported goods were expensive as a result of duties.
- They opposed the abolition of the Wheat Board, which had guaranteed prices in 1919; they now feared that prices would collapse.

There was a fall in demand for wheat as peacetime conditions returned, allowing the former belligerent countries to return to domestic production. This led to a collapse in prices. Coupled with the onset of drought again, this brought a hardship to the prairies from which they never really recovered. Wheat prices had been set as $2.20 per bushel in early 1917, though this sometimes rose to $2.90 per bushel; by mid-1922 this had fallen to $1.10.

As a result of these dissatisfactions, farmers became increasingly politicized both during and after the war. The Canadian Council of Agriculture developed the Farmers’ Platform during the middle years of the war, a new national policy calling for, among other things, nationalization of the railways and more equitable taxation. Its programme was accepted by most farmers as a basis for political action and the Council morphed into the New National Party, which called for tariff reductions, reductions in freight charges and national management of resources. It also attacked the apparent ostentation of the very rich, singling out in particular Casa Loma, overlooking Toronto, the home of international financier and speculator Sir Henry Pellatt. Its programme was embraced by the **Progressive Party**, a new political grouping formed out of farming interests and disaffected Liberals, which won 64 seats in the 1921 election and controlled the balance of power.
Industrial unrest
There was a series of industrial disputes after the war, which often resulted in violence. The most serious precursor of future unrest was in the city of Winnipeg, paralyzed by strikes in May 1919. Many employees were angered by the wartime inflation which reduced their purchasing power, and also feared that the influx of demobilized troops would cut wages further or lead to the laying off of existing workers. Many of those in dispute sought the creation of One Big Union (OBU) to speak for all workers. In Winnipeg as many as 30,000 public and private sector workers went on strike on 15 May 1919. When strikers paraded on 21 June, the mayor read the Riot Act and the demonstration was dispersed with force, causing the deaths of two strikers. In future the authorities would be prepared to use police and militias to quell demonstrations.

These strikes were a feature of many post-war societies, including Britain and the USA, and reflected the disillusion occasioned by the war, post-war dislocation, economic downturn and uncertainties as to the future. In Canada discontent was also shown in regional movements that focused on more localized concerns and manifested in organizations seeking more autonomy from federal government.

Regional differences
Post-war conditions exacerbated feelings of discontent throughout Canada and led to the growth and development of regional political movements.

Maritime rights movement
The maritime provinces of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick felt they were being marginalized as their percentage of Canadian population fell in relation to other areas as people moved to more prosperous regions, particularly large cities. They particularly felt aggrieved that freight prices were too high for them to compete with other provinces. Only when it was clear after the 1925 elections that the three maritime provinces had shifted their allegiance to the Conservatives did Liberal Prime Minister Mackenzie King offer a royal commission to investigate their grievances the following year. As a result freight charges were reduced, but the discontent continued.

Quebec
French Canadians in Quebec felt as alienated in the post-war period as they had before because they saw no progress in any movement towards greater independence from the Canadian Federation. However, during the inter-war period their protests became dominated by the conservative clergy who emphasized two beliefs, neither of which were practical in the post-war world:

- agrarianism or a return to farming in small communities
- rural industrialization.

Neither of these ideas ever succeeded and the aspirations of separatists were to find a voice in the 1930s with the development of Union-Nationale.

**KEY TERM**

Riot Act A call for demonstrators to disperse before being forced to by the authorities.

Rural industrialization The main policy of the post-war Quebec government led by Louis-Alexandre Taschereau. The idea was industrial development in the form of natural resources projects such as the development of hydro-electric power and mineral extraction, again in small communities.

Union-Nationale A separatist movement in Quebec seeking greater autonomy or even independence from the federal government.
Chapter 5: Canada and the First World War: participation and impact

Foreign relations
The impact of the First World War saw Canada become more independent and less inclined to involve itself in foreign affairs at the bequest of Britain. Borden asserted Canada’s growing autonomy from Britain by insisting that the Canadian parliament had to approve the peace treaties and membership of the League of Nations. This it did, although ironically the main concerns, as with the USA, were over Article 10, which could have committed Canada to involvement in foreign disputes (see page 120). Canadian independence of action was demonstrated in several instances, as outlined below.

Membership of the League of Nations
Borden insisted Canada be admitted as a member of the League of Nations and have a non-permanent seat on the Council, which was the main decision-making body. The USA objected to this, as it did for all the other dominions, because it believed Canada would not act independently of Britain. President Wilson, however, allowed Canada its voice. Canada had to fight a similar battle to be admitted to join the International Labour Organization, despite Borden asserting that Canada was probably the seventh most industrialized country in the world.

Successive Canadian leaders were less committed to Canada’s role in the world and less enamoured of the League of Nations as international crises unfolded. During the 1920s, in particular, Canada avoided foreign entanglements. Raoul Dandurand, one of Canada’s early envoys to the League of Nations, spoke for many when he said Canadians lived ‘in a fireproof house far from sources of conflagration’ – in other words they had no need to get involved in foreign disputes.

Renewal of British–Japanese naval agreements
In 1921 the USA objected to Britain’s policy to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance because of its fears of Japanese influence in the Pacific and the combined strength of the British and Japanese fleets. Australia, however, welcomed the renewal of the treaty because it felt safer with the two as allies. Canada was in a dilemma. Borden had retired in 1920. His successor, Arthur Meighen, relied heavily on Borden’s foreign policy adviser, Loring Christie, who believed Anglo-US friendship would be in Canada’s best interests and the British–Japanese agreements would threaten this. The dominions (Australia and Canada) were therefore in disagreement. At the 1921 Imperial Conference, Meighen argued that Canada should have the strongest voice in discussing issues that had implications for the USA, and renewal of the treaty could affect Canadian–US relations.

The issue was settled by the Washington Naval Conference of the following year (see page 130). However, the significance of this incident was that the dominions would not necessarily co-operate and they would follow their national interests when these were in conflict with those of other dominions.
Chanak Crisis, 1922

In 1922 Britain confronted Turkey about its disavowal of treaty obligations following the approach of Turkish troops to the Dardanelles, a designated neutral zone by the Treaty of Sèvres (see page 119). British troops were defending the Chanak region against Turkish advance when Lloyd George asked the dominions for military support. Canadian Premier Mackenzie King asserted that the Canadian parliament would have to discuss the issue. By the time it did so the crisis was over, but he had demonstrated Canada’s independence of action.

Throughout the inter-war period Canada was increasingly independent of Britain in foreign affairs, as shown in a treaty with the USA in 1925 regarding fishing rights – its first treaty negotiated as an independent nation – and the Balfour Declaration in 1926, which acknowledged that white-governed dominions were independent of Britain but united by a common allegiance to the crown. In other words it gave the dominions greater international autonomy. Finally, in 1931 the Treaty of Westminster formalized the 1926 Balfour Declaration. It was the key legislation on relations between Britain and the white-governed dominions, asserting their legislative independence. Britain could not pass laws on their behalf, and they were not tied to British foreign policy. Britain could no longer, as in the First World War for example, declare war on their behalf.

---

**KEY TERM**

**Treaty of Westminster**
Statute establishing legislative independence for British dominions such as Canada.
Key debate

Key question: How far do historians agree that involvement in the First World War saw the creation of a Canadian nationhood and identity?

The official history of the war
Writing in 2006 in his book Clio’s Warriors, Tim Cook considered the work of the official historian of the war, Lieutenant Colonel A.F. Duguid. Duguid had been so anxious to demonstrate the tremendous contribution and sacrifice of the Canadian Expeditionary Force that he spent most of the inter-war years gathering an archive and only actually completed one volume of the eight he was commissioned to write. Duguid’s achievement was to create this archive, which is in effect a memorial to the success of the Canadian soldier, a success which, many have argued, defined and created Canadian nationhood and identity. How far this is true has been the divisive issue historians have considered when examining the impact the war had on Canada.

The forging of the nation
Traditionally many historians followed the words of Brigadier General A.E. Ross who wrote about Vimy Ridge, ‘In those few minutes, I saw the birth of a nation.’ One veteran of the battle agreed with the sentiment: ‘We went up Vimy Ridge as Albertans and Nova Scotians. We came down as Canadians.’ Writing in the 1960s, historian Roger Graham echoed this: ‘Vimy Ridge became a symbol of Canadian achievement … the pride engendered on the bloody slopes of that commanding hill did much to bring Canada to full nationhood.’ Pierre Berton wrote a classic account of the battle in 1986 in which he, too, saw it as a crucial step in Canada emerging as a nation. It was commonly felt that Canada’s war experiences had bound the nation together, and disillusion about the carnage further encouraged it to go its own way, creating an increasingly distinct identity from Britain. Another consequence was that Canada became more isolationist in the inter-war years so that it wouldn’t get dragged into further conflict.

Cult of victory
In 1997 historian Jonathan F. Vance challenged this interpretation in his book Death So Noble in which he exhaustively examined contemporary views of the conflict. While he agreed about the significance in terms of culture and nationhood, he argued that a cult of victory persisted well into the 1930s; Canadians were proud of their achievement in the First World War. He cites, for example, the fact that there was a big demand for war trophies to display in open spaces and that 6000 Canadians went to Vimy for the unveiling of the Canadian memorial in 1936. Whilst acknowledging his scholarly achievement in this work, some have argued that Vance overstated his case. French Canadians, for example, remained bitter about conscription and were less inclined to celebrate the war.
Some then have seen the conflict as Canada’s war of independence from Britain while others have been more concerned about the way it divided different groups of Canadians, notably those of British and French origin.

The war and Canadian nationhood

According to historian Desmond Morton, the war divided the nation. Writing on the ninetieth anniversary of the Armistice, he argued that Quebec had never embraced the war in the first place. Morton agreed about the significance of Vimy Ridge, quoting in one article the French historian Ernest Renan who wrote, ‘Nations are made by doing great things.’ Nevertheless, he goes on to argue that French Canadians opposed to conscription and the internment of ‘enemy aliens’ did not share the sentiment. Susan Mann Trofimenkoff, writing in 1982 about Quebec during the war, argued that the Québécois feared contamination of their language and culture in the face of aggressive English-Canadian interests that tied the future of Canada to Britain and the English language. Conscription simply enforced the division.

Laurier’s successor as Liberal leader, Mackenzie King, learnt from the conflict that Canada should not get involved in future wars because such involvement simply brought to the surface the divisions in Canadian society. Following on from this, writing in the inter-war period and fearful of Canada being dragged into another war, historian Arthur Lower argued that the war had caused internal divisions and demonstrated that English Canadians were too close emotionally to Britain. For Canada to develop as a coherent nation, a clean break was needed with these ties. He pointed not only to French Canadians but also to recent immigrants from eastern Europe and elsewhere, arguing, ‘To many a Slav on the Western Prairies, King George must be as obscure as the Shah of Persia.’ He meant by this that newer Canadian immigrants would not have historical ties to Britain or France.

Historians J.L. Finlay and D.N. Sprague, writing in the 1970s, would tend to echo this sentiment, arguing that the war was a two-fold tragedy both because of the carnage and also the way in which it divided Canada. They concluded their account by suggesting that English-speaking Canadians were too quick to forget these divisions. Desmond Morton would tend to agree with these earlier interpretations. While historians agree that the experience of war was significant in the creation of a Canadian identity, particularly in the English-speaking areas, they are more divided on how far this permeated elsewhere and therefore how ‘Canadian’ this perceived sense of Canadian identity actually was.
Chapter 5: Canada and the First World War: participation and impact

Canada and the First World War: participation and impact

Canada was torn between a desire to break away from its ties with Britain and a fear that, without them, it might be absorbed by the USA. It entered the First World War enthusiastically and made a tremendous sacrifice. Prime Minister Borden was determined to have more say in war decision-making and the Imperial War Cabinet was set up for this purpose. However, his decision to introduce conscription opened up the fissures in Canadian society, particularly between English- and French-speaking Canadians. Canadians of German extraction were interned as the federal government began to exert wartime controls. Many historians think the war led to Canada’s birth as an independent nation, as exemplified by its involvement in the Paris Peace Conference and membership of the League of Nations. While it did undoubtedly lead to greater independence from Britain, it also remained in many ways divided as a nation.

Examination advice

How to answer ‘analyse’ questions

When answering questions with the command term ‘analyse’ you should try to identify the key elements and their relative importance. It is also important to include historical detail to support your analysis. Try to arrange your essay thematically and avoid straight narrative.

Example

Analyse the reasons why many French Canadians were reluctant to volunteer to fight in Europe during the First World War.

1. To answer this question successfully you should think of all the possible reasons why French Canadians were hesitant about participating in the Great War.
2. Take several minutes to write down the various reasons. Try to group these according to theme or topic. For example, you might first focus on political reasons. Then, you could detail the social and/or historical ones. There is no one correct answer. You will be judged on how you structure your essay and the degree to which you offer supporting historical evidence, as well as the analysis you provide. An example is given below.

Political reasons:
- French Canadians, especially in Quebec, supported the Liberal Party; voted against Borden’s Unionist Party; polarized nation.
- Henri Bourassa and his Le Devoir newspaper pushed for fewer ties with Britain and spoke out against perceived attacks on French Canadians.
• Long history of mistreatment at the hands of English-speaking Canadians.
• War was not seen as being their war.
• Early French-Canadian volunteers felt mistreated; commanded by English-speaking officers.
• Sir Sam Hughes was in charge of enlistment until late 1915 – notorious as anti-French and anti-Catholic.
• Controversial Military Service Act, 1917.
• Anti-conscription riots, 1918.

Social/historical reasons:
• French Canadians had less emotional attachment to France than did English Canadians to Britain.
• Canada joined the war in 1914 as part of the British empire.
• French Canadians tended to marry and have children younger than English counterparts; reluctant to leave home.
• Fears that their culture was being threatened by provincial governments, e.g. bilingual schools were outlawed in Manitoba.

3. In your introduction, briefly explain which significant factors help explain why French Canadians did not rush to participate in the war. A good strategy would be to order these in terms of importance. Part of your analysis could include why one factor was more significant than another. An example of a good introduction follows.

When war broke out in Europe in August 1914, Canadians, as part of the British empire, volunteered by the hundreds of thousands. The vast majority of these volunteers were either English-speaking Canadians or recent immigrants. For a variety of reasons, the French Canadians, most of who lived in the province of Quebec, resisted these calls. Later in the war in 1917 when the Canadian Government actually introduced conscription, French Canadians rioted. They felt little emotional attachment to either Britain or France. They did not feel that the war in Europe was really their concern. Furthermore, they bitterly resented what they perceived to be their second-class status in Canada. They also believed that this mistreatment extended to those who had volunteered in the early days of the war. It was because of this combination of political and social factors that they remained hesitant to contribute to the war effort.
4. For each of the key points you raise in your introduction, you should be able to write at least one paragraph in the main body of your essay. Be sure to include supporting evidence and to explain how your key points tie into your thesis.

5. In the final paragraph, you should tie your essay together by stating your conclusions. Do not raise any new points here.

6. Now try writing a complete answer to the question, following the advice above.

---

**Examination practice**

Below are two exam-style questions for you to practise on this topic.

1. To what extent did Canada’s involvement in the First World War contribute to Canadian nationalism? 
   (For guidance on how to answer ‘to what extent’ questions, see pages 136–138.)

2. Assess the economic impact of the First World War on Canada. 
   (For guidance on how to answer ‘assess’ questions, see pages 192–195.)
Latin America in the First World War: participation and impact

This chapter considers how the war impacted generally on Latin America and particularly on Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. It shows how while only Brazil actually declared war on Germany, most countries grew hostile towards Germany and the Central Powers, and how the war had a huge economic impact on the region. It ends by considering how historians have evaluated the impact of the war on Latin America.

You need to consider the following questions throughout this chapter:

- To what extent were Latin American countries affected by the First World War?
- How far did Argentina benefit from the war?
- What was the impact of the First World War on Brazil?
- How did the war impact on the relations between Mexico and Germany, and Mexico and the USA?
- How far are historians in agreement about the impact of the war on Latin American countries?

1 Latin America and the First World War

Key question: To what extent were Latin American countries affected by the First World War?

Latin American countries followed the lead of the USA in adopting a policy of benevolent neutrality on the outbreak of war in August 1914.

- As early as August 1914, Peru suggested that all Latin American countries agree a common policy to protect their shipping lanes and international trade. Little came of this because any German threat was significantly reduced after the destruction of the German fleet in the South Atlantic following the Battle of the Falklands in December 1914.
- In autumn 1914, Brazil called for a demilitarized zone around South America from which all warships should be barred. Again, nothing came of this.
- The Pan-American Union set up a Special Neutrality Commission headed by the US Secretary of State to define the rights of neutrals. However, it had not reported by 1917, when both the USA and Brazil joined the conflict.
This movement came about as a way to organize relationships between Latin American countries, and to provide an effective means by which Latin Americans could orchestrate a common response to Central and Southern American issues. As we have seen (page 27) there had been Pan-American conferences but they achieved little. The one scheduled for 1914 was actually postponed as a result of the war, and didn’t convene until 1923. In 1915 a Pan-American financial conference was organized by William McAdoo, the US Treasury Secretary, to discuss the economic and financial dislocations caused by the war, but delegates distrusted US motives. They felt they were trying to gain capital by replacing European creditors and imports on terms favourable to themselves. While there were various calls for concerted action, including conferences (e.g. at Buenos Aires in May 1917), they came to nothing.

Following the war, Latin American countries often felt ignored by the rest of the world. The League of Nations rarely got involved in Latin American affairs, refusing to arbitrate, for example in the dispute between Chile on the one hand and Peru and Bolivia on the other concerning the territory of Tacna-Arica, or to get involved later in the inter-war period in the devastating Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. This movement came about as a way to organize relationships between Latin American countries, and to provide an effective means by which Latin Americans could orchestrate a common response to Central and Southern American issues. As we have seen (page 27) there had been Pan-American conferences but they achieved little. The one scheduled for 1914 was actually postponed as a result of the war, and didn’t convene until 1923. In 1915 a Pan-American financial conference was organized by William McAdoo, the US Treasury Secretary, to discuss the economic and financial dislocations caused by the war, but delegates distrusted US motives. They felt they were trying to gain capital by replacing European creditors and imports on terms favourable to themselves. While there were various calls for concerted action, including conferences (e.g. at Buenos Aires in May 1917), they came to nothing.

Following the war, Latin American countries often felt ignored by the rest of the world. The League of Nations rarely got involved in Latin American affairs, refusing to arbitrate, for example in the dispute between Chile on the one hand and Peru and Bolivia on the other concerning the territory of Tacna-Arica, or to get involved later in the inter-war period in the devastating Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. This movement came about as a way to organize relationships between Latin American countries, and to provide an effective means by which Latin Americans could orchestrate a common response to Central and Southern American issues. As we have seen (page 27) there had been Pan-American conferences but they achieved little. The one scheduled for 1914 was actually postponed as a result of the war, and didn’t convene until 1923. In 1915 a Pan-American financial conference was organized by William McAdoo, the US Treasury Secretary, to discuss the economic and financial dislocations caused by the war, but delegates distrusted US motives. They felt they were trying to gain capital by replacing European creditors and imports on terms favourable to themselves. While there were various calls for concerted action, including conferences (e.g. at Buenos Aires in May 1917), they came to nothing. Following the war, Latin American countries often felt ignored by the rest of the world. The League of Nations rarely got involved in Latin American affairs, refusing to arbitrate, for example in the dispute between Chile on the one hand and Peru and Bolivia on the other concerning the territory of Tacna-Arica, or to get involved later in the inter-war period in the devastating Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. This movement came about as a way to organize relationships between Latin American countries, and to provide an effective means by which Latin Americans could orchestrate a common response to Central and Southern American issues. As we have seen (page 27) there had been Pan-American conferences but they achieved little. The one scheduled for 1914 was actually postponed as a result of the war, and didn’t convene until 1923. In 1915 a Pan-American financial conference was organized by William McAdoo, the US Treasury Secretary, to discuss the economic and financial dislocations caused by the war, but delegates distrusted US motives. They felt they were trying to gain capital by replacing European creditors and imports on terms favourable to themselves. While there were various calls for concerted action, including conferences (e.g. at Buenos Aires in May 1917), they came to nothing.

Following the war, Latin American countries often felt ignored by the rest of the world. The League of Nations rarely got involved in Latin American affairs, refusing to arbitrate, for example in the dispute between Chile on the one hand and Peru and Bolivia on the other concerning the territory of Tacna-Arica, or to get involved later in the inter-war period in the devastating Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. However, by the cessation of hostilities most Latin American countries were hostile towards the Central Powers, although only Brazil formally declared war on Germany. Seven countries in the Caribbean also declared war on Germany, mainly because of ties with the USA, Britain or France. Only seven Latin American nations maintained full neutrality – Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, El Salvador and Venezuela.

This section examines the reason why various countries became involved in the war and the level of their participation.

**The initial responses in Latin America**

On the surface one could argue that the First World War was peripheral to Latin America. The battlefields were thousands of miles away and the causes of the conflict were remote from their concerns. However, the war made a quick impact on the countries. Historian Bill Albert has shown that the Cañete Valley in Peru experienced serious food shortages within one week of the war starting. Even before Britain entered the war on 4 August 1914, banks throughout Latin America were closing, both unemployment and prices were rising, and the export trade in primary products (the mainstay of the continent’s economy) was severely dislocated in the short term. The war had an impact throughout the Southern American continent. Although some countries such as Ecuador and Paraguay remained less affected, it had significant effects on some of the larger and more developed countries.

**Trade**

**Trading conditions**

Latin America had seen a huge growth in trade, mainly to Europe, during the final decades of the nineteenth century and first of the twentieth. The trading relationship was largely dependent on primary exports and the import of manufactured goods. Often countries were over-dependent on the production of one commodity – what is known as a monoculture. The

**How did countries in Latin America respond to war?**

**Primary exports** Exports of raw materials and agricultural products such as foodstuffs that have not been manufactured.

**What changes came about in trading arrangements as a result of the war?**
disadvantages of this were that Latin American countries were reliant on the smooth working of the financial and trading systems, and their own industrial development was postponed because the emphasis was on the production of primary exports instead of developing their own industrial processes.

The onset of war
The onset of war severely disrupted the network of international trade, which Great Britain had dominated as a consumer and supplier, carrier and financial provider. All the countries at war called in loans and refused to lend more. In Brazil, for example, its long-term loans from European countries were valued at $19.1 million in 1913, $4.2 million in 1914 and nil in 1915. The Government was only rescued from having to default on its loans by an emergency £15 million raised in London in October 1914. Early disruptions in trade arose from the removal of trade credits and physical shortages of shipping due to the demands of war. Given that many Latin American governments received their principal revenues from tariffs and duties, this disruption of trade had significant effects; Chilean government revenues fell by 66 per cent between 1911 and 1915 and Brazilian exports fell to half of their pre-war value.

Recovery
Most Latin American countries had recovered to some degree by 1916 as shipping lanes were reopened and demand for foodstuffs and raw materials soared among the belligerents. Mexican oil, Peruvian copper, Bolivian tin and Chilean nitrates were in huge demand. Venezuela began its first exports of oil in 1918 – 21,194 metric tons were exported by Caribbean Petroleum – despite shortages of machinery and transport from the war. Countries such as Brazil whose main exports, in this case coffee, were considered luxuries did not do so well; Brazil saw a 50 per cent reduction in trade during the war years although its production of manganese for use in iron and steel manufacture grew (see page 183). Imported goods cost more due to wartime conditions and led to inflation throughout Latin America. Rising prices led to industrial unrest in many countries.

Development of trade with the USA
The major development in terms of trade during the war period was the growth of imports from and exports to the USA. By 1914, the USA was already the main trading partner of Mexico and the Caribbean countries; during the war its share in their markets rose from 25 per cent to a huge 80 per cent of their trade. The opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 (see pages 67–70) allowed the USA to carry goods more easily to South American countries. The USA superseded Germany in particular as a market for Latin American goods. Even if it still had surplus goods to trade or money to pay for imports, Germany’s trade would be stifled by the Allied blockade. US exports to Latin America rose faster than to any other region in the world. For example, as can be seen from Source A opposite, the value of its exports to Mexico rose from $39 million in 1914 to $208 million by 1920. The percentage of imports from South American countries to the USA meanwhile increased from 16.2 per cent of the total in 1913 to 25.9 per cent.

**KEY TERM**

**Trade credits** The purchase of goods to be paid for later.
by 1918. By 1918, only Argentina kept Britain as its main trading partner and this, too, would shift as the inter-war period developed.

**SOURCE A**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>741</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These strengthening economic ties were reflected in closer banking links. Between 1914 and 1918, the US First National City bank set up twelve branches in Latin America.

While trade to the USA increased by the biggest percentage, the Allied nations also demanded large quantities of products from Latin America. The impact on trade may have been the most significant overall factor in the impact of war on Latin America, but this tells us little about the specific impact on individual countries. The next section will deal with the impact of war on Brazil, Argentina and Mexico as three of the largest and most developed countries in the region.

---

**SUMMARY DIAGRAM**

The impact of the First World War on trade

- **Europe**
  - Belligerents reduced imports
  - Belligerents called in loans
  - Trade levels fell proportionate to USA

- **Latin America**
  - Demand for imports
    - Mexico – oil and henequen
    - Peru – copper
    - Bolivia – tin
    - Chile – nitrates
    - Brazil – manganese

- **USA**
  - 1918: 80 per cent of Latin American trade
  - Panama Canal opened, 1914
  - Investment in Latin America
  - Growing demand for Latin American imports

---
Argentina and the First World War

**Key question:** How far did Argentina benefit from the war?

While Argentina remained neutral, the war had a significant impact on its trade and its leader Hipólito Irigoyen used the conflict to try to extend his influence in the region.

### Argentine politics

Argentina had introduced male suffrage by the Sáenz-Peña political reforms in 1912. Hipólito Irigoyen, the leader of the Radical Party, was the first president to be elected by popular vote in 1916. His opponents, the Conservatives, controlled Congress, the Argentine parliament. This meant he found it difficult to get legislation passed. Before 1912, Argentine politics had been dominated by the elites – wealthy landowners, the Church and leaders of the armed forces. These groups remained distrustful of democracy. In the working-class areas of towns and cities, meanwhile, immigrants from southern Europe often introduced new, radical ideas – particularly anarchism, which sought the overthrow of capitalist society, by violent means if necessary. Anarchists had gained control of many of the trade unions and advocated direct action, which sparked off the events of ‘Tragic Week’ in January 1919 (see pages 178–179).

### How did Argentinians respond to the war?

The nature of Argentina’s involvement in the war

Like other Latin American countries, Argentina initially pursued a course of ‘benevolent neutrality’, hoping trade would not be dislocated and loans from Britain would continue. Neither of these happened. President Irigoyen was a nationalist wary of US influence and as such was reluctant to get involved in pan-American commitments, which he feared would be controlled by the USA. He sought to maintain independence of action. However, as the leader of an exporting nation he was naturally concerned about the impact of German policies on trade, particularly the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917 (see pages 96–97) which saw three Argentine merchant ships sunk and calls from pro-Allied newspapers, such as La Nación, for Argentina to enter the conflict. This led to large anti-German demonstrations in Buenos Aires and Germany agreed to exclude Argentine ships from attack. The period also saw pro-German demonstrations, principally from members of Argentina’s German immigrant communities, and Spanish journals in circulation such as La Gaceta de España tended to be pro-German in opinion.

### Opinions within Argentina

Sympathies with the belligerents were divided in Argentina:

- Many in the army which, like others in the continent, was based on the **German model** and had been trained by German officers, favoured the Central Powers.

---

**Key term**

**German model** Military organization based on that of Germany.
Many in the navy supported Britain as it had strong ties with the Royal Navy, which had been involved in training its personnel.

The governing Radical Party was divided. Leaders from the ranks of the landowning elites such as Marcelo T. de Alvear supported the Allies, while others such as Irigoyen maintained neutrality.

Argentina had long distrusted the influence of the USA. It had seen itself as the ‘Colossus of the South’, believing it had the potential to become a rival of its northern neighbour in terms of power. Many, including Irigoyen, still distrusted the USA and saw any partiality towards the Allies as threatening Argentine independence of action. Argentina saw the war as an opportunity to extend its own influence within Latin America by leading the drive to maintain benevolent neutrality. In May 1917, Irigoyen called for all Southern American states to send delegates to the Argentine capital, Buenos Aires, to discuss a concerted policy of continent-wide neutrality. This move was seen as a deliberate snub to the USA, which was contemplating entry into the war at that time – but only Mexico, which had its own reasons for hostility towards the USA (see pages 81–84), showed any interest.

In 1914 there was a 100,000-strong German community in Argentina, descended from immigrants. These were mainly found in Buenos Aires, and in the Pampas, where they maintained their distinctly German culture and tended to support the Kaiser during the war. Their numbers in Buenos Aires were augmented by many from the Pampas who had unsuccessfully sought passage to fight for Germany in the war. This created a large, mainly middle-class German community in the capital city, which was anxious that the Government at least maintain its neutrality, and also participated in pro-German activities to gain support for it in the war.

**Argentine neutrality**

In keeping Argentina out of the war, therefore, Irigoyen probably reflected the predilections of most of the Argentine people. However, his patience was tried on several occasions, notably in September 1917 when correspondence from the German Minister in Buenos Aires, Count von Luxburg, was intercepted and published in the USA. Not only did the minister make unflattering comments about Argentine leaders, for example calling the Foreign Minister ‘a pompous ass’, but more seriously called for Argentine ships en route to Europe to be either left alone or ‘sunk without trace’. ‘Sunk without trace’ meant that survivors would be machine gunned to erase any evidence of the sinking so no blame could be apportioned to German vessels. Amid an indignant clamour for war when this correspondence was leaked, Germany apologized, von Luxburg was recalled and Irigoyen assured Argentines that Germany had given no real provocation for war. Despite a vote in the Argentine Congress to sever diplomatic relations, Irigoyen maintained them.

The gross insult to the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs revealed by the publication of the von Luxburg telegrams and his sinister ‘sunk without traces’ advice to the German Foreign Office were enough, without the submarine controversy, to arouse a great State, high-spirited, disgusted with the broken German promises in which the Argentine Minister at Berlin lately expressed such artless or infatuated pro-German confidence. Von Luxburg had to be smuggled out of the country, and several other South American countries indicated their unwillingness to receive that ornament of diplomacy even in transitory. There was violent popular indignation. Both branches of the Congress voted to break off diplomatic relations with Germany. The Radical President, Mr. Irigoyen, for reasons not understood, setting up the technical reason that he wished a conference of the two houses on the matter, has so far suspended action.

The impact of the war on Argentina

In this section we will look at the impact on the Argentine economy, and social and political unrest resulting from the war.

Economic impact of the war

The war had both positive and negative economic effects.

Argentine trade during the war

Exports

As trade patterns changed as a result of the war some sectors of the economy gained and others lost out. While Argentina had huge potential for growth, before the war its economy was still dominated by primary exports of wheat and beef, with Britain as its main customer and its finances very much tied to British financial institutions. The outbreak of war brought shipping and trade to a halt. The subsequent recession persisted until 1917, by which time the sea lanes were open and production was geared to meet the enhanced demand for exports. The demand for Argentine exports, particularly processed meat for the troops, soared during the war. Export earnings valued at approximately 400 million gold pesos (opposed to paper pesos) in 1913 almost tripled to 1.1 billion by 1919. By 1919 some meat-processing plants were experiencing profits in excess of 50 per cent. Meanwhile, the volume of imports fell from 10 million tons in 1913 to 2.6 million by 1918. However, the cost of imports soared, not least because shipping charges quadrupled. Indeed, in 1913 400 million gold pesos were expended on imports; in 1918 this figure was 850 million despite the four-fold decrease in volume.

Impact of reductions in imports

Higher import costs led to huge price rises; clothing for example tripled in price despite the development of domestic textile manufacturers, albeit mainly in small workshops. In many cities, as imported machinery and tool
parts for manufacture dried up, unemployment rose; by 1918 as much as 20 per cent of the workforce of Buenos Aires was unemployed. Before the war unemployed people had often left to seek employment elsewhere on the continent; now because of shipping shortages most were trapped in Buenos Aires. Those in work often faced longer working days and lower wages, with a labour surplus ready to take their jobs if they complained. For many in Buenos Aires the impact of the war was a reduction of up to 50 per cent in the value of real wages.

**SOURCE C**


He [Irigoyen] saw no need for his country to do anything but make profits from the sale of her products which she was doing on an enormous scale, without bothering about the balance of power or international moral issues of questionable validity.

**Government revenues**
The Government received less in revenues because of its dependence on customs duties. It subsequently cut many public work schemes – leading to recession in the construction industry, which largely depended on these – and faced high levels of unemployment; as we have seen, in Buenos Aires alone, 20 per cent of the workforce was without a job in 1918. The higher cost of imports also led to inflation, which saw prices rise to the extent that for many, particularly those living in the cities, living standards fell and discontent rose.

**Debt**
Having said earlier that the Government attempted to retrench in the face of falling revenues from tariffs, it did acquire new debts, mainly from the USA. The public floating debt nearly trebled between 1914 and 1918, from 256 million paper pesos to 711 million.

**Output**
In 1994 economic historian Victor Bulmer-Thomas argued that Argentina did not significantly benefit financially from the war. Although imports were reduced, possibly by as much as 20 per cent, the country lacked the industrial infrastructure to develop its own production capacity to replace them. Not until 1919 was the 1913 output surpassed; in 1917 it was still 17 per cent below the 1913 level. While the economy grew particularly in the years following the war, the impact of this growth was uneven. However, with overall growth in the first four post-war years estimated at 40 per cent, there clearly had been developments in domestic production of consumer goods such as leather goods and textiles, and the manufacture of automobiles began in 1916. Moreover, the increases in revenue from exports, for example when Argentina began to sell surplus wheat to the Allies in early 1918, did help make Argentina a creditor nation, albeit briefly.
Economic contractions
Growth in the Argentine economy had been contracting even before the onset of the war. Annual GDP rates of 6.3 per cent before 1910 fell to 3.5 per cent thereafter. Between 1913 and 1927 only 1200 kilometres of railways were built. In the decade beginning in 1913, immigration was effectively halted. Nevertheless, the post-war years saw a marked recession as wartime demand for exports slumped. The beef industry was particularly affected, with the numbers of cattle slaughtered for export in 1921 being half of the 1918 figure. The problem was exacerbated by investment in inferior stock producing cheaper meat for processing during the war to feed the troops. Investment in new processing plants such as in Zárate near Buenos Aires had also led to an overcapacity now that demand was reduced.

There is then some dispute among historians about the precise effects of the war on the Argentine economy. Broadly speaking, after the dislocation at the beginning of the war, conditions slowly improved until, by the end of the war, Argentina was selling more and performing better. However, it did not replace lost imports with goods of domestic manufacture. While exports grew and imports fell, the cost of the latter rose significantly so there was little financial gain from their falling. Meanwhile, government revenues, dependent on customs duties, fell for most of the war period and this led to less government spending and rising unemployment, for example in the construction industry. Towards the end of the war, however, Argentina did start to earn surplus revenues.

Political unrest
In Argentina, as elsewhere, the economic conditions caused by high inflation and the lower value of wages, coupled with the influence of the Russian Revolution and instability in Europe, led to a series of strikes in the immediate post-war period. While most employees no doubt sought nothing more sinister than better working conditions and pay, unions tended to be dominated by radicals, many of whom had a political agenda of violent revolution (see box on page 174). Of particular interest here is how Irigoyen’s Government appeared to side with the strikers, especially when employers represented foreign interests. Hence, when port workers and railwaymen, whose concerns were mainly British owned, went on strike, Irigoyen’s Government ordered police to protect the picket lines and put pressure on the employers to give in to their workers’ demands. However, as historian David Rock has shown, Irigoyen was also more likely to be partial to strikers when they were based in Buenos Aires, and particularly when they were likely to be supporters of his Radical Party. In 1918, for example, meat packers who were mainly of foreign origin were treated to repression and strike breaking.

‘Tragic Week’, January 1919
The lowest point of the post-war industrial unrest came during ‘Tragic Week’ in January 1919. The conflict began on 3 January, when workers at the
British-owned Vasena plant went on strike for better working conditions. Their action became violent when they fired on police bringing materials for production into the plant in an attempt to break the strike; four days later they fought a pitched battle with the police, which led to five of their number being killed. It was at the funeral of these on 9 January that events really became ugly, with riots and attacks on property throughout the city. At one point the British directors of the Vasena plant were trapped inside the building.

With port workers also out on strike demanding higher wages and working conditions, union members called for a 24-hour strike which brought the city to a halt. Rumour and counter-rumour were at fever pitch among Porteños. It was said that communists were plotting a revolution in Buenos Aires. Argentine Jews were accused of being communist agitators. The authorities even said they had broken up the first meeting of the self-proclaimed revolutionary government of Argentina, all members of whom were Jewish immigrants from Russia.

The armed forces, supported by police and vigilante groups, notably the Argentine Patriot League, restored order brutally. They targeted Jewish people in particular for violence. By 13 January, the insurrection had largely been suppressed. Casualty figures have been estimated at as many as 700 dead although the true figure is likely to be nearer to 100. Over 50,000 were arrested. The Argentine Patriot League became a fact of life in Argentina during the 1920s, threatening and attacking those it perceived to be a danger to stability, particularly Jews who were unfairly seen as potential communists and traitors, and members of left-wing groups.

While the Argentine system of government was maintained, and Irigoyen was replaced peacefully in 1922, the war had the effect of polarizing political attitudes. The economic uncertainties had led to greater political awareness among many of the lower classes, who had embraced radical ideas such as anarchism and communism. Among the reactions to this was the emergence of right-wing vigilante groups that supported the elites and were supported in turn by many members of the security forces. Nevertheless, the 1920s remained a relatively stable decade in Argentina.

### Brazil and the First World War

**Key question:** What was the impact of the First World War on Brazil?

Brazil was the only Latin American country to declare war on Germany and its reward was to be widely seen by the Allies as the political leader of the continent when the war was over. However, as with Argentina, the war led to economic and political dislocations that had a significant impact. Some groups gained and others lost out as a result of the impact of the war in Brazil.
In this section we will consider the reasons for direct Brazilian involvement, and the war’s economic, political and social effects, before concluding with a consideration of its impact on Brazil’s international standing.

### Brazil’s involvement in the war

Brazil was the only mainland Latin American country to formally declare war on Germany. It was in a potentially difficult situation as on the one hand many Germans lived there, particularly in the southern provinces of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina. On the other hand, there was plentiful support for Britain and France, particularly among the elites. In this scenario the incoming president in 1914, Venceslau Brás, might have been expected to enforce a benevolent neutrality.

However, this was difficult in the face of German attacks on Brazilian shipping.

#### Attacks on shipping

Unlike other Latin American countries, Brazil had a sizable merchant fleet, which suffered particularly when the Germans resumed unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917. Even before this, in May 1916, the Brazilian vessel Rio Branco had been sunk. In April 1917, the Paraná followed, prompting anti-German demonstrations and the expulsion of the German Minister to Brazil. When Brazil reaffirmed its neutrality following the US entry into the war in April 1917, protests prompted the dismissal of the Foreign Minister Lauro Müller, who was of German origin.

**SOURCE D**

An extract from a speech by President Venceslau Brás, quoted in ‘Latin America in the First World War’ by Ron Genini (found at www.worldwar1.com/sfla.htm).

Brazil should adopt the attitude that one of the belligerents forms an integral part of the American continent and that to this belligerent we are bound by tradition, friendship and by a similarity of political opinion in the defense of our vital interests of America and the principles accepted by international law.

When another Brazilian ship, the Macau, was sunk in October, Brazil declared war. Forty-six German ships in Brazilian harbours were seized and German assets, notably banks and insurance houses, were taken over.

**SOURCE E**


This nation, your Excellency can assure his Holiness, would have remained apart from the conflict in Europe in spite of the sympathy of public opinion for the Allies’ liberal cause had Germany not extended the war to America and thereby prevented inter-trading between all neutral countries.
Without renouncing her obligations as an American nation, this country could not fail to assume the position of a belligerent as a last resource, without hatred or any interest other than the defence of our flag and our fundamental rights.

Happily today the republics of the New World are more or less allied in their rights, but all, equally menaced in their liberties and their sovereignty, draw closer the bonds of the solidarity which formerly was merely geographic, economic, and historic, and which the necessities of self-defence and national independence now make political as well.

For such reasons Brazil can no longer maintain her isolated attitude, and now, in close solidarity as she must be and really is with the nations on whose side she has ranged herself, she can even speak as an individual entity.

**Extent of Brazilian involvement**

The Government was fully committed to the war and expected its troops to serve abroad, indeed it had requested that Allied leaders send them to the Middle East zone of operations where they might be more accustomed to the climate than other Allied troops. However, Brazilian troops were to play little part in the conflict.

President Brás introduced conscription, resulting in 50,000 recruits. Yet, with limited transatlantic shipping and poor supplies, the Brazilian forces remained at home largely to police the predominantly German areas where insurrection was expected. The Government declared *martial law* in the provinces of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Brazil’s main contribution to the war effort was assuming some responsibility for naval patrols in the South Atlantic.

However, entry into the war did raise Brazil’s prestige. At the end of the war, the USA intervened on Brazil’s behalf on two issues:

- to force Germany to pay for Brazilian coffee impounded in German ports at the outbreak of war
- to enable Brazil to keep the impounded German ships, which had been requested by the other victorious nations to be divided up among themselves.

Brazil joined the League of Nations as a founder member with a *non-permanent seat* on the Council, which was the governing body of the League of Nations.

**The impact of the war on Brazil**

In this section we will consider the impact of war in political and economic terms and how it affected the international standing of Brazil.

**Political impact**

The elites in Brazil tended to support the Allies and so there was no real opposition to Brazil’s entry into the war. There were though considerable numbers of Germans, mainly in the south of the country where in 1890 they
made up 13.3 per cent of the population in Rio Grande do Sul. During the war, German language newspapers were suppressed, property belonging to German nationals was confiscated, and German-owned banks were taken over by the state. Seven hundred Germans were interned. However, the expected rebellions didn’t happen and after the war they returned to their place in society, with sequestrated property restored.

**Industrial unrest**

The trade union movement in Brazil, particularly in the city of São Paulo, was largely in the hands of anarchists. As in Argentina, immigrants from southern Europe had brought ideas of violent revolution and saw industrial strife as a conduit for this. More immigrants settled in São Paulo than elsewhere so extremist views were more prevalent there. However, workers went on strike for more basic reasons such as higher wages and better working conditions. Industrial action had largely been unsuccessful because of the power of employers who could deploy strong-arm squads to intimidate striking employees and bring in strike breakers to take over their jobs. The Government’s response had generally been not to get involved.

In June and July 1917, a massive general strike brought São Paulo to a halt. Historian Boris Fausto asserts that discontent was broadly due to crippling inflation as a result of wartime conditions, and the inspiration of the Russian Revolution which saw the overthrow of the Tsarist government – although the actual imposition of a communist regime did not occur until October, by which time the São Paulo strike was over. Nevertheless, the impetus given to revolutionary groups such as anarchists by the overthrow of the monarchy and government by narrowly based elites was profound, particularly in urban areas throughout Latin America and indeed Europe and the USA.

In the event the São Paulo unrest began when female employees at the Rudolfo Crespi textile mill went on strike for a 25 per cent wage increase. Their action escalated as male workers joined them and employees in other industries followed suit. A São Paulo Committee of the Defence of the Proletariat, comprised mainly of anarchists and their supporters, took over the strike and co-ordinated action to shut the city down. On 6 July, the newspaper *Estado de São Paulo* estimated that as many as 20,000 people were on strike. On 14 July, leading employers offered a 20 per cent wage increase for all workers, and improved working conditions. The strikers had won.

In the ensuing years, governments did consider legislation to improve working conditions, such as limitations on child and female labour and an eight-hour working day. Most proposals were defeated by conservative Congressmen, and all that was achieved was a law to ensure compensation for industrial accidents passed in 1919.

In March 1922, mirroring the split between anarchists and communists in Russia, Brazilian anarchists were divided; some split to form the Brazilian Communist Party. Although illegal, its membership grew from 73 in 1922 to
1000 by 1930; however, it made little impact in the 1920s. Similarly, the cards were stacked against the trade unions, although their membership grew. Industrial disputes were often put down with considerable brutality. Conditions for workers hardly improved although they were at a very low base in 1920; average earnings were 60 cents for a ten- to twelve-hour day; average life expectancy was 28 years; and 64 per cent of Brazilians aged over fifteen were illiterate, a fact which, under the Constitution, precluded them from voting.

While the war may have raised political awareness, despite industrial action, workers did not appear to have achieved much as a result of Brazilian involvement.

**Economic impact of the war**

As elsewhere in Latin America, the war loosened Brazil’s financial and commercial ties with Great Britain and Germany by the reductions in trade.

- In 1913, Brazil sold 14 per cent of its total exports to Germany and imported 17.5 per cent of its goods from there; by 1919 these figures had fallen to 0.54 per cent and 0.26 per cent respectively. Exports to Britain fell in the same period from 24.5 per cent of the total to 16.3 per cent and imports from 13.2 per cent to 7.3 per cent. In the ensuing years the USA stepped in as a trading partner.

- With shipping lanes restored by 1915 following the Battle of the Falklands (see page 170), Brazil exported foodstuffs, notably coffee and sugar, to the Allies. Increased demand for rubber saved its declining rubber industry from extinction, at least temporarily.

- Brazilian production of manganese grew, with exports rising from 245,000 tons in 1914 to 432,000 by 1918. Brazil was to provide the USA with 80 per cent of its manganese ore during this period.

- The output of cotton textiles rose from 70 million to 160 million metres between 1914 and 1918.

We should be wary, however, of attributing too much success on the basis of this evidence. It must be remembered that Brazil’s main export was still coffee and this was regarded as a luxury item. Much of the textiles were kept in warehouses in the hope that prices would rise; at the end of the war as demand fell they were still unsold. In 1920 the census showed there were 13,336 manufacturing firms employing 275,000 workers; this was less than 3 per cent of the working population.

Moreover, the response of the Brazilian Government to reductions in revenues from imports and difficulties in borrowing money on international markets during the war years was to print more money. As we have seen, inflation led to strikes in the industrial areas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in 1917.

**Industrial development**

Shortages of imports led to the volume of Brazilian industry doubling during the war, and the beginnings of industrial development were made – although foodstuffs and textiles still accounted for 75 per cent of the total production.
The value of industrial production quintupled between 1907 and 1920 to $153,060,000. Many repair shops turned to small-scale manufacture in an attempt to replace imported goods. Because of the war, fewer imports entered Brazil. However, countries at war needed foodstuffs. A new industry centred on frozen meat led to the exportation of more than 60,000 tons of meat in 1918. Brazil had not exported meat prior to this period. To this end, the advent of cold storage plants to preserve and keep meat fresh led the US firms Armour and Wilson to found branches in Rio de Janeiro in 1917 so processed meat could be delivered to Allied troops. Of the 13,336 industrial companies in 1920 mentioned above, at least 5936 were created during the war.

**International prestige**

One of the reasons for Brazil’s entry into the war was undoubtedly to win international prestige. Despite its minimal involvement in the war Brazil was allowed, on the basis of its population size, to send three delegates to the Paris Peace Conference (see pages 117–119). One of its delegates, Epitácio Pessoa, a Congressman, Supreme Court Justice and future president, spoke for the countries of Latin America. He spoke particularly passionately about how there should be a declaration of racial equality written into the Covenant of the League of Nations; this did not happen due to the influence of colonial powers such as Britain and France.

Nevertheless, Brazil was a founder member of the League and elected onto the Council as a non-permanent member. The permanent members were the Allies with the exception of the USA: Britain, France, Italy and Japan. However, disillusion set in as ‘the big four’ made decisions in their own interests and other parts of the world were ignored. Brazil believed the permanent members should represent areas all over the globe. Clearly it saw itself as the representative from Latin America. However, with no progress on this issue Brazil left the League in 1926, arguing it was better to play no role than one of insignificance. In this then Brazil’s international prestige arising from the war was relatively short-lived.

**The 1920s**

The 1920s saw economic hardship in Brazil. It might be argued that involvement in the war had led to few advantages. The military had generally been content to accept civilian rule so long as they were given generous budgets. The decade saw increased military involvement in politics and several attempted coups, particularly by young officers called *tenentes* who sought modernization and effective government. Discontent culminated in 1930 in a successful military coup that brought the future dictator Getúlio Vargas into power.
Chapter 6: Latin America in the First World War: participation and impact

Mexico and the First World War

Key question: How did the war impact on the relations between Mexico and Germany, and Mexico and the USA?

Mexico endured a devastating period of civil war from 1910 to 1920 and so might have been expected to ignore the wider conflict elsewhere. It lost almost a million inhabitants, its railroads and telegraph wires were largely destroyed, and 50 per cent of its estates were laid to waste. In addition, various strong-arm leaders such as Pancho Villa (see pages 83–84) held sway in particular regions over which the central government had little control. However, Mexico was a repository of oil reserves, which were vital in terms of supplies for the belligerents.

Mexican involvement in the war

Mexico remained officially neutral throughout the period of the First World War, but so long as the oil continued to flow, the Allies (apart from the USA) showed little interest in what was happening there. In contrast, Germany tried to draw Mexico into a war with the US to provide a diversion for the USA, although this was never likely to be taken seriously by any Mexican government. Nevertheless, the Mexican government led by Venustiano Carranza retained strong relations with Germany.

Carranza’s foreign policy

Venustiano Carranza was a nationalist who distrusted the USA. He became president in 1916 although the civil war continued in different parts of the country. Carranza was not prepared to follow the lead of the USA and break ties with Germany, arguing (with some justification) that Germany had never taken land from Mexico, or intervened militarily in its affairs. The USA, however, was afraid that Germany might sabotage the oilfields or become involved in Mexican affairs. This, of course, was highlighted with the publication of the Zimmermann telegram (see page 102), which Carranza ignored; no country in the depths of civil war was likely to attack the USA. However, Germany hoped that poor relations between the USA and Mexico would keep the former preoccupied in its own hemisphere. It would be in Germany’s own interests to encourage hostilities between Mexico and the USA, thereby keeping US troops as far away as possible from the European conflict. Carranza also wanted to maintain German friendship, partly because he feared Germany might otherwise commit acts of sabotage in the Mexican oilfields, and partly because he sought German funding.

Carranza’s relationships with Germany and the USA

In January 1917 Carranza’s government passed a new constitution. Article 27 asserted that foreigners could not buy Mexican land unless they were prepared to accept Mexican law, and subsoil deposits remained in the

KEY TERM

Subsoil deposits The resources under the ground; Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution asserted that all deposits under the surface of the soil (including minerals) belonged to the state and so were subject to tax.
ownership of the Mexican government. This had huge ramifications for foreign mining and oil interests and threatened a serious rift with the USA who feared Carranza would impose a new tax on these deposits. Not surprisingly, US banks were reluctant to lend money to Carranza, and in October the US government imposed new restrictions on US exports of gold, food and industrial equipment to Mexico. Possibly hoping to play one government against the other, Carranza was also seeking German funding. In November 1917 German officials in Mexico did offer a 70 million peso loan so long as Mexico agreed to remain neutral during the war and offer favourable conditions to German trade afterwards. However, this loan did not materialize. In May 1918 the German government in Berlin offered only 5 million pesos. This was made after the threatened tax on the oil industry was announced (see page 185), jeopardizing US and British interests.

Ultimately Carranza received funding from neither the USA nor Germany; the latter country was increasingly pre-occupied with imminent defeat in the war. In the face of the new tax on subsoil deposits US interests sought the overthrow of Carranza and relations deteriorated between the two countries to the extent that there were violent clashes across the Texas–Chihuahua border. In August 1918, Carranza abandoned the threatened tax as it stood and asked his officials to negotiate an acceptable alternative with US interests. He was overthrown in 1920, before this materialized.

The impact of the war on Mexico

This section will examine the economic and foreign policy effects of the war on Mexico – which, it should be remembered, remained a country embroiled in civil war throughout the period.

Economic impact

Mexico was important to the Allies in economic terms because it had two resources that were vital to their interests – oil and henequen.

Oil

Despite threats by the Government to move against the regional bandit Pelaey, who controlled many of the oilfields and was allegedly paid protection money by both the British and US oil companies, the oil kept flowing and Mexico was briefly the world’s largest exporter of oil during the war period. The major companies of Standard Oil, Mexican Petroleum and El Aguila all raised production levels. Oil production rose from 23 million barrels in 1913 to 87 million in 1919.

Britain, in particular, depended upon supplies of Mexican oil to fuel its war effort and keep war materials moving. It was prepared to follow the lead of the USA in protecting these supplies so long as its efforts were successful.
However, for all his liking of Britain, US President Wilson didn’t entirely trust the British authorities. He suspected once the war was over they would make separate deals with whatever government emerged in Mexico, against US interests. For this reason he asked J.P. Morgan to form an international committee of investment bankers to take the lead on investments in Mexico with the aim of preventing separate agreements. From the formation of this committee, which controlled investment in Mexico, it was a short step to discouraging European investment in Latin America at all (see page 123). US state department officials argued that the Government should support the expansion of US banking interests and firms throughout Latin America to extend US and reduce European influence. We have already noted the post-war growth of US investment compared with that of Great Britain (see page 124).

**What does Source F suggest about conditions of work inside an oil rig in 1915?**

*Source F*

Oil workers inside the drilling rig at Tanhuijo, Mexico in November 1915.
**Henequen**
Henequen is a fibre used in making twine. During the war it was essential to make rope for naval and military purposes. Seventy-five per cent of the world’s supply was grown in the Mexican province of Yucatán. Growers decided to take advantage of increased demand by raising the price from 1.5 cents a pound to 19 cents with a further rise to 23 cents threatened. Some in the US demanded military intervention but the State Department argued sensibly that a war would cut off all supplies. In the event, negotiators from the US Food Department managed to hold the price at 19 cents, in part due to a latent threat of military action if their efforts failed. With the end of the war, demand for henequen crumbled.

**Impact on foreign policy**
Carranza saw himself as a leading influence in Latin American policies throughout the war and post-war period. Historian Friedrich E. Schuler has argued that his policies long survived their author and guided Mexican foreign policy through much of the twentieth century. He rejected the Monroe Doctrine, and indeed the right of any powers to intervene in Latin American affairs, and asserted that Mexico’s economy and territory should be respected. After the League recognized the Monroe Doctrine, Mexico refused to join.

**Overall impact on Mexico**
The war impacted on Mexico largely in terms of how Germany sought to exploit it to divert the attention of the USA. Clearly Mexico’s own civil war and the devastation this caused precluded its involvement. However, its relations with the USA were affected by both wider and internal conflicts in that the USA sought a victor friendly to its interests and the protection of the property and interests of its citizens in Mexico. Mexico was also rich in valuable resources, notably oil and henequen, which were needed in wartime. However, the end of the war passed it by; its own conflict did not end until 1920 after which a huge reconstruction process was necessary. The 1921 census saw 900,000 fewer inhabitants than in 1911, having fallen from 15.2 million to 14.3. The fall can largely be explained by war, plague and famine, although unknown numbers emigrated to the USA.

- The railroads meanwhile were bankrupt, 1000 miles of telegraph wires were destroyed out of 20,000, and 50 per cent of the estates were laid waste.
- With foreign debt at $1 billion, massive investment was necessary.
- The army stood at 100,000 and consumed 60 per cent of the national budget. There were still a plethora of ambitious generals and regional strongmen, such as Pancho Villa, with large armies of supporters.
- The USA demanded compensation for damage to its property during the civil war and withdrew its Ambassador – without US recognition any new government would find it difficult to attract the necessary foreign investment.
- Relationships with the USA were not normalized until the middle years of the decade (see page 126).
Key debate

**Key question:** How far are historians in agreement about the impact of the war on Latin American countries?

Historians have tended to focus on economic issues such as the shift in trade to the USA, how far Latin America industrialized in the face of reductions in manufactured imports, and more political concerns such as how far the countries moved forward as a bloc in the face of common concerns as a result of the conflict. In all these debates the influence of the USA and reactions to this loom large.

**Effects on trade**

Few historians could disagree that the main impact of the war was the growth in US trade with, and investment in, Latin America, but their emphases are different. Edwin Williamson, writing in the 1990s, argued that changes were taking place before the outbreak of war – war simply speeded them up. He first points to the long-term decline in European demand for food imports as families became smaller and domestic supplies increased due to improved farming and production methods. Later he goes on to argue that British dominance was already in decline. Latin America had traditionally traded its primary products in Europe for industrial goods and financial loans. Now it entered into a more complex pattern in which it increasingly relied on industrial goods imported from the USA, while still having to export its primary products to European markets – although these
were in decline. This was because the USA did not require imported foodstuffs, which were, in any event, excluded from entry by high tariffs.

Economic historian Victor Bulmer-Thomas agreed to a large extent, arguing that the war finished off the old trading order dominated by Britain and ended Latin America’s ready access to European loans. Both saw that the overdependence on primary exports was to lead to problems in the post-war period. In this they followed the analysis of economic historian Andre Gunder Frank who argued that, generally, in the middle years of the twentieth century, over-reliance on exports inhibited development in poorer countries. Writing in 1986, Rosemary Thorp used economic data to show that during the war exports from Latin America rose and this adversely affected any impulse to develop domestic industry.

In a more recent study (2012), historians C.E. Martin and M. Wasserman agreed that the onset of war exposed the uncertainties of the market and instability associated with over-reliance on exports. However, Latin American farmers in particular tended to borrow to offset losses in the expectation that once the war was over the old trading pattern would re-emerge. This didn’t happen.

**Effects on industrial development**

Many historians once believed that the dislocation of import supplies as a result of the First World War led Latin American countries to begin to develop their own industries. Hence F.A. Kirkpatrick, writing in 1938, argued that they were forced onto their resources before the USA superseded Europe as the main provider of imports; as a result they developed their own industries and developed more trade with each other. However, Kirkpatrick offers no evidence to support this claim and, while it is undoubtedly true of a later period, more modern historians are dubious of the extent to which it happened as a result of the First World War. Of course, one can discern developments such as the growth in the number of companies as E. Bradford Burns does in relation to Brazil in his book *A History of Brazil* (1993).

Writing about industrial development, in 1986 historian Colin M. Lewis considered that the reduction in manufactured imports did stimulate domestic industrial development, for example with repair firms moving into manufacture. However, these firms often became over-ambitious and post-war economic retrenchments led to problems, for instance in the British-owned Vasena foundry in Buenos Aires where demand for its products contracted due to the post-war return of imported goods. Historian Bill Albert, writing in 1992, argued that the view of how Latin American countries began to develop industrial infrastructures as a result of wartime shortages of imports is inaccurate. He argues that effectively pre-war conditions prevailed. There was a huge demand for primary products within a year of the war, and because of shortages of machinery and technical expertise, little possibility of Latin American industrialization taking off. Indeed, Albert argues that the debate as to the impact of dislocation in foreign links is misconceived. The lack of industrial development during the
war was more due to the lack of infrastructure arising from the domination of export-led growth before it than its continuation.

Unity
In his book *The Western Hemisphere*, published in 1968, historian Wilfrid Hardy Callcott emphasized that the countries of Latin America were in fact separate and one could not expect them to speak with one voice – or have the same views on the war.

In his history of Latin America, published in 1962, D.M. Dozer argued that the First World War and subsequent instability in Europe stimulated nationalism throughout Latin America in the sense that, as with Canada and the USA, many thought the older nations were a lost cause and preferred to develop without their involvement. This led to a desire to co-operate together and to move forward as a **Latin American bloc**. Writing primarily about Mexico, historian Friedrich Schuler in 2000 showed how angry its leaders were that the League of Nations recognized the Monroe Doctrine and refused to intervene in Latin American concerns about growing US influence.

Dozer expanded this point by arguing that, while the League was reluctant to get involved in Latin American disputes, it did nevertheless court Latin American membership and appointed officials from there to important positions. Albert (see above) considered the development of national identity as a major factor after the war: the rejection of, say, European culture led to the development of distinct Latin American identities; furthermore, the growth of a politicized working-class and middle-class discontent emanated from the war and posed a threat to the elites.

Writing in 1986, Robert Freeman Smith also reminded us how this new sense of national identity manifested itself in anti-Americanism, not necessarily in terms of economic penetration but military intervention, for example in Nicaragua (see pages 79 and 127). In 1917 Colombian author J.M. Vargas Vila wrote a devastating critique of the USA in which he asserted it had taken advantage of wartime conditions to extend its influence – which he saw as imperialism.

**SOURCE G**


The Yankees are giving themselves over to the division and plunder of Latin America, the Yankee has chosen well his hour; this tragic and crepuscular hour, in which none can go in aid of the peoples he is devouring; the Yankee has exploited the European War as if it were a mine. Why not make Latin America see what, in reality, this race and people are? A lustful race, hostile and contemptuous, a countless people, spurious and cruel, insolent and depreciatory toward us, with a monstrous idea of their superiority and an unconquerable desire for conquest.
While the vast majority of Latin American countries remained neutral during the First World War the conflict had a significant impact, albeit in different ways and to differing degrees. The one common factor on which historians agree, and indeed was noted at the time, was the extension of US influence, particularly in terms of the growth of trade and investment at the expense of its European trading partners. This development may have been accelerated by wartime dislocations, but the growth in US influence could be discerned even before the war, and by the end of the 1920s the USA was clearly the most significant trading partner within the western hemisphere, although countries of Latin America were more aware of their own national identities and common interests.

Latin America in the First World War: participation and impact

Most Latin American countries remained neutral during the First World War, although Brazil declared war on Germany. In economic terms, the war saw a short-term dislocation of trade but over time the USA stepped in to become the biggest trading partner of Latin American countries. Many did well from exports and some began to industrialize to replace lost imported goods with those of domestic manufacture – although this was small scale. Argentina skilfully avoided involvement in the war but political ideas and influences emanating from the Russian Revolution stimulated industrial unrest, culminating in ‘Tragic Week’ in January 1919. Brazil did declare war because of its shipping losses, but its actual involvement in the conflict was limited. As in Argentina, there was industrial unrest resulting from the influx of revolutionary ideas. Mexico saw a great demand for its oil and henequen. It was, however, embroiled in civil war for much of the period, but President Carranza saw himself as a leader of Latin America who was wary of US policies and attempted unsuccessfully to court Germany as a counterweight to the influence of the USA. In the event, the disputes between Mexico and the USA were left unsolved at the time of his death.

Examination advice

How to answer ‘assess’ questions

Questions that ask you to ‘assess’ want you to make judgements that you can support with evidence, reasons and explanations. It is important for you to demonstrate why your own assessment is better than alternative ones.

Example

Assess the impact of the First World War on two Latin American countries.

1. For this question, you need to set the terms. Given the information in this chapter, you would probably focus on both the economic and political impact in Argentina and Brazil. However, because the question does not specifically state what type of impact, you could possibly focus your argument on one or the other. If you wish to discuss the impact of
the war on the two countries from 1914–18 you may do so, but state that this is the direction you are taking. You could also write about the immediate repercussions of the war after 1918. That said, there is no reason why you cannot write about both. Just say so in your introduction. Try to seek a balanced answer. In other words, try to write approximately the same amount of analysis for each country. If you only write about one country, you will be penalized. Finally, this is not a compare/contrast question so you do not have to structure your answer along those lines.

2. Take five minutes to create a brief outline before writing your essay. You could organize it like the example below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argentina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political impact:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government not united on which side to support in Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• President Irigoyen wished to remain neutral and make Argentina Latin America’s leading nation. Irigoyen maintained diplomatic relations with Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sinking of three Argentine ships by German U-boats led to massive anti-German demonstrations in Buenos Aires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Politics polarized after war: leftists in working-class groups and unions; right-wing vigilantes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tragic Week, 1919. Government repression; possibly hundreds killed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Economic impact: |
| • Loans from Great Britain cut off during war. |
| • Some small-scale development of local industries after imports cut off. Argentina did not have the technological skills to replace important manufacturing items. |
| • After sea lanes reopened in 1917, Argentina exported large quantities of beef and wheat to Europe. Big drop after war. |
| • 50 per cent reduction in real wages in Buenos Aires: impact on living standards and purchasing power. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brazil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political impact:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Only mainland Latin American country to declare war on Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• As a result, increased prestige after the war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Some suspension of civil liberties, especially for Germans in southern Brazil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sinking of Brazilian ships by German U-boats resulted in pro-Allied stance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• Russian Revolution inspired workers.
• Elites supported France and Great Britain.

Economic impact:
• Some evidence of creation of local manufacturing: 50 per cent of industrial companies formed during the First World War.
• Some increase in exports but not significant because chief product was coffee (a luxury).
• Because Latin American governments relied on tariffs and duties for significant revenues, the decrease in trade with Europe hurt.
• Industrial action (strikes) in some areas but workers' gains minimal.
• Increased inflation: Brazil could not borrow money from abroad so it printed more at home.

Historians' views
• Most historians see the impact of the First World War on Latin America in economic terms. The USA replaced European nations as the primary exporter of goods.

3. Your introduction should state your thesis, which might be something like: The First World War had a significant economic impact on Argentina and Brazil while the political impact, though important, was not nearly as important. An example of a good introductory paragraph for this question is given below.

When the First World War broke out in 1914, Latin American nations hoped to remain neutral so that they could continue to trade with the European belligerents. Europe represented the most important trading bloc for Latin American primary products. As the war progressed, countries such as Argentina and Brazil were dragged into the conflict. When merchant ships of both were sunk by German U-boats, popular opinion turned against Germany. The cessation of German unrestricted submarine warfare led to increased exports of beef and wheat (Argentina) and cotton and coffee (Brazil). Because European countries were no longer exporting their manufactured goods to Latin America, the latter had to respond to shortages at home. Small industrial enterprises were started in the two most important countries in Latin America at the time, Brazil and Argentina, but these could not replace needed European spare parts. Politicians were also split on which side to support given the immigrant communities and divergent political leanings. The war and the success of the Russian Revolution also meant that the
workers became more politicized. Strikes and other industrial action took place as wages and living standards fell. Few gains were realized by the workers in either country. In many regards, the economic impact of the First World War was more significant than the political one, both during and immediately after the war.

4. In the body of your essay, expand on the points you raised in your introduction. For example:

**Latin America initially hoped to remain neutral as Europe went to war. However, in the case of Brazil, the Government felt it had few options once Germany began to sink Brazilian merchant marine ships in 1916 and 1917. Brazil had not profited from the war to the same extent as Argentina. Its primary export, coffee, was seen as a luxury and so not in as much demand as goods viewed as essential to the war effort such as Argentina's beef products and wheat. The Brazilian Government did see a silver lining, though. By being the first (and only) mainland Latin American country to declare war on Germany in 1917, it hoped to secure the position as the region's most important country. Brazil was on the winning side even if it had not contributed to the war effort in any significant way. It would enter the League of Nations as a charter member but soon found itself sidelined by more powerful countries. Brazil found itself much more involved economically with the USA at the end of the war than it had been at the beginning.**

5. In the conclusion, you should tie together the ideas you have explored and come to a judgement about the impact of the war on the countries you have chosen.

6. Now try writing a complete answer to the question, following the advice above.

---

**Examination practice**

Below are two exam-style questions for you to practise on this topic.

1. Compare and contrast the impact of the First World War on Canada and one Latin American country. 
   (For guidance on how to answer ‘compare and contrast’ questions, see pages 88–90.)

2. Why did the US involve itself in the Mexican Revolution? 
   (For guidance on how to answer ‘why’ questions, see pages 57–59.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1823</td>
<td>Monroe Doctrine announced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>Treaty of Wanghia with China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>Commercial treaty with Japan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>Purchase of Alaska</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>Burlingame Treaty with China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>Senate refusal to annex Dominican Republic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>McKinley Tariff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>US conflict with Chile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td><strong>February</strong> Cuban rebellion against Spain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>December</strong> Support for Venezuela in its conflict with Britain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td><strong>January</strong> Acquisition of Wake Island completed occupation of Midway Islands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>March</strong> Annexation of Hawaii</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>April</strong> Spanish–American–Cuban War began</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teller Amendment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td><strong>July</strong> Announcement of Open Door policy in China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>August</strong> Spain ceded Guam and Puerto Rico to USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>December</strong> Treaty of Paris ceded Philippines to USA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899–</td>
<td>Acquisition of eastern Samoa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>War in the Philippines</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Boxer Rebellion in China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Platt Amendment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>US arbitration in dispute between Britain and Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>USA took control of Dominican Republic customs and excise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td><strong>February</strong> Building of Panama Canal began</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>December</strong> Roosevelt Corollary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td><strong>August</strong> President Roosevelt brokered Treaty of New Hampshire between Japan and Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Algeciras Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Root–Takahira Agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td><strong>March</strong> Taft’s presidency and beginnings of dollar diplomacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>October</strong> USA invaded Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Beginnings of Filipinization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td><strong>April</strong> Invasion of Mexican port of Vera Cruz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>August</strong> Declaration of neutrality in First World War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td><strong>May</strong> Sinking of Lusitania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>September</strong> Invasion of Haiti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Invasion of northern Mexico to catch Pancho Villa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td><strong>January</strong> German resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>February</strong> Discovery of the Zimmermann telegram</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>April</strong> Declaration of war on Germany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>June</strong> Espionage Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td><strong>January</strong> Announcement of the Fourteen Points</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>April</strong> National War Labor Board formed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>May</strong> Sedition Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>November</strong> Armistice signed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Paris Peace Conference opened</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Senate rejected US membership of League of Nations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Peace treaties passed with League of Nations clauses excluded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921–22</td>
<td>Washington Naval Agreements, US aid in Russian famine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Senate refused to allow USA to join World Court</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>August Bucareli Accords with Mexico, September US aid to Japan after earthquake</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>July US troops withdrawn from Dominican Republic, August Dawes Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>August US troops withdrawn from Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>May US troops returned to Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>May Peace of Tipitapa, December Geneva Naval Conference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>March Calles–Morrow Compromise, August Kellogg–Briand Pact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Young Plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>April Battle of Vimy Ridge, Introduction of nationwide prohibition, August Compulsory Service Act, September Wartime Elections Act, Military Voters Act, December Controversial federal election returned Borden as Prime Minister, Halifax explosion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>November Armistice signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Winnipeg general strike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Chanak crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Treaty of Westminster</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Spanish–American–Cuban War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Opening of Panama Canal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Pan-American Financial Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>January New Mexican Constitution, February Zimmermann telegram discovered, May Failure to organize Neutrality Conference in Buenos Aires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>September Unflattering correspondence from German Ambassador in Argentina discovered, October Brazil declared war on Germany, January ‘Tragic Week’ in Argentina</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>British North America Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Dispute with USA about borders of Canada and Alaska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Naval Service Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Borden’s Conservative Party won federal elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>August Canadian entry into First World War, Wartime Measures Act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Aegis  Protection or shield; an umbrella organization.
Allies  Name given to the countries fighting Germany, e.g. Britain, France, Russia.
Alsace-Lorraine  Area of France taken by Germany after the 1871 Franco-Prussian War.
American Federation of Labor  An organization of craft-based labour unions formed in 1885.
Anglo-Japanese Alliance  An alliance between Britain and Japan, dating from 1902 and due for renewal in 1922.
Annexation  When a country takes over another, in this case the possible annexation of Hawaii by the USA.
Anti-clerical  Against the Church.
Anti-Imperialist League  An organization of different groups that opposed US imperial expansion.
Anti-imperialists  Canadians who were opposed to close ties with Britain as the imperial power.
Appropriation  Monies allocated for a particular purpose.
Arbitration  The process by which parties submit their dispute to an impartial body in order to arrive at a decision.
Armistice  The ceasefire at the end of the war on 11 November 1918.
Associated power  Power not formally allied to other countries fighting against a common enemy, therefore having independence as to military strategy and the subsequent peace settlement.
Attrition  Destructive, exhausting conditions.
Balance of power (Europe)  Relative weighting of power and influence between the Great Powers in Europe; traditionally if any became more powerful, this could affect the balance of power and potentially threaten conflict.
‘Balanced antagonisms’  Roosevelt’s term for the way rivalries between countries could prevent them from extending their influence; how their determination to protect their own interests could cancel out their ability to expand them.
Barbary pirates  Pirates based on the coast of North Africa.

Belligerent  To do with a hostile country involved in war.
Benevolent neutral  A country that tries to arbitrate between disputing nations without taking sides.
‘Big stick’  The term given to Roosevelt’s threat of US intervention if countries, particularly in Latin America, didn’t govern themselves effectively and act responsibly to foreign interests, for example, over the repayment of debts.
Black press  Newspapers, magazines and periodicals aimed at a largely black audience.
Boer War  War between Britain and the descendants of Dutch colonists in South Africa, 1899–1901.
Bond  Loan to raise revenue.
Boxer Rebellion  Rebellion against foreigners in 1900; Boxers were so-called because they belonged to the ‘Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists’.
British blockade of Germany  British ships preventing goods entering and leaving German ports.
British Secret Service  British intelligence service.
Canadian Corps  Canadian troops in the First World War.
Canadian Expeditionary Force  The initial Canadian force sent to war in 1914.
Canadian Patriotic Fund  A fund to support the dependants of those who had volunteered to serve in the Armed Forces.
Capital ships  The most important, usually the largest, warships.
Census  Population count undertaken every ten years.
Central America  The geographical region between North and South America including countries such as Mexico.
Central Powers  Germany and its allies such as the Austro-Hungarian empire (Austria and Hungary) and the Ottoman empire (Turkey).
‘China hands’  Name given to US diplomats and businessmen who had lived in China.
Chinese Exclusion Act 1882  Legislation passed by Congress to completely exclude Chinese immigration for a period of ten years; it was renewed every decade until 1943.
Coalition government  A government made up of different parties, in this case Conservatives and Liberals, who would agree to serve together in the face of the increasing demands made by the war.
Colonialism  The expansion of an empire by acquiring, ruling and exploiting countries or people.
Colonies  People or territories ruled by a separate country or power.
‘Colossus of the South’  A term Argentines gave their country to describe its economic and political potential for growth and influence.
Combines and Fair Prices Bill 1919  A bill to prevent the hoarding of food and other ‘necessities of life’ in wartime.
Concentration camps  Prison-type camps where relatives and sympathizers of rebels were kept to deny insurgents support mechanisms.
Concessions  Favourable trading rights.
Confederacy  The name given to the Southern states which broke away during the Civil War period.
Congress  Legislative branch of the US government.
Conscientious objectors  Those who refuse to enlist on moral grounds such as being opposed to war.
Conservatives  Canadian political party favouring the maintenance of ties with Britain.
Contingents  Groups of troops sent to fight.
Covenant of the League of Nations  Document containing the rules and organization of the League of Nations. Its acceptance was a clause in all the peace treaties so its rejection would also mean rejection of all the peace treaties.
Crepuscular  An adjective relating to twilight which in the extract on page 191 refers to a dark or tragic hour.
‘Cuba Libre’  ‘Free Cuba’, the slogan of those seeking Cuban independence.
Dawes Plan  Plan of 1923 which offered Germany scaled-down reparations and provided it with a loan of $250 million to help stabilize the currency.
Declaration of Neutrality  Declaration to Congress by President Wilson on 19 August 1914 in which he warned US citizens against taking sides in the First World War.
Default on international debts  Where a government refuses to pay back its debts to other countries.
Demilitarized zone  Area where no troops or military installations are allowed.
Demobilization  The process of returning troops to civilian life.
Democrat  One of the major US political parties, embracing wider support groups and more concerned with social reforms.
Depression  Downturn in the economy leading to firms closing down and unemployment.
Dollar diplomacy  The policy of increasing US influence abroad through financial investment, thus making foreign states economically reliant on the US.
Dominion  Semi-independent country within the British empire.
Doughboy  Term applied to US soldiers in the First World War.
Dustbowl conditions  When over-cultivation of the soil leads to it becoming parched and powdery and liable to being blown away in heavy winds.
Eligible men  Men meeting the criteria for conscription.
Elites  Powerful and influential groups, notably leading politicians, large-scale landowners, leaders of the Church and armed forces.
Embargo  Refusal to trade with a certain country.
Envoy  Representative sent for a specific diplomatic purpose.
Espionage  Spying activities.
Expeditionary force  Name given to a force from a country which goes overseas to fight.
Far East  Countries in East Asia such as China and Japan.
Federal  Central as opposed to provincial governments.
Federal government  The government of the USA, based in Washington DC.
Filipinization  Giving Filipinos more say in governing the Philippines.
Filipino independence movement  Groups fighting for independence for the Philippines from Spain.
First Nations  Aboriginal peoples in Canada.
First Sino-Japanese War  War fought between Japan and China in 1894 and 1895 over control of Korea.
Flying boats  Aircraft that cross large stretches of water.
Food rationing  Wartime controls on food.
Founding Fathers  A term applied to the politicians who created the USA following the rebellion against British rule.
Fourteen Points  President Wilson’s blueprint for a post-war peace settlement.
**Frontiers** The edge of settlement and civilization; one of the main themes of US history, particularly with reference to the 1893 thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner, explaining how, after one frontier was closed through the development of settlement and civilization, new ones were always sought.

**German model** Military organization based on that of Germany.

**Gold pesos** Pesos valued in terms of gold; they had a higher value than paper pesos.

**Gold Rush** Migration of people to an area to find gold and become rich after initial discoveries there; in this case the Gold Rush in the Yukon, Alaska.

**Good Neighbor policy** Policy of cultivating good relations with Canada and Latin America introduced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933.

**Governor General** The chief representative of the British Government in the dominions. His precise role was disputed until defined by the Balfour Report of 1926 (see page 164).

**Great Powers** The most powerful countries such as Britain, France, Germany and Japan.

**Guerrilla** Fighter using techniques such as ambush, avoiding large-scale confrontations.

‘**Gushers**’ Prolific oil wells.

**House of Representatives** The lower house of Congress in which the number of representatives chosen is based on a state’s population.

**Hun** A derogatory term for Germans, derived from the Huns, a warlike tribe renowned for their cruelty and barbarism in the fifth century.

**Imperial expansion** The colonization or annexation of less economically developed areas.

**Imperial federation** Formal ties between the dominions and colonies of the British empire; almost like one giant federal state.

**Imperial High Command** Those controlling British military strategy.

**Inaugural address** A new president’s first keynote speech, setting out the vision of the new administration.

**Indemnity** A fine as compensation for violent acts, e.g. destruction to property.

**Industrial Revolution** An economic shift from predominance in agriculture to manufacture of industrial goods.

**International Labour Organization** An organization set up under the authority of the League of Nations to improve international working conditions.

**Inter-war period** The period between the two world wars; in the case of Canada, 1919–39.

**Irregular militias** Forces drawn up from those other than members of the regular army; volunteer fighters.

**Isolationism** The policy by which the USA detached itself from foreign affairs.

**Kaiser** Title of the German emperor.

**Kemmerer Plans** Plans drawn up to help stabilize and develop the economies of Latin American countries, offering, for example, advice on sound currency and central banks to facilitate the financial infrastructure to pay for increased trade and industrial development.

**Labour battalions** Troops that worked in construction or loading or transportation of equipment rather than serving in combat.

**Labour unions** US trade unions.

**Laissez-faire** An approach where the government deliberately avoids getting involved in economic planning, thus allowing the free market to operate.

**Large policy** Name given to the policy promoted by expansionists who advocated that the USA break with any tradition of non-intervention in foreign affairs and take its place among the Great Powers, e.g. Britain and Germany.

**Latin America** The countries to the south of the USA.

**Latin American bloc** Latin American countries moving forward together and developing common policies because of their common interests.

**League of Nations** International organization to be set up after the war to maintain peaceful relations and encourage countries to co-operate together to address common problems such as disease and slavery.

**Legalistic** Following the letter of the law.

**Lenin** Russian revolutionary leader.

**Liberal Party** The political party less inclined to support Britain and more assertive of Canadian independence of action; particularly sympathetic to the aspirations of French Canadians.

**Liberty and Victory Loans** Loans to raise money to pay for the war effort.
**Manifest Destiny** The belief that it was the God-given right of Americans to settle their continent and then spread their ideas abroad.

**Manila** Capital city of the Philippines.

**Martial law** Military rule imposed over a region, with features such as suspension of civil liberties and curfews.

**Materiel** Equipment and supplies to be used in war.

**McKinley Tariff** High tariff introduced in 1890.

**Mennonite** A Christian group that lives a simple life in small communities without any use of modern technology; it is opposed to war and so members would not enlist in the First World War.

**Midwest** The middle regions of the USA.

**Military war games** The practice of military exercises to prepare military forces for combat.

**Militias** Groups of local part-time soldiers.

**Minority government** A government in which no one party has overall control.

**Missionaries** People who attempt to convert others to the religion to which they belong.

**Mobilization** Gearing the country for war, including recruiting, equipping and transporting the military.

**Monoculture** Over-concentration on production of one item, e.g. sugar in Cuba or coffee in Brazil.

**Moral diplomacy** The belief that contact with the USA could only benefit others; that the USA was morally superior to other nations and its diplomacy was governed by noble and benevolent principles.

**Multinational companies** Companies with branches and interests in different countries.

**Munitions** Weapons and ammunition.

**NAACP** African-American organization to promote civil rights, founded in 1909.

**Napoleonic Wars** Wars in the early nineteenth century between Napoleonic France and many European powers; the USA was particularly angry about the British naval blockade which prevented neutral countries trading with France.

**Nationalist** Someone who promotes the interests of his or her country.

**Native North Americans** The original inhabitants of the North American continent, also called First Nations in Canada.

**Natural products** Goods such as raw materials that aren’t manufactured.

**New Imperialism** The growth of empire in the late nineteenth century by European powers, particularly the exploitation of Africa and the Far East.

**Nobel Peace Prize** An annual prize established in 1901 for an individual, group or organization that has done the most to promote peace over the previous year.

**Nomenclature** Names used to refer to something.

**Non-permanent seat** The Council or governing body of the League had four permanent members – Britain, France, Italy and Japan – and four non-permanent, voted every three years to be members of the Assembly, the parliamentary body of the League.

**Northern political elites** Powerful politicians and businessmen from Northern USA who were very influential in decision making in federal government.

**‘Open Door’** US policy that foreign interests in China should respect each other’s rights to trade and invest there.

**Opera bouffe** Light or comic opera.

**Ordnance** Ammunition for artillery.

**Pacifist** Opposed to war and violence.

**Pampas** The grasslands of Argentina, the heartlands of cattle ranching and wheat production.

**Pan-American** Relating to all the countries on the American continent.

**Pan-American Union** An organization to encourage co-operation between American countries, founded in 1910 as a result of the fourth Pan-American conference, with the US Secretary of State as permanent Chairman. It had little power or influence.

**Paper pesos** Paper banknotes.

**Peace societies** Societies to promote the cause of peace such as the Women’s Peace Society and the World Peace Association.

**Picket lines** Lines of striking workers that prevent others from going to work.

**Plains** The great land mass of midwestern USA.

**Porteños** Inhabitants of Buenos Aires, the ‘people of the port’.

**Powder magazine** The place on a ship where weapons and ammunition are stored.

**Prairie economy** Production and sale of agricultural produce, e.g. wheat, from the vast prairies or lands of western Canada.
Primary exports  Exports of raw materials and agricultural products such as foodstuffs that have not been manufactured.
Privy Council  Council made up of members of the British Government and charged with interpreting matters of government such as which body holds which responsibilities.
Progressive Party  A new post-war political party made up of disaffected Liberals and farmers' interests.
Progressivism  US movement to expand the role of government in dealing with social and economic problems and tackle corruption and abuses.
Prohibition  A constitutional amendment that placed a ban on the manufacture, transportation and sale of alcoholic beverages. It became law throughout the USA in 1919 and lasted until 1933.
Protection  Tariffs to defend domestic production against imported goods.
Protectionists  Those who supported import and export duties to protect domestic industries from foreign competition.
Protectorate  The term given to a country ‘protected’ by or heavily under the influence of another.
Provinces  Different political regions, for example, Quebec and Ontario in Canada.
Public floating debt  Short-term loans to the government attracting lower rates of interest than longer-term ones.
Public work schemes  Government-financed schemes, for example, road building.
Puppet emperor  A ruler who was controlled by others; in this case Maximilian owed his position and authority to France.
Quakers  Like the Mennonites, the Quakers are a Christian denomination opposed to war, but unlike the Mennonites they might volunteer to serve on the battlefield in non-combatant roles, for example, as stretcher bearers or ambulance drivers.
Québécois  Inhabitants of Quebec.
Radical Party  An Argentine political party committed to openness and fair dealing, and opposed to corruption.
Ratification  Approval of a measure by voting.
Real wages  Wages valued in terms of what they will actually buy.
Recession  A downturn in the economy.
Reciprocity agreements  Trade agreements of mutual benefit.
Referendum  A vote put to the electorate on a specific issue.
Regulation 17  Law passed in 1912 to limit the teaching of French in schools in Ontario.
Reparations  Compensation to be paid by the losing side for the costs of the war.
Republic  A country without a monarch.
Republican  One of the main US political parties, particularly associated with big business and wealthier groups who tended, during the period covered by this book, to favour minimal government activity and lower taxes.
Reserved occupations  Types of employment deemed essential for the war effort.
Revisionist  Challenging accepted views.
Revolutionary Wars  The wars between countries, such as Britain, against the French, 1793–1815.
Riot Act  A call for demonstrators to disperse before being forced to by the authorities.
Rockefeller Foundation  Philanthropic organization founded in 1913 by John D. Rockefeller to do good works throughout the world.
Royal Navy  The British navy.
Rural industrialization  The main policy of the post-war Quebec government led by Louis-Alexandre Taschereau. The idea was industrial development in the form of natural resources projects such as the development of hydro-electric power and mineral extraction, again in small communities.
Russian Revolution  The communist revolution in Russia of 1917.
Safe seat  A parliamentary seat a political party expects to win.
Scorched earth  A military strategy to destroy everything when forces retreat/withdraw, so the opposing army finds a wasteland lacking in food and shelter, and impossible to exploit.
Scramble for Africa  The race by European powers to colonize Africa.
Secession  Where a section of a country seeks to break away, possibly to become an independent nation.
Secret diplomacy  Secret agreements between countries.
Secretary of State  US official responsible for the administration of foreign policy.
Seditious  To do with material attacking the government.
Segregation  Separation of people of different racial groups in terms of use of facilities, areas where they live and opportunities.
Self-determination  The belief that peoples should be free to govern themselves and choose their own form of government.
Senate  Upper house of the US Congress with two senators from each state.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee  Senate committee responsible for the oversight of foreign affairs.
Shock troops  Troops used for special, often particularly dangerous, missions or ‘suicide missions’.
Social Darwinism  Application of the theory of evolution to human development, suggesting that some ethnic and racial groups are more highly developed than others.
Socialist  Someone who believes that wealth should be shared out more equally and society should have more equality of opportunity.
Spanish–American War  The name originally given to the Spanish–American–Cuban War of 1898, discussed in Chapter 2.
Speaker of the House of Representatives  The person controlling the debates in the US House of Representatives.
Sphere of influence  Countries or regions under the influence of another, e.g. USA and Latin America.
State Department  The US branch of government responsible for the implementation of foreign policy.
State of the Union address  Annual statement by the President on how well the US is doing, what challenges it faces and so on.
Strike breaking  Trying to defeat a strike, for example, by using other workers to do the jobs of those on strike.
Subsoil deposits  The resources under the ground; Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution asserted that all deposits under the surface of the soil (including minerals) belonged to the state and so were subject to tax.
Supreme Court Judge  One of nine Justices who make up the Supreme Court, the main judicial authority in the USA.
Tariffs  Import and export duties.
Teller Amendment  Amendment to the April 1898 resolution from Congress threatening war with Spain if it did not withdraw from Cuba. Introduced by Henry Teller, Democrat Senator for Colorado, it asserted that the USA would not annex Cuba but would leave Cubans to decide their own future.
Theory of evolution  Theory that describes how organisms change over time.
Third Republic  French system of government, 1870–1940, featuring a strong legislative arm and weak presidency.
Tommy  Name given to British soldiers in the First World War.
Trade credits  The purchase of goods to be paid for later.
Treason  Attempting to undermine or go against the government.
Treaty of Westminster  Statute establishing legislative independence for British dominions such as Canada.
Trench warfare  The defensive network used on the Western Front and elsewhere in which millions died.
Turner’s thesis  F.J. Turner’s thesis, dating from 1893, about the unique character of the USA and how it had been largely determined by the US frontier and the challenges of westward expansion.
U-boat  German submarine.
Union  The United States of America; the federal government supported by 25 states (five border slave states and 20 free states).
Unionist Party  Coalition party of Conservatives and some Liberals formed as a result of the 1917 federal election.
Union-Nationale  A separatist movement in Quebec seeking greater autonomy or even independence from the federal government.
Unrestricted submarine warfare  Attacking any ship en route to an enemy port.
US Civil War  War between the Federal Government and forces of the Southern states who broke away to form the Confederacy, from 1861 to 1865.
US diplomatic notes  Notes used for correspondence between US and foreign governments.
Veterans’ pensions  Pensions received by former servicemen.
**Vigilante groups**  Groups that take the law into their own hands.

**War bonds**  Loans to pay for the war, to be redeemed after victory.

**War College**  US college to train future military leaders in aspects of national security and military strategy.

**War indemnity**  Compensation or reparations from a defeated nation to the victors following war.

**Warlords**  Local and provincial militia commanders.

**War profiteering**  Making excess profits during wartime, for example, by charging artificially high prices.

**Western Front**  The battlefields in France and Belgium.

**Western hemisphere**  The continents of North and South America.

**White House**  The home of the US president.

**Wilsonianism**  Name given to Wilson’s policies based on Christian ideas and moral diplomacy.

‘**Wipe the eye**’  A phrase referring to an attack on someone or, in the example on page 144, a country, i.e. the USA.

**World Court**  Also known as the Permanent Court of International Justice, this was set up under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1920 to help countries settle disputes peacefully by passing judgements.

‘**Yellow Press**’  Term given to sensationalist journalism in the 1890s. It became known as the Yellow Press after a cartoon character called the Yellow Kid, from Pulitzer’s *New York World* (who later appeared in Hearst’s *New York Journal*).

**Young Plan**  Plan of 1929 offering to further scale down German reparations.
Further reading

Canada

Moving, detailed study of the Battle of Vimy Ridge and its importance.


Cook, T., *Clio’s Warriors*, University of British Columbia Press, Vancouver, 2006
An analysis of how the official war histories came to be written.

Finlay, J.L. and Sprague, D.N., *The Structure of Canadian History*, Prentice-Hall, Ontario, 1979
Useful for a longitudinal approach to Canadian history.

Useful analysis of the significance of war within the wider Canadian context.

Brilliant analysis of how Canadian people remembered and reflected on the war.

Websites

www.warmuseum.ca/home
Indispensable to any detailed study of the effects of the war on Canada.

www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/index-e.html and www.archives.canada.ca
Links to the Canadian National Archives.

Film

*Passchendaele* (2008)
A very moving film about Canada’s involvement in the First World War on both the home and battle fronts.

Latin America

One of the few books in English dedicated to the impact of the First World War on Latin America; specialist but accessible.

These volumes deal authoritatively with continent-wide issues (Vol. IV) and specific countries (Vol. V).

Very readable and comprehensive text.

Thorough and accessible economic analysis, well explained.

Callcott, W.H., *The Western Hemisphere*, University of Texas Press, Austin, TX, 1968
Thorough on the impact of the First World War on the countries of Latin America.

Contains detailed analysis of the impact of the First World War on the countries of Latin America.

Translated from the Portuguese, this is probably the best short introduction covering the impact of the First World War on Brazil.

A thorough examination of the Philippines as a US colony.
A concise history, useful on Mexico’s relations with the USA.

A thorough and accessible account.

Particularly useful for the impact of the First World War on industrial unrest in Brazil.

Insightful essays on various aspects of Mexican history; particularly useful here is the essay on ‘Mexico and the Outside World’ by F.E. Schuler.

A thought-provoking examination of the reasons why the US intervened in the Cuban–Spanish war.

Considers the continent as a whole, then examines individual countries.

**Websites**

www.casahistoria.net/uslatam.htm
Links to other web pages on the relations between Latin America and the USA.

www.worldwar1.com/sfla.htm
Site containing a very useful article by Ron Genini; particularly good as a starting point for further study.

www.historyofcuba.com/history/havana/Sugar1b.htm
Very useful for the relations between Cuba and the USA, and the Cuban sugar industry.

**USA**

An always interesting and often provocative account.

An evaluative account with useful historiographical discussions.

Introductory thematic analyses, then examines events and personalities separately.

Study of the nature of US imperialism; the early historical background chapters are particularly useful.

A controversial account that argues that the USA should have remained neutral in the conflict.

Contains useful and authoritative chapters on foreign policy.

This book examines seven issues that collectively explain Blaine’s views, focusing particularly on how far he regarded Latin America as being important to US interests.

An authoritative, up-to-date analysis.

An interesting gendered perspective.
*A study of foreign policy from the biographical perspective of key individuals, particularly useful here for its study of Henry Cabot Lodge.*

*Right-wing and celebratory in style, but always a good read.*

*A controversial analysis arguing that the USA pursued an imperialist path against its own interests.*

*A useful and brief account.*

*A thorough, specialist interpretation.*

*Brilliant Pulitzer-Prize-winning analysis, particularly useful here for its examination of the attitudes of progressives to foreign policy.*

*A concise account of foreign policy, emphasizing the achievements.*

*A detailed study of the significance of one year.*

*Zinn’s chapters of US imperialism and the war in the Philippines contain excellent contemporary extracts.*

### Articles

Examines how the USA became involved in the First World War.

*A very interesting view of the home front from the perspective of African-Americans.*

Examines the relationships between the USA and France during the period of the war.

Examines the role of President McKinley in the Spanish–American–Cuban War.

Ray, C., ‘Woodrow Wilson as Commander-in-Chief’, *History Today*, 43, April 93
*An evaluation of Wilson’s role as Commander-in-Chief.*

*The Spanish–American–Cuban War from the Spanish perspective.*

### Websites

[www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/ojeda.html](http://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/ojeda.html)
*‘The Spanish–American War of 1898: a Spanish View’ by Jaime de Ojeda.*

[www.spanamwar.com](http://www.spanamwar.com)
*A detailed site devoted to the Spanish–American–Cuban War.*

[http://shprs.clas.asu.edu/american_imperialism](http://shprs.clas.asu.edu/american_imperialism)
*Many good links to US imperialism.*
The internal assessment is a historical investigation on a historical topic. Below is a list of possible topics on the emergence of the Americas in global affairs from 1880–1929 that could warrant further investigation. They have been organized by chapter theme.

**Chapter 1: United States’ expansionist foreign policies**
1. In what ways did Captain Alfred T. Mahan’s books impact the development of the Japanese and German navies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?
2. How were American sugar interests able to overthrow the Hawaiian monarchy?
3. Why was Emperor Maximilian I’s rule in Mexico doomed?
4. How did the *Baltimore* incident in 1891 reflect the limits of Chile’s importance as a Pacific naval power?

**Chapter 2: The Spanish–American–Cuban War, 1898**
1. To what extent were US newspaper reports of American atrocities in the Philippines accurate?
2. How important was the sinking of the USS *Maine* in the US decision to declare war on Spain in 1898?
3. Why was the Anti-Imperialist League unable to stop the US from seizing and keeping Spanish colonies?
4. To what extent did José Martí contribute to Cuba’s independence from Spain?

**Chapter 3: United States’ foreign policies, 1901–17**
1. To what extent did the Boxer Rebellion mark the beginning of the end of the Qing Dynasty in China?
2. In what ways was the Panamanian revolt against Colombia fabricated in Washington, DC?
3. How successful were President Wilson’s efforts to bring stability to the Caribbean region?
4. In what ways did Latin American intellectuals respond to US interventions in the region, 1904–30?

**Chapter 4: The United States and the First World War: from neutrality to involvement**
1. What impact did anti-German propaganda play in the 1917 US decision to declare war on Germany?
2. To what extent were German submarine attacks on US shipping responsible for the US entry into the First World War?
3. How were Americans of German descent treated in the US during the First World War?
4. How successful were Augusto Sandino’s efforts against US interventions in Nicaragua?

**Chapter 5: Canada and the First World War: participation and impact**
1. In what ways and with what effects did French-speaking Canadians resist conscription during the First World War?
2. What impact did the Halifax explosion have on Canada’s war effort?
3. To what extent did Canadian actions at Vimy Ridge influence Canadian nationalism?
4. Why was the Canadian government’s decision to conscript its young males taken so late in the First World War?

**Chapter 6: Latin America in the First World War: participation and impact**
1. Why did Brazil leave the League of Nations in 1928?
2. To what extent did the Argentine economy benefit from the First World War?
3. How did Latin American countries respond to German submarine attacks on their shipping?
4. Why did Brazil declare war on the German empire in 1917?
Index

A
African-Americans 109, 112–14, 115
Aguinaldo, Emilio 46, 49, 50, 53
Alaska 11, 14, 17, 141–2
Algeciras Conference (1906) 72
American Civil War 10, 40
and Britain 14–15
and sea power 21
Argentina 83, 124, 127
and the First World War 170, 171, 174–9, 189
economic effects 177–8
politics 174, 178–9
and trade 173, 176–7
African-Americans 109, 112–14, 115
Aguinaldo, Emilio 46, 49, 50, 53
Alaska 11, 14, 17, 141–2
Algeciras Conference (1906) 72
American Civil War 10, 40
and Britain 14–15
and sea power 21
Argentina 83, 124, 127
and the First World War 170, 171, 174–9, 189
economic effects 177–8
politics 174, 178–9
and trade 173, 176–7

B
Balfour Declaration (1926) 142, 164
Black press 112–14
Boer War 141
Bolivia 27, 171, 172
Borden, Robert 142–3, 144
and the First World War 146, 147, 148, 161
conscription 150, 151–2, 156
and the League of Nations 163
Brazil 83, 124
and the First World War 170, 179–84, 189, 190
industrial development 183–4, 190
industrial unrest 182–3
and the League of Nations 184
US exports to 173
Britain
Anglo-Japanese Alliance 129–30, 163
and Canada 139–43, 144–5, 163–4
and Canadian national identity 165–6
and China 72
and the First World War 93, 94
and Canada 146–8
and the Imperial War Cabinet 148
and Latin America 171, 172, 175, 186–7
naval blockade 95–6, 97, 99
post-war peace settlement 117, 118
submarine warfare 96, 97
US entry into the war 99, 100
and international agreements 130
and the League of Nations 184
Royal Navy 175
and the USA 20, 28, 72, 87
and the American Civil War 14–15
British Guiana 15
Bryan, William Jennings 52, 53, 80
and the First World War 92, 96, 97, 104
Canadian Patriotic Fund 157
Caribbean 61–6, 171
and the Spanish–American–Cuban War 46–8
Carnegie, Andrew 51–2
Carranza, Venustiano 82, 83, 185–6, 188
Castro, José Cipriano 66
Céspedes, Carlos Manuel de 35, 37
Chaco War 171
Chanak Crisis (1922) 164
Chile 27–8, 83, 124
and the First World War 171, 172
China 71, 78, 80, 134
Boxer Rebellion 73–4
Sino-Japanese War 16
US Open Door policy 72–3, 74–5, 76
US trade with 15–16
Christians
and military service in Canada 158
missionaries 23, 73
in the Philippines 51, 55
Civil liberties
in Canada 154–8
in the USA 109–12
Clark, James Beauchamp ‘Champ’ 143–4
Cleveland, Grover 9, 26, 28
Colombia 68–9, 80, 126, 171
colonialism see imperialism
Coolidge, Calvin 122, 130, 131
Costa Rica 81
Cuba
rebellion (1895) 34–5, 36, 61–2
and the Spanish–American–Cuban War (1898) 61
causes of the war 34–42
course of the war 46–7
Paris Peace Conference 48, 49
sugar industry 61–2, 64–5
US intervention and trade 61–5, 173

D
Darwin, Charles 22
Dawes Plan 130–1, 132
Dewey, George 45–6

Dollar diplomacy  78, 79, 124
Dominican Republic  17–18, 66–7, 81, 128
Du Bois, W.E.B.  113, 114

Economies and the First World War
Argentina  177–8
Brazil  183–4
Canada  153–6
Mexico  186–8
USA  107–8
Ecuador  171
El Salvador  127, 171
Examination questions
‘analyse’   167–9
‘assess’   192–5
‘compare and contrast’   88–90
‘evaluate’   30–2
‘to what extent’   136–8
‘why’   57–9

First World War see Britain; Canada; Latin America; United States
France
and international agreements  130, 131
and the League of Nations  184
and Mexico  15
Napoleonic Wars  14
and the post-war peace settlement  117, 118
and the USA  11, 72
French Canadians  167–9
and Britain  144–5, 166
and conscription  150–1, 165
and separatism  140, 162
French Revolutionary wars  21

Gender
and the Spanish–American–Cuban War  43–4
Germany  22, 23, 66
and China  72
and the First World War  93–4, 95, 105, 135
and Argentina  174, 175–6
and Brazil  179, 180, 181–2, 183

and Canada  149, 158
and Latin America  170, 172
and Mexico  185–6, 188
post-war peace settlement  116–17, 118, 119
submarine warfare  96–7, 99, 101, 102, 105, 180
US entry into the war  100, 101–3, 104
post-war reparations  130–1
and Samoa  25
and the Spanish–American–Cuban War  41
US relations with  71, 72, 76
Good Neighbor policy  127–8, 129
Guam  16–17, 46, 48, 49, 130
Guiana  28

Imperialism
Canada and the British empire  144
and the USA
annexation of the Philippines  49–56
Anti–Imperialist League  51–2, 53
growth of US imperial interests  24–9
historians on motives for  85–8
large policy  33
and Latin America  27–8, 70
new Imperialism  16
opposition to colonialism  17–18
Pacific region  16–17, 24–6, 28
preclusive  23, 28, 50
in the progressive era  85–8
reasons for imperial expansion  19–24
and the Spanish–American–Cuban War (1898)  28–9

Industrial development
Brazil  183–4, 190
Canada  153, 154, 162
rural industrialization  162
Latin America  190–1
United States  10, 13–14, 20
International Labour Organization  163
Irigoyen, Hipólito  174, 175, 179

Japan
Anglo–Japanese Alliance  129–30, 163
and the League of Nations  184
Sino–Japanese War  16
and the USA  15–16, 71, 75–6
and the Washington Naval Agreements  129–30

Kellogg–Briand Pact  131–2
Kemmerer Plans  125
King, Mackenzie  162, 164, 166
Kipling, Rudyard  49
Korea  76

Latin America
and the First World War  170–95
effects of the war  170–3
historians on  189–92
and industrial development  190–1
and trade  171–3, 174, 176–7, 189–90
unity and the Latin American bloc  191–2
independence movement  15
and Pan–Americanism  27, 170, 171
and the USA  123, 191
imperial expansion  27–8, 70
post–First World War  123–9
the progressive era  61–71, 80–4
and trade  20
see also individual countries, e.g.
Argentina
Laurier, Wilfrid  140–1, 143, 145, 150, 151, 166
League of Nations  116, 118, 119, 163
and Latin America  171, 181, 184, 191
and the USA  120–1, 122, 123
Lloyd George, David 147, 148, 164
Locarno Conference 129
Lodge, Henry Cabot 21, 33, 117, 118, 122, 133
and the League of Nations 120, 121

M
McKinley, William 38, 40, 42, 43, 44–5, 46, 53
and American imperialism 85
and the annexation of the Philippines 50–1, 55–6
and US policy in China 75
Madero, Francisco 82
Mahan, Captain Alfred Thayer 21–2
Manifest Destiny
and Canada 140
and US imperialism 22, 28, 33
Martí, José 34, 37, 43, 44
Meighen, Arthur 163
Mexico
civil war 81–4, 185
and the First World War 170, 171, 172, 175, 185–8, 189
economic impact of 186–8
impact on foreign policy 188
French involvement in 27
US exports to 173
and the USA 11, 13, 124, 126, 127, 188
Wilson and moral diplomacy in 81–4
and the Zimmermann telegram 102, 185
Midway Island 16
Monroe Doctrine 14, 15, 23, 27, 131
and Latin America 28, 66, 127, 191
and Mexico 188
Moral diplomacy 80–5, 92, 105, 106

N
Napoleonic Wars 14, 95
National identity
Canadians and the First World War 146, 148, 152–3, 165–6
and Latin America 191–2
Native North Americans 11, 21
Nicaragua 78, 79, 81, 127, 134, 191
O
Obregón, Alvaro 126
Oil production 14
Mexico 186–7, 188
Olney, Richard 73

P
Pan–Americanism 27, 170, 171
Panama Canal 67–70, 80, 125, 141, 172
Paraguay 171
Paris Peace Conferences (1898–99) 48, 49
(1919) 117–18, 119
Peru 27, 124, 171, 172
Pessoa, Epitácio 184
Philippines 23, 76–7, 81
annexation of 49–56, 85
effects of 53–4
historians on 55–6
opponents of 51–3
and progressive era imperialism 85, 86, 87
supporters of 50–1
Filipinization policy 77
Filipino independence movement 46, 49, 50, 53
and the Spanish–American–Cuban War (1898) 33, 34, 45–6
war of independence 49
Platt Amendment 64
Preclusive imperialism 23, 28, 50
Prohibition 157
Puerto Rico 47–8, 49, 61, 65, 81, 85
Q
Quesada, Gonzalo de 37

R
Racism 18
Rockefeller Foundation 123
Roosevelt Corollary (1904) 60, 66–7, 80, 88, 127
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 127, 128, 131
Roosevelt, Theodore 21, 60, 88, 99
and Alaska 142
and the Caribbean/Latin America 61–71, 127
and the Far East 72–7
the Great Powers and Asia 71–7
and the ‘Great White Fleet’ 76
and the Spanish–American–Cuban War 45, 46, 50, 52
Root–Takahira Agreements 76
Russia 11, 17, 102, 116
Russian Revolution 178

S
Sagasta, Práxedes Mateo 45
Samoa 16–17, 23, 24–5, 28
Sandino, Augusto César 127, 128
Schenk, Charles 112
Scott, Emmett Jay 113, 114
Seward, William H. 17
Social Darwinism 22–3, 28
Spain
Algeciras Conference (1906) 72
and the Cuban rebellion (1895) 34–5, 36, 43
and the Paris Peace Conference 48, 49
and the Philippines 46, 50, 52
reasons for involvement in Cuba 45
Spanish–American–Cuban War (1898) 10, 16, 24, 33–59, 61
in the Caribbean 46–8
causes 33–42
historians on 42–5
propaganda and the Yellow Press 37–8, 43, 54
the USS Maine sinking 38–9, 40, 44, 45
declaration of war 40–1
and Hawaii 26
in the Pacific 45–6
and the Paris Peace Conference 48, 49
and the Philippines 33, 34, 45–6, 48
annexation of 49–56
and US imperial expansion 28–9, 87

T
Taft, William Howard 60, 76, 78, 81, 124
Teller Amendment 40–1, 48, 49, 61
Trade
and the First World War 94–5
and Latin America 171–3, 174, 176–7, 189–90
protectionism 20
and the USA 13–14, 16, 123
and Canada 143–4, 145
and Cuba 35–6, 64–5
United States

and Argentina 175

army 21

Chinese Exclusion Act (1882) 16

conquest of internal frontiers 11–12, 19

and Cuba 61–5

the Cuban rebellion (1895) 34–5, 36

US business interests 38

US economic involvement in 62–4

US–Cuban relations 35–6

see also Spanish–American–Cuban War

economic and cultural influence 122–3

economic depression (1893) 20, 43

economic development 12–14

First World War 61, 88, 91–123

African–Americans 109, 112–14, 115

the Knox–Porter resolution 121

and Mexico 185–6

neutrality policy 91–8, 105

Post-war peace settlement 116–21

propaganda and civil liberties 109–12

and trade with Latin America 172–3

US entry into the war 99–107

war production and finance 107–8

workers 109

foreign policies

expansionist 9–32

progressive era/presidents 60–90

industrial development 10, 13–14, 20

international agreements 129–32

isolationism 10, 14, 104–5, 121

historians on 122–3, 133–4

and the League of Nations 120–1, 122, 123

naval expansion and sea power 21–2

population growth 13

presidential election (1900) 52–3

railroads 11, 13, 108

Republicans 26, 40, 117, 121

Roosevelt Corollary (1904) 60, 66–7, 80, 88, 127

see also imperialism; Monroe Doctrine

Uruguay 124

Venezuela 66, 72, 140

and the First World War 171

and US imperialism 28

Villa, Francisco (Pancho) 83–4, 185

Virgin Islands 81

Wake Island 16–17

Washington, George 19

Washington Naval Agreements 129–30, 132, 163

Weyler, Valeriano 34–5

Wilhelm II, German Kaiser 41, 101

Wilson, Woodrow 51, 60, 61

and dollar diplomacy 79

and the First World War 101, 104, 105–6

Fourteen Points 100, 116–17, 119, 135

and the League of Nations 116, 118, 119, 120–1

and Mexico 187

and moral diplomacy 80–5, 92, 105, 106

and the presidential election (1916) 98

Women and the First World War 109

in Canada 156, 157

Yellow press 37–8, 43, 54

Young Plan 130–1, 132

Zimmermann telegram 102, 185